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INTRODUCTION

This article explores the first of four phases in the history of
U.S. legal education, lasting from the founding of the Republic
until the 1860s. 1 There has been a considerable upsurge of
1. In recognition of the revolution in U.S. legal education initiated by
Christopher Columbus Langdell during his twenty-five-year tenure as Dean at

Harvard (from 1870 until 1895), it is tempting to call this first phase the preLangdellian phase (lasting from the time of the Revolution until the 1860s).
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interest during the last few years in the history of U.S. legal
education in general, and in the history of this first phase in
particular.2 The present article is intended to contribute to this
The three remaining phases that I identify are: the phase of Langdellian legal
science (lasting from the 1870s until the 1920s); the legal realist phase (lasting
from the 1920s until the 1960s); and the postrealist and postmodernist phase
(lasting from the 1960s until the present time). These three remaining phases
are denominated by reference to the prevailing jurisprudence of the period in
question, in recognition of the influence of the prevailing jurisprudence upon
the shape and content of legal education. In keeping with this approach, the
characterization of the first phase as "pre-Langdellian" can be understood as a
reference to pre-Langdellian jurisprudence; an alternative designation might
be: the natural law phase. There is little that is original in the above
periodization. In particular, the identification of the different time periods,
and the influence of the specified jurisprudential paradigms during the period
in question, are well recognized.
2. The upsurge of interest in this first phase during the last few years will
be evident from perusing the sources cited in Part II.A of the present article.
For a very useful recent collection of articles (as well as other materials) on
the history of U.S. legal education, including the history of this first phase, see
THE HISTORY OF LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES: COMMENTARIES
AND PRIMARY SOURCES (Steve Sheppard ed., 1999) [hereinafter THE HISTORY
OF LEGAL EDUCATION]. For an earlier useful collection of materials, see THE
GLADSOME LIGHT OF JURISPRUDENCE: LEARNING THE LAW IN ENGLAND AND
THE UNITED STATES IN THE 18TH AND 19TH CENTURIES (Michael Hoeflich ed.,
1988) [hereinafter THE GLADSOME LIGHT].

The following is a list of books and articles that address (or, particularly
in the case of some of the books, that contain passages that address) general
developments in legal education or developments in particular aspects of legal
education during this first phase. The books listed are those that are cited
frequently in the present article. The articles listed are those articles cited
from the Sheppard collection, whether or not they are cited frequently. In the
case of these articles, the list gives citations to the original source if the article
has been published elsewhere, as well as references to the pages in the
Sheppard collection where the article may be found. When these articles are
cited thereafter, the citation is to the relevant pages in the Sheppard
collection.
Books frequently cited:
LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW (2d. ed. 1985).
WILLIAM LAPIANA, LOGIC & EXPERIENCE: THE ORIGINS OF MODERN
LEGAL EDUCATION (1994).
ALFRED ZANTZIGER REED, TRAINING FOR THE PUBLIC PROFESSION OF
THE LAW: HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT AND PRINCIPAL CONTEMPORARY
PROBLEMS OF LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES WITH SOME ACCOUNT
OF CONDITIONS IN ENGLAND AND CANADA (1921) [hereinafter REED I].
ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM
THE 1850S TO THE 1980S (1983).
THE HISTORY OF LEGAL EDUCATION, supra.
Articles cited from Sheppard collection:
James Barr Ames, The Vocation of the Law Professor (1901), reprinted
in 2 THE HISTORY OF LEGAL EDUCATION, supra, at 1000.
Robert Charles, Legal Education in the Late Nineteenth Century,
Through the Eyes of Theodore Roosevelt, 37 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 233 (1993),
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body

of literature

in

two

main

ways -

first, by

reprintedin 1 THE HISTORY OF LEGAL EDUCATION, supra, at 349.
Morris Cohen, Thomas Jefferson Recommends a Course of Law Study,
119 U. PA. L. REV. 823 (1971), reprinted in 1 THE HISTORY OF LEGAL
EDUCATION, supra, at 169.
Daniel R. Coquillette, Justinian in Braintree: John Adams, Civilian
Learning, and Legal Education 1758-1775, in LAW IN COLONIAL
MASSACUSETTS 1630-1800 359 (Daniel R. Coquillette ed., 1984) reprinted in 1
THE HISTORY OF LEGAL EDUCATION, supra, at 75.
Michael Hoeflich, Law and Geometry: Legal Science from Leibniz to
Langdell, 30 AM. J. LEGAL HISTORY 95, (1986) [hereinafter Hoeflich, Law and
Geometry], reprinted in 2 THE HISTORY OF LEGAL EDUCATION, supra, at 589.
Michael Hoeflich, Plus Qa Change, Plus C'est la M~me Chose: The
Integration of Theory and Practicein Legal Education,66 TEMPLE L. REV. 123
(1993) [hereinafter Hoeflich, Theory and Practice],reprinted in 2 THE HISTORY
OF LEGAL EDUCATION, supra, at 861.
Thomas Hunter, The Teaching of George Wythe [hereinafter Hunter,
George Wythe], in 1 THE HISTORY OF LEGAL EDUCATION, supra, at 138.
Thomas Hunter, The Institutionalizationof Legal Education in North
Carolina, 1790-1920 [hereinafter Hunter, Institutionalization], in 1 THE
HISTORY OF LEGAL EDUCATION, supra, at 406.
John Langbein, ChancellorKent and the History of Legal Literature, 93
COLUM. L. REV. 547 (1993), reprintedin 1 THE HISTORY OF LEGAL EDUCATION,
supra, at 207.
James Peden, The History of Law School Administration, in 2 THE
HISTORY OF LEGAL EDUCATION, supra,at 1105.
Roscoe Pound, The Work of the American Law School, 30 W. VA. L.Q. 117 (1923), reprinted in 2 THE HISTORY OF LEGAL EDUCATION, supra, at 678.
Howard Schweber, Before Langdell: The Roots of American Legal
Science, in 2 THE HISTORY OF LEGAL EDUCATION, supra, at 606.
Steve Sheppard, Casebooks, Commentaries, and Curmudgeons: An
Introductory History of Law in the Lecture Hall, 82 IOWA L. REV. 547 (1997)
[hereinafter Sheppard, Lecture Hall], reprinted in 1 THE HISTORY OF LEGAL
EDUCATION, supra, at 7.
Steve Sheppard, An Informal History of How Law Schools Evaluate
Students, with a PredictableEmphasis on Law School FinalExams, 65 UMKC
L. REV. 657 (1997) [hereinafter Sheppard, Final Exams], reprinted in 2 THE
HISTORY OF LEGAL EDUCATION, supra, at 815.
Michael Swygert and Jon Bruce, The Historical Origins,Founding,and
Early Development of Student-Edited Law Reviews, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 739
(1985), reprinted in 2 THE HISTORY OF LEGAL EDUCATION, supra, at 966.
Among the above sources the articles by Ames and Pound are
interesting for the additional reason that they also briefly survey earlier
developments in the history of legal education. Pound's article discusses the
history of Roman, European, and English legal education, while Ames' article
focuses on English legal education. Pound, supra, at 682-85; Ames, supra, at
1000-03. For further discussion of the history of Roman, European, and
English legal education in Sheppard's collection, see David Hoffman, A
Lecture, Introductory to a Course of Lectures, (1823) [hereinafter Introductory
Lecture], reprinted in THE HISTORY OF LEGAL EDUCATION, supra, at 291-96,
and Theodore Dwight, InauguralAddress: Our Municipal Law and the Best
Mode of Acquiring a Knowledge of It [hereinafter Inaugural Address],
reprinted in THE HISTORY OF LEGAL EDUCATION, at 339 n. 26. For a more
extensive treatment addressing the history of European and English legal
education, see REED I, supra, at 11-24, 107-10.
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undertaking in Part II a study that considers and builds upon the
results of much of the scholarship within the corpus, and that
hopefully will be both of intrinsic historical interest and of use for
a number of different purposes; and second, by suggesting in
Part III how the results of this study can be used for one
particular purpose - namely, to illuminate the curricular
concerns and related professionalism concerns that are articulated
there, and to support a call for the "liberalization" of legal
education in an effort to address these concerns
Part I of the article briefly summarizes some of the more
important developments in the general history and legal history of
the period in order to provide a broader historical context, and
reference, for the subsequent discussion. Part II then undertakes
the exploration of U.S. legal education itself. Section A provides
an overview of the various settings - apprenticeship training,
independent law school programs, and college/university law
programs - in which a student could receive some type of formal
legal education during this first phase.
The overview first
considers various general matters relevant to an understanding of
these formal legal education settings, such as the extent to which
acquisition of a formal legal education was (or was not) a
requirement for the practice of law and the nature of the general
college education that many students received before beginning
their formal legal education.
It then provides a general
description of each of the formal legal education settings in turn,
also discussing such matters as the types of curricula that were
followed and the types of pedagogical methods that were used in
these settings, and it addresses as well the significant legal
literature of the period, in particular the works of Blackstone,
Kent, and Story that were typically part of a formal legal
education.
The shape and content of a formal legal education appear to
have been influenced, at least in part, by various jurisprudential
ideas and by a particular professional ideal. Section B of Part II
first discusses the jurisprudential ideas that appear to have
prevailed for most of the period, examining such elements as: the
nature of the common law tradition; the nature of common law
reason in classical common law thought; three related notions that
represent some further ways in which the common law was
conceptualized in classical common law thought; the character of
associated natural law thinking; the emergence of a new,
instrumentalist conception of law, particularly during the second
part of the period; and, early American legal science. Section B
then discusses the professional ideal - the ideal of the lawyerstatesman, with its emphasis upon the twin virtues of practical
wisdom and devotion to the public good - that was closely
associated with certain of these jurisprudential elements and that
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also appears to have prevailed for much or most of the period. In
particular, it examines the various claims made by Anthony
Kronman and Robert Gordon regarding the nature of this ideal
and its influence during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries, and considers the extent to which these claims are
consistent with claims made by other scholars writing about the
prevailing political philosophy of the period. The discussion in
Section B also considers how students would have been exposed to
the prevailing jurisprudential ideas and the prevailing professional ideal during their formal legal education.
Drawing upon the discussion of formal legal education
settings and significant legal literature in Section A, and the
discussion of the prevailing jurisprudence and prevailing
professional ideal in Section B, Section C of Part II undertakes a
more detailed, and comparative, analysis and evaluation of the
breadth of coverage provided by the curricula of studies followed in
these various settings. In order to facilitate this comparative
analysis and evaluation, the "subjects" within the curricula are
organized into various categories, using for this purpose a
taxonomic schema, developed in an earlier article, that identifies
six sets of "fundamental dimensions of law": the substantive
dimensions of law, the structural dimensions of law, the practical
dimensions of law, the social dimensions of law, the cultural
dimensions of law, and the transnational dimensions of law.3
Section C finds that many of the curricula in the apprenticeship
and college/university law program settings displayed a striking
breadth of coverage, especially through their emphasis upon the
cultural and transnational dimensions of law. Moreover, if the
exposure received during a prior college education (or its
equivalent) is also taken into account, there was a remarkable
emphasis upon a broad education for lawyers (including an
emphasis upon the social dimensions of law) in all formal legal
education settings. Section C concludes that this emphasis upon a
broad education for lawyers may have reflected, in particular, the
influence of the natural law and legal science elements in the
prevailing jurisprudence, as well as the influence of the prevailing
professional ideal of the lawyer-statesman and the political
philosophy of civic republicanism underpinning that ideal.
Following this exploration of the formal legal education of the
period, Part III outlines a descriptive claim and a normative
argument that will be developed further in subsequent articles.
Descriptively, Part III contends that a general narrowing of the
law school curriculum that occurred after this first phase resulted
3. Mark L. Jones, Fundamental Dimensions of Law and Legal Education:
A Theoretical Framework, 26 OKL. CIT. UNIV. L. REV. 547 (2001). For an
explanation of these terms in the present article, see infra notes 444-449 and

accompanying text.
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in a marginalization within the mainstream law school curriculum
of courses in the areas of legal history, jurisprudence, and
comparative law, and of courses in the general subject areas of
international/transnational/global
legal studies - a marginalization of courses, in other words, that address the cultural and
transnational dimensions of law. Normatively, Part III contends
that this marginalization, which in fact continues today (although
appearances may lead one to suppose otherwise), raises important
professionalism concerns because it diminishes the ability of law
school graduates to perform in an optimally competent, effective
and responsible manner in the various types of roles they will
perform both as practicing members of the legal profession and as
leaders in society. The continued failure to ensure that all law
students receive a basic minimum exposure to the general subject
areas of legal history, jurisprudence, and comparative law, as well
as to the general subject areas of international/transnational/global legal studies, should be redressed by restoring the
cultural and transnational dimensions of law to a central place in
the mainstream law school curriculum, just as they were accorded
a central place in much of the legal education during the first
phase. In effect, this represents a call for the "liberalization," or
perhaps more accurately for the "reliberalization," of U.S. legal
education.
With respect to matters of format, the article is heavily
footnoted, particularly in Part II. This is because, consistent with
my usual practice, secondary discussion elaborating on points in
the text has been placed in the notes, so as not to distract
unnecessarily those readers who are interested only in the main
outlines of this account of the history of U.S. legal education
during its first phase.
I.

BROADER HISTORICAL CONTEXT

In order to provide a broader historical context and reference
for the subsequent discussion, Section A of this first part of the
article summarizes some of the more important and relevant
developments in the general history (i.e., the political, economic
and social history) of the period, and Section B does the same for
the legal history of the period.
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GeneralHistory4

The American Revolution lasted from April 1775 (when
hostilities broke out with Britain) until September 1783 (when
Britain and the United States signed the Treaty of Paris).' One of
the significant political events of the Revolution was, of course, the
adoption of the Declaration of Independence on July 4, 1776.6
Another was the adoption of the Articles of Confederation, which
somewhat strengthened the powers of the central Congress and
came into effect in March 1781.' During the next few years, the
remaining weaknesses of the Confederation became evident.8
Delegates from all thirteen states met in Philadelphia in 1787,
therefore, for the purpose of revising the Articles, but ended up
producing an entirely new document, the United States
Constitution, instead.9
The Constitution was ratified by the
4. In preparing this summary account of the general history of the period,
I have relied upon three main sources: JOAN GUNDERSEN AND MARSHALL
SMELSER, AMERICAN HISTORY AT A GLANCE 33-130 (5th ed. 1994); THE
READER'S COMPANION TO AMERICAN HISTORY (Eric Foner and John Garraty
eds., 1991); and, STEPHEN FELDMAN, AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT FROM PRE-

MODERNISM TO POST-MODERNISM: AN INTELLECTUAL VOYAGE 57-74, 83-91
(2000).
For a useful summary of the main developments in the general history
of the period, which was published after preparation of the present summary
in this subsection, see the entry for "History of the United States" in THE NEW
YORK TIMES GUIDE TO ESSENTIAL KNOWLEDGE 275-83 (John Wright ed., 2004)
[hereinafter ESSENTIAL KNOWLEDGE]. See also id. at 258-60 (the American
Revolution (1775-83)); id. at 261-65 (the American Civil War (1861-65)). For a
useful summary of the main developments in the general history of the
colonial period, see id. at 272-75. See also id. at 258 (the Seven Years War
(1756-63)).
5. GUNDERSEN AND SMELSER, supra note 4, at 27, 30; THE READER'S
COMPANION TO AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 4, at 939, 942. For the text of
the Treaty of Paris, see WE THE PEOPLE: GREAT DOCUMENTS OF THE
AMERICAN NATION 27-29 (Jerome Agel ed., 1997) [hereinafter GREAT
DOCUMENTS].
6. See GUNDERSEN AND SMELSER, supra note 4, at 28; THE READER'S
COMPANION TO AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 4, at 271-72. For the text of
the Declaration of Independence, see GREAT DOCUMENTS, supra note 5, at 1720.
7. See THE READER'S COMPANION TO AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 4, at
53-55; see also GUNDERSEN AND SMELSER, supra note 4, at 32. For the text,
and short analysis, of the Articles of Confederation, see GREAT DOCUMENTS,
supra note 5, at 21-26.
8. See GUNDERSEN AND SMELSER, supra note 4, at 33-37, together with
THE READER'S COMPANION TO AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 4, at 831
(identifying foreign trade, currency issues, public finance, foreign relations,
Indian relations, boundary disputes between states, and state restrictions on
intersate commerce as problem areas)
9. See GUNDERSEN AND SMELSER, supra note 4, at 37-40; THE READER'S
COMPANION TO AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 4, at 831-33. For the text of
the U.S. Constitution, see GREAT DOCUMENTS, supra note 5, at 36-44. For
further discussion of the Constitution, see infra note 42 and accompanying
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requisite number of states by mid-1788 but only after spirited
debate between the Antifederalists,
who regarded
the
centralization effected by the Constitution as a threat to American
liberty and the gains of the Revolution, and the Federalists, who
regarded the Constitution as essential to their preservation.' ° A
Bill of Rights, in the form of the first ten Amendments to the
Constitution, was adopted in 1789-1791 to respond to one of the
major concerns of the Antifederalists as well as the
recommendations of several of the ratifying states."
Following ratification of the Constitution in 1788, the new
federal government was established." George Washington was
elected President in 1788, and again in 1792, each time
unanimously." During Washington's presidency, "the Federalist
consensus" behind him disintegrated, a process fueled initially
because Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson and Congressman
James Madison were opposed to Treasury Secretary Alexander
Hamilton's financial program for the new nation." This process
resulted in the emergence of two political parties - the
Jeffersonian Republicans, led by Jefferson and Madison, and the
Federalists, led by Hamilton and John Adams." The differences
between them were stark. Thus, "the Federalists preferred a
stronger national government focusing on stable finances and
aggressive
commercial
practices,
while
the Jeffersonian
Republicans favored state governmental power and agrarian
pursuits. " "6 Moreover, the Federalists' "civic republican elitism,"
founded on their belief in "[tihe superior political talents of a
natural aristocracy," stood in contrast to the Republicans' stress on
"a more democratic popular sovereignty" and the value of "common
virtue." 7 The presidential election of 1796 was won by Adams, but

text.
10. See THE READER'S COMPANION TO AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 4, at
912-14. See also id. at 39-40, 387, together with GUNDERSEN AND SMELSER,
supra note 4, at 40-42 (discussing further the Antifederalist and the Federalist
Papers urging ratification of the Constitution).
11. See THE READER'S COMPANION TO AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 4, at
97-99, 913-14; see also GUNDERSEN AND SMELSER, supra note 4, at 43-44. For
the text of the Bill of Rights, see GREAT DOCUMENTS, supra note 5, at 45-46.
For further discussion of the Bill of Rights, see infra note 43 and
accompanying text.
12. See GUNDERSEN AND SMELSER, supra note 4, at 43-44.
13. Id. at 43, 49.
14. See FELDMAN, supra note 4, at 68, together with GUNDERSEN AND
SMELSER, supra note 4, at 45, and THE READER'S COMPANION TO AMERICAN
HISTORY, supra note 4, at 388.
15. See FELDMAN, supra note 4, at 68, together with GUNDERSEN AND
SMELSER, supra note 4, at 45-47.
16. FELDMAN, supra note 4, at 68; see also GUNDERSEN AND SMELSER,
supra note 4, at 45.
17. See FELDMAN, supra note 4, at 68, together with GUNDERSEN AND

1050

The John MarshallLaw Review

[39:1041

Jefferson defeated Adams in the election of 1800, ushering in a
period of internal stability during which the Jeffersonian
Republicans (known as the Democratic-Republicans by 1816) held
the Presidency for twenty-five years (Jefferson himself being reelected in 1804, Madison being elected in 1808 and 1812, and
James Monroe in 1816 and 1820), with the Federalist Party fading
away as an institution by 1820.1" During this time, too, democratic
populism increased, and by 1825 all but three states had
eliminated property requirements for voting, thereby extending
the franchise to all adult white males.1 9
Although all the major candidates in the presidential election
of 1824, including Andrew Jackson, were nominally DemocraticRepublicans, the election of John Quincy Adams represents a
crucial turning point in the political history of the period.2' After
the election, the Democratic-Republican Party divided into two
factions: the National Republicans, led by Adams and Henry Clay,
and the Democratic-Republicans, led by Jackson.2'
Whereas
Adams and Clay represented a continuation of Federalist economic
and political thinking, Jackson's impulses were profoundly
democratic and populist. 2
Supported by western farmers,
southern planters and eastern laborers, Jackson won the next two
presidential elections, in 1828 and 1832, and Martin Van Buren
(Jackson's Vice-President during his second term) won the election
in 1836.2
Widely seen as "a champion of the common man," Jackson
was the symbol of "a democratic upheaval," a "second American
Revolution," that "was not only political but also social,
For example, the era of
intellectual, and humanitarian.
SMELSER, supra note 4, at 44.
18. See GUNDERSEN AND SMELSER, supra note 4, at 49-53, 59-60, 62, 64, 68,
together with FELDMAN, supra note 4, at 69.
19. FELDMAN, supra note 4, at 69-70; see also GUNDERSEN AND SMELSER,
supra note 4, at 71; THE READER'S COMPANION TO AMERICAN HISTORY, supra

note 4, at 1044-45. However, between 1790 and 1860, almost every state
disenfranchised free blacks, and black male suffrage was recognized nationally
only in 1870 with the adoption of the Fifteenth Amendment; women, also,
were ineligible to vote, and indeed remained so until the Nineteenth
Amendment was adopted in 1920. See id. at 1045-46; see also FELDMAN, supra
note 4, at 71 (discussing the evolution of social hierarchies in America,
particularly after the 1830s).
20. See GUNDERSEN AND SMELSER, supra note 4, at 70-72.

21. Id.
22. See id., together with THE READER'S COMPANION TO AMERICAN
HISTORY, supra note 4, at 9-10 (Adams), id. at 190-91 (Clay), and id. at 581-82
(Jackson). As pointed out in THE READER'S COMPANION TO AMERICAN

HISTORY, Jackson's vision of democracy was nevertheless limited: it did not
extend to black slaves or Native Americans. Id. at 580, 582. Nor, of course, did
it extend to women.
23. See GUNDERSEN AND SMELSER, supra note 4, at 70, 72, 75-76.

24. See id. at 70, together with THE READER'S COMPANION TO AMERICAN
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"Jacksonian Democracy" saw the development of mass politics,
attacks on financial and business power and privilege, the
beginnings of the labor movement, and the development of various
social reform movements (such as the abolitionist, temperance,
public education, feminist, and prison reform movements). 5 With
the election of William Henry Harrison in 1840, the Presidency
passed from the Democrats (as Jackson's Democratic Republicans
had come to be called during his tenure as President) to the Whig
Party (formed in 1834 from the National Republican opposition),
although Harrison himself died in 1841 after taking office and was
succeeded by Vice-President John Tyler." Following defeat of the
Whig Party candidate Henry Clay by the Democratic candidate
James Polk in the 1844 election, the Whig Party, which is difficult
to characterize due to its heterogeneous nature, regained the
Presidency in 1848 with the election of Zachary Taylor (Taylor
being succeeded by Milton Fillmore following Taylor's death in
1850), but lost it again to the Democrats in 1852 with the election
of Franklin Pierce.27
From the mid-1840s on, the issue of Southern slavery, in
particular the issue of its extension into the western territories,
became increasingly divisive and began to dominate national
politics. The Missouri Compromise of 1820 had sought to resolve
an earlier crisis over this issue, with respect to the land west of
the Mississippi River that had been included in the 1803
Louisiana Purchase, by providing that, except for Missouri, any
states created from the purchase land north of 360 30' must be free
states' (the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 had already prohibited
slavery in the land east of the Mississippi River and north of the

HISTORY, supra note 4, at 580.
25. See GUNDERSEN AND SMELSER, supra note 4, at 74-76, 79-81, together
with THE READER'S COMPANION TO AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 4, at 580,

582-84; see also FELDMAN, supra note 4, at 70 (discussing mass politics and
reporting that, "between 1824 and 1840, the population grew 57 percent, but
the number of eligible voters casting a ballot in the presidential election in
those years increased 700 percent").
26. See GUNDERSEN AND SMELSER, supra note 4, at 78-79, 93, together with
THE READER'S COMPANION TO AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 4, at 1146, and
HUGH BROGAN, THE PENGUIN HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
281-82 (1985).
27. See GUNDERSEN AND SMELSER, supra note 4, at 93-94, 96-97, 99,
together with THE READER'S COMPANION TO AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 4,
at 1146-47.
28. See GUNDERSEN AND SMELSER, supra note 4, at 55, 67-68. For an
account of the Louisiana Purchase, in which France sold the United States
most of the land lying between the Mississippi River and the Rocky

Mountains, see id. at 55-57, and THE READER'S COMPANION TO AMERICAN
HISTORY, supra note 4, at 681-82. For extracts from the text of the Louisiana
Purchase, see GREAT DOCUMENTS, supra note 5, at 80-83. For the text of the
Missouri Compromise, see id. at 90-91.
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Ohio River that was part of the land acquired from Britain under
the Treaty of Paris in 1783)."9 Another compromise, in 1850,
sought to resolve a second crisis over the issue, this time with
respect to the land extending from Texas to California that had
been won from Mexico in the 1846-47 Mexican War."0 The third
crisis, precipitated in 1854 when Congress created two territories
(Kansas and Nebraska) from land included in the Louisiana
Purchase on terms that undid the Missouri Compromise, resulted
in "the greatest partisan realignment in American history" as
those Democrats and Whigs opposed to the further extension of
slavery into the territories founded the Republican party, and
those Democrats and Whigs more tolerant of such extension
united as Democrats. 3'
Against the background of this realignment and various other
events connected to the slavery issue, the Democrats won the
Presidency in 1856 with the election of James Buchanan, but lost
it to the Republicans in 1860 with the election of Abraham
Lincoln. 32 Feeling their profound economic, social and philosophical differences with the northern states (which were also
economically aligned with the northwestern states), and fearing a
loss of political power and a threat to their way of life, the
southern states seceded from the Union in 1861, precipitating the
Civil War that lasted until 1865. 33 Lincoln, who had been reelected in the 1864 election as the candidate of the Union party
(formed from the merger of the Republicans and "War
Democrats"), was succeeded by Vice-President Andrew Johnson
following his assassination a few days after the South
surrendered.34 During Johnson's presidency and the presidency of
Republican Ulysses S. Grant (who was elected in 1868 and again
in 1872), the South underwent a process of "reconstruction" by the
North, and although reconstruction ended in 1877, it left a bitter
legacy for future relations between the two sections.35
The period was marked by several long-term trends, many of
which are reflected in the preceding discussion. Along with the
dramatic geographical expansion of United States territory, which
extended from the Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific Ocean by the end
of the period and from which twenty new states had been created
29. See THE READER'S COMPANION TO AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 4, at
796, 823; see also GUNDERSEN AND SMELSER, supra note 4, at 34. For the text
of the Northwest Ordinance, see GREAT DOCUMENTS, supra note 5, at 73-77.
30. See GUNDERSEN AND SMELSER, supra note 4, at 94-99.
31. Id. at 101-02.
32. See id. at 102-07.
33. See id. at 82-90, 108-15, together with THE READER'S COMPANION TO
AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 4, at 182-85.
34. GUNDERSEN AND SMELSER, supra note 4, at 115-16.
35. See id. at 119-29; THE READER'S COMPANION TO AMERICAN HISTORY,
supra note 4, at 917-24.
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by 1860, and twenty-four by 1870 (most after having passed
through the stage of territorial self-government),36 there was also:
a dramatic increase in population, from 5.3 million in 1800 to 31.4
million in 1860, and about 40 million by 1870 (some of that
increase being due, particularly after 1820, to higher levels of
immigration);" a westward movement of population (resulting in
conflict with, and the displacement of, American Indians);38 and
the rapid growth of a transportation infrastructure (with the
development of roads, steamboats, canals and railroads).3 9 The
economy also grew, correspondingly, with the expansion of trade
and commerce, together with finance capitalism, and the
development of a national market in which the North became
increasingly centered on industrial manufacturing (especially
textiles and iron), the South on plantation agriculture (especially
cotton), and the West on various other types of agricultural
production (especially grain and livestock).4 ° In addition, the
resulting expansion of economic opportunity and the growth of
political democracy (at least for white males), together with the
renewal of Protestant Christianity in a more populist form
following the Second Great Awakening in the late 1820s and 1830s
(which was also linked with the various social reform movements),
manifested a developing ethos of egalitarian individualism.4'
36. See THE READER'S COMPANION TO AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 4, at
366, 368, and 1625-27, together with GUNDERSEN AND SMELSER, supra note 4,
at 56 and 63 (for relevant maps and tables), and BROGAN, supra note 26, at
198 (discussing the different stages in the political organization of new
territorial acquisitions).
37. See THE READER'S COMPANION TO AMERICAN HISTORY at 855
(presenting table of population statistics), together with STEPHEN LEGOMSKY,
IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAw AND POLICY 23-24 (4th ed. 2005) (presenting
tables of immigration statistics); see also GUNDERSEN AND SMELSER, supra
note 4, at 31, 82 (discussing population increases and population distributions).
38. See THE READER'S COMPANION TO AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 4, at
552-59, together with GUNDERSEN AND SMELSER, supra note 4, at 61, 92.
39. See GUNDERSEN AND SMELSER, supra note 4, at 61, 82-83; THE
READER'S COMPANION TO AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 4, at 1084-85.
40. See THE READER'S COMPANION TO AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 4, at
19-20, 240-41, 560, 1085, together with GUNDERSEN AND SMELSER, supra note
4, at 83-86, and FELDMAN, supra note 4, at 67-68.
41. See FELDMAN, supra note 4, at 65-71, together with THE READER'S
COMPANION TO AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 4, at 363, 928, 975.
Of particular interest for the subsequent exploration of the prevailing
jurisprudence and the prevailing professional ideal of the period and their
impact on legal education, undertaken in Part II.B of this article, is Feldman's
explication of the complexity of the general historical situation as it bears on
jurisprudential thought. Thus, Feldman contends that the kinds of "modernist
forces" in the economic, political, and religious spheres identified in the
preceding discussion of long-term trends were opposed both by certain
economic and political forces that "seem[ed] to delay the advance of
modernism," as well as by various political and religious factors that "seemed
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B. Legal History
During this period, there were fundamental developments in
the area of public law, such as: the adoption of the U.S.
Constitution42 and the Bill of Rights;' the creation of a federal
court structure by the Judiciary Act of 1789;" the landmark
decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court under Chief Justice Marshall
establishing the superior legal authority of the national
government over the states and the principle of judicial review of

to nurture persistent premodern views" and that, paradoxically, resulted from
some of the same modernizing forces in those spheres. FELDMAN, supra note
4, at 71-74. Feldman considers that, as a result, American jurisprudential
thought retained its premodern character until the Civil War era, in particular
due to its continuing commitment to natural law thinking. Id. at 74.
The modernizing forces were sufficiently strong, however, to precipitate
a change from a first, to a second stage of premodern jurisprudential thought
by about 1820. Id. The first stage was characterized by the prevalence of a
cyclical view of history in which change was generally seen as evidencing
decay and deterioration; the second stage, by contrast, was characterized by
an altered viewpoint in which change (such as the expansion of territory and
population, and the improvements in transportation and communication
brought about by science and technology) was seen as indicative of progress,
but in which jurisprudents understood progress in eschatological terms as
.movement toward the realization of eternal and universal principles," this
alteration in viewpoint being reflected in changes both in natural law thinking
and in American conceptions of government. See id. at 58, 61-65, 74-75, 79-80;
see also id. at 11-15 (discussing first and second stage premodern Western
thought in general); infra notes 258-61 and accompanying text (discussing
natural law thinking); infra notes 381-87 and accompanying text (discussing
American conceptions of government).
42. The Constitution, of course, enumerates powers of the U.S. government,
and distributes those powers among three distinct branches - the legislative
branch (i.e., the Congress, consisting of a House of Representatives and a
Senate), the executive branch (i.e., the President), and the judicial branch (i.e.,
the Supreme Court and any lower courts established by Congress) - in such a
way that most of the powers of each branch are checked and balanced by
powers granted to the other two branches. For a useful analysis of these and
other features of the U.S. Constitution, see, for example, ESSENTIAL
KNOWLEDGE, supra note 4, at 313-27. For a useful list of the main checks and
balances among the three branches of the U.S. government, see KENNETH
DAVIS, DON'T KNOW MUCH ABOUT HISTORY 118-19 (2003).
43. The Bill of Rights, of course, constrains the powers of the U.S.
government and protects the liberties of the people in specific ways (the first
eight Amendments), recognizes the potential existence of other nonenumerated rights of the people (the Ninth Amendment), and explicitly
reserves to the states or to the people those powers not delegated to the United
States or prohibited to the states by the Constitution (the Tenth Amendment).
For a useful analysis of the Bill of Rights, see, for example, ESSENTIAL
KNOWLEDGE, supra note 4, at 327-31.
44. See THE READER'S COMPANION TO AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 4, at

607-08. For extracts from the text of the Judiciary Act of 1789, see GREAT
DOCUMENTS, supra note 5, at 64-65; for the full text see JUDICIARY ACT OF
1789, ch. 20, 1 stat. 73.
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acts of Congress; 5 and the enactment of the Reconstruction Acts
and adoption of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth
Amendments.'6 In addition, several other legal developments are
relevant to the subsequent discussion.
E. Allan Farnsworth provides a very useful overview of
several of the most important developments that will suffice for
present purposes. 7 Farnsworth explains that during the
eighteenth century, prior to the Revolution, there had already
been a considerable increase in the influence of English law, in the
number of trained lawyers, and in the availability of English law
books, including William Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws
of England.' He then continues:
45. For a discussion of these and other important decisions of the Supreme
Court under Chief Justice John Marshall (who held the position of Chief
Justice from 1801 until 1835) see GUNDERSEN AND SMELSER, supra note 4, at
64-65, and THE READER'S COMPANION TO AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 4, at

703-04, 1050-51. For a discussion of the Court under Chief Justice Roger
Taney (1836-64), including a discussion of the notorious 1857 Dred Scott case
(in which Taney ruled that even free blacks were not citizens, and that
Congress lacked authority to prevent the expansion of slavery into the new
territories), see THE READER'S COMPANION TO AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note
4, at 1051, 1058. For a discussion of the Court under Taney's successor
Salmon Chase (1864-73), see id. at 648-49, 1051. For further discussion of the
Dred Scott case, see id. at 295-96; GUNDERSEN AND SMELSER, supra note 4, at
105.
46. See GUNDERSEN AND SMELSER, supra note 4, at 121-23, together with
THE READER'S COMPANION TO AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 4, at 352, 919-

20. For a useful analysis of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments
(adopted in 1868 and 1870 respectively), see ESSENTIAL KNOWLEDGE, supra
note 4, at 332-33. For a useful analysis of the Thirteenth Amendment
abolishing slavery (adopted in 1865), see id. at 331-32. Lastly, for a useful
analysis of the other Amendments adopted earlier during this period, the
Eleventh Amendment (adopted in 1798) and the Twelth Amendment (adopted
in 1804), see id. at 331.
47. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM
OF THE UNITED STATES 8-10 (3d ed. 1996).
48. Id. at 8. For Farnsworth's discussion of the situation during the early
colonial period, before the eighteenth century, see id. at 6-8.
With respect to Blackstone's COMMENTARIES, Farnsworth explains that
the COMMENTARIES were "widely read," and "it has been said that, by the time
of the Revolution ... [they] had sold nearly as many copies in America as in
England." Id. at 8. William Blackstone began lecturing on the common law at
Oxford University in England in 1753, and was appointed to the newly created
Vinerian professorship in English law in 1758; before Blackstone, no lectures
on the common law (as opposed to the civil law) had ever been offered at an
English university. See id. at 8 n.9, together with Lecture Hall, supra note 2,
at 12. Blackstone put his lectures into publishable form and the resulting
four-volume COMMENTARIES on the Laws of England were published by the
Clarendon Press at Oxford University between 1765 and 1769. Lecture Hall,
supra note 2, at 12. Blackstone's COMMENTARIES were first printed in
America in 1771, although many Americans had already bought copies of
English editions. See id. (referencing WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (Philadelphia, R. Bell 1771)). For further
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By the time of the Revolution English law had come to be generally
well regarded and each colony had a bar of trained, able, and
respected professionals, capable of working with a refined and
technical system. The colonial legal profession, especially in the
cities, had achieved both social standing and economic success. It
was also politically active: twenty-five of the fifty-six signers of the
Declaration of Independence were lawyers. 49
Farnsworth explains further that the thirteen original states (and
also the additional states subsequently created from the western
territories) formally "received" English law into their legal systems
as that law existed prior to a specified date, either by enactment
(constitution or statute) or by judicial decision alone. ° However, a
state is not bound by developments in English law occurring after
the specified date of reception.5 " Farnsworth then completes his
discussion of the status of English law in the new states, and
describes subsequent developments during our period, as follows:
The Revolution resulted in a setback to the influence of English law
in some of the new states because of political antipathy. In a few,
anti-British sentiment was implemented by statutes prohibiting the
citation of English decisions handed down after independence. At
the same time the quality of the practicing bar as a whole
declined .... 52 There was not even an adequate body of American
case law that could be used by those judges who had the ability and
inclination to do so. Although reports of cases began to be published
at the end of the eighteenth century, they were few in number. The
opportunity for broadening the base of American law was
considerable. There was some inclination to look to French and
Roman law, and European writers were cited, particularly in the
fields of commercial law and conflict of laws where English treatises
were inadequate. But few judges were versed in modem foreign

discussion of Blackstone's COMMENTARIES, see infra notes 53, 103, 175-86 and
191-93 and accompanying text.
49. FARNSWORTH, supra note 47, at 8.
50. Id. at 9.
51. Id.
52. Id. Farnsworth elaborates upon this point as follows:
Some lawyers, who had been loyalists, had left the country before the
end of the war; others, seizing the opportunity for leadership, accepted
political or judicial posts under the new government. The standards and
repute of the remainder deteriorated in many communities. The era of
the lay judge was not entirely over and during the early nineteenth
century the state of Rhode Island had a farmer as chief justice and a
blacksmith as a member of its highest court.
Id. For further discussion of the varying types and quality of judges and
lawyers during our period, see, for example, FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 30314, 633-48 (lawyers), and at 124-38, 371-81 (judges). In a comment that
provides a useful perspective on the matters discussed in Part II.B.2 of this
article (addressing the professional ideal that prevailed for much of the
period), Friedman observes that "[tihe Eastern and Southern statesmanlawyer was a far cry from the dusty rider of the plains." Id. at 310.
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languages and, while English treatises and reports were available,
the Code Napolgon did not appear until after the beginning of the
nineteenth century.
Blackstone's Commentaries, which was
available in American editions
throughout the nineteenth century,
3
was particularly influential.
During the first part of the nineteenth century, agriculture and
trade dominated the economy as energies went into the westward
expansion and the production of staples for European markets.
Judges labored to shape English legal materials to fit the conditions
of their particular jurisdictions.
They examined the preRevolutionary English law to determine its applicability to
American conditions and laid the foundations of such fields as
contracts, torts, sale of goods, real property, and conflict of laws.
There was constant legislative intervention in such areas as
procedure, criminal law, marriage and divorce, descent and
distribution, wills and administration of estates.M Sometimes the
law grew out of local usages or needs ....5 But it was also an era
of great "national" treatises such as James Kent's Commentaries on
American Law, published from 1826 to 1830, 56 and nine works by

53. For a discussion of these American editions, see Sheppard, Lecture Hall,
supra note 2, at 12 ("Blackstone's own editions were not the sole basis for his
enduring fame and influence on American legal education. For the next five
decades [after 1771] scores of annotated COMMENTARIES poured forth.
Various authors annotated Blackstone's original text with the newly written
law of England and, more particularly, of the American courts"); id. at 12 n.56
("Of the many American editions of Blackstone, three seem to have had the
greatest academic influence: St. George Tucker's in 1803, Sharswood's in 1859,
and Cooley's in 1870"). For discussion of Blackstone's original text, see supra
note 48 and accompanying text and infra notes 178-84 and accompanying text.
For further discussion of St. George Tucker's 1803 American edition of
Blackstone's COMMENTARIES, see infra notes 103, 118, 185-86 and
accompanying text. For further discussion of the legal literature of the period,
see the references cited infra note 176.
54. FARNSWORTH, supra note 47, at 10. For an in-depth discussion of
developments in all the different fields and areas of law during our period, see
FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 107-56, 177-302, 391-605.
55. FARNSWORTH, supra note 47, at 10. Farnsworth elaborates upon this
point as follows:
The customs of western farmers and gold miners formed the basis for
water and mining law in some of the western states. Some of the prairie
states where cattle-raising was the means of livelihood and wood for
fences was scarce, changed the English rule that the owner of cattle is
liable without fault for damage that they may cause to a neighboring
crop-owner.
Id.
56. Id. Farnsworth includes the following biographical note on James
Kent:
James Kent (1763-1847) became the first professor of law at Columbia
College in 1793. He resigned in 1798 to go on the New York Supreme
Court and was appointed Chancellor of the state in 1814. Upon his
retirement in 1823 he returned to Columbia, and during this period he
published his Commentaries on American Law, a collection of his
lectures dealing with nearly all phases of contemporary substantive law.
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Joseph Story published from 1832 to 1845. 57 These treatises, which
went through many revisions, played an important role in
promoting uniformity by helping to counter the forces which
contributed to diversity.5

Id. at 10 n.11; see JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW (Da Capo

Press 1971) (1826-1830). For further discussion of Kent's COMMENTARIES, see
infra notes 104, 120, 175-77, 187-93 and accompanying text. For further
discussion of Kent's law program at Columbia, see infra notes 120, 125, 130-32
and accompanying text.
57. FARNSWORTH, supra note 47, at 10. Farnsworth includes the following
biographical note on Joseph Story:
Joseph Story (1779-1845) was appointed to the United States Supreme
Court in 1811. In 1829, while retaining his seat on the Court, he
became a professor of law at the Harvard Law School, where he
reorganized the curriculum and revitalized the school. His nine
commentaries developed from his lectures on subjects ranging from the
Constitution to conflict of laws.
Id. at n.12. Sheppard, Lecture Hall, supra note 2, at 17 n.157, gives the
following citations for Story's nine Commentaries: COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: WITH A PRELIMINARY REVIEW OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE COLONIES AND STATES, BEFORE THE
ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION (Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co., 1833);
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICTS OF LAWS, FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC: IN
REGARD TO CONTRACTS, RIGHTS, AND REMEDIES AND ESPECIALLY IN REGARD
TO MARRIAGES, DIVORCES, WILLS, SUCCESSIONS, AND JUDGMENTS (Boston,
Hilliard, Gray & Co., 1834); COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE: As
ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA (Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co.,
1836); COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY PLEADINGS, AND THE INCIDENTS THEREOF:
ACCORDING TO THE PRACTICE OF COURTS OF EQUITY, OF ENGLAND AND
AMERICA (Boston, Little & Brown, 2d. ed. 1840); COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW
OF AGENCY: AS A [BRANCH] OF COMMERCIAL & MARITIME JURISPRUDENCE,
WITH OCCASIONAL ILLUSTRATIONS FROM THE CIVIL AND FOREIGN LAW (Boston,
Little & Brown, 1839); COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF BAILMENTS: WITH
ILLUSTRATIONS FROM THE CIL AND FOREIGN LAW (Cambridge, Hilliard &
Brown, 1832); COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF BILLS OF EXCHANGE, FOREIGN
AND INLAND, AS ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA: WITH OCCASIONAL
ILLUSTRATIONS FROM THE COMMERCIAL LAW OF THE NATIONS OF
CONTINENTAL EUROPE (Boston, Little & Brown, 1843); COMMENTARIES ON
THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP: AS A BRANCH OF COMMERCIAL AND MARITIME
JURISPRUDENCE, WITH OCCASIONAL ILLUSTRATIONS FROM THE CIVIL AND
FOREIGN LAW (Boston, Little & Brown, 1841); COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF
PROMISSORY NOTES, AND GUARANTIES OF NOTES AND CHECKS ON BANKS AND
BANKERS: WITH OCCASIONAL ILLUSTRATIONS FROM THE COMMERCIAL LAW OF
THE NATIONS OF CONTINENTAL EUROPE (Boston, Little & Brown, 1845).
For further discussion of Story's series of treatises, see infra notes 17577, 194-97 and accompanying text. For further discussion of the law programs
at Harvard Law School under Story, see infra notes 144-57, 167-68 and
accompanying text.
58. FARNSWORTH, supra note 47, at 10. Farnsworth concludes his overview
of legal developments during the first half of the nineteenth century by
observing that "[olut of the first half of the century came institutions and
procedures that still survive. But the functions they now perform and the
issues they now deal with often differ from those of the earlier formative
period." Id. He then notes that "[tlhe years of the Civil War, 1861 to 1865,
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In the above passage, Farnsworth singles out Blackstone's
Commentaries, Kent's Commentaries, and Story's series of
treatises as being especially important within the legal literature
of the period. Perhaps unsurprisingly then, as we shall see in Part
II below, these works also played a central role in the legal
education of the period.
II. LEGAL EDUCATION DURING THE FIRST PHASE
Before embarking upon our exploration of U.S. legal
education during this first phase, it may be helpful to indicate how
the various sections in this part relate to each other. Each section
is intended to be of interest in its own right. However, the
overview of formal legal education settings in Section A is also
intended to provide a framework for the subsequent discussion in
Section B, addressing the jurisprudential ideas and professional
ideal that prevailed for much of the period; and both Section A and
Section B are intended to provide a framework for the subsequent
discussion in Section C, containing my own analysis and
evaluation of the curricula of studies followed in the various
formal legal education settings. A consequence of this organization
is that the discussion of curricula which is part of the overview in
Section A is in a sense only completed in Section C.
A. Overview of Formal Legal Education Settings
Subsection 1 will consider various general matters relevant to
an understanding of formal legal education settings during this
first phase, and Subsection 2 will examine the different formal
Subsection 3 will then
legal education settings themselves.
address the significant legal literature of the period, focusing
especially on those works by Blackstone, Kent, and Story that
were typically part of a formal legal education.
1.

General Considerations

During this first phase, there were a number of different
settings in which it was possible to receive some type of formal
The most common setting
professional legal education."9
make a rough but convenient division between this period and the later
development of American law." Id. at 11. For his very brief discussion of this
later development of American law, see id. at 11-12.
59. For a general discussion of these various settings, see STEVENS, supra
note 2, at 3-34; FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 318-22, 606-12; Ames, supra note
2, at 1003-05; Martin Levine, Legal Education and Curriculum Innovation:
Law and Aging as a New Field of Law, 65 MINN. L. REV. 267, 271-72 (1980);
Brian Moline, Early American Legal Education, 42 WASHBURN L.J. 775
(2004); Pound, supra note 2, at 685-86; Sheppard, Lecture Hall, supra note 2,
at 8-25. See also Mark Warren Bailey, Early Legal Education in the United
States: Natural Law Theory and Law as a Moral Science, 48 J. LEGAL EDUC.
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throughout the entire period was an apprenticeship (or clerkship)
in the office of a practicing lawyer." At the same time, the
foundations were being laid for the institutionalization of legal
education.
Despite the opportunities for a formal legal education, there
was a significant decline, during the course of this period, in the
number of jurisdictions requiring any formal training for entry
into the profession. During the early part of this first phase,
almost all of the thirteen original states seem to have required
some period of formal apprenticeship training.6' Subsequently,
however, partly or even largely as a result of the atmosphere
created by Jacksonian Democracy in the 1830s and 40s, there was
a significant decline in educational standards and requirements
for admission to the bar.62 In 1840, a period of apprenticeship
training was required in no more than 11 out of 30 jurisdictions; in
1860 it was required in only 9 out of 39 jurisdictions, and
311 (1998) (discussing the jurisprudential thought of American legal educators
in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries and the materials they
used); Hoeflich, Theory and Practice, supra note 2, at 861-75 (discussing
briefly the apprenticeship system of legal education, and also discussing the
debate over the integration of theory and practice in university-based legal
education, particularly during the first phase); Peden, supra note 2, at 1106-11
(discussing the apprenticeship system, the rise of formal instruction in law,
and their relationship to state bar admission requirements); Sheppard, Final
Exams, supra note 2, at 820-23 (describing the method of evaluation by
examinations employed at Litchfield and at university law schools); Swygert
and Bruce, supra note 2, at 966-76 (describingthe various forms of legal
education - treatises, law reports, and legal periodicals - during the first
phase, prior to the publication of the first student-edited law review in 1875).
For a detailed discussion of pertinent developments in one particular state, see
Hunter, Institutionalization,supra note 2, at 406-46 (discussing developments
in North Carolina).
For a survey of the methods of legal education during the colonial
period, see Charles R. McManis, The History of FirstCentury American Legal
Education: A Revisionist Perspective, 59 WASH. U. L.Q. 597, 600-06 (1981)
(identifying the three principal methods as "(1) study in England at the Inns of
Court; (2) self-education by reading one or more books in law; or (3)
apprenticeship with a member of the legal profession or in the clerk's office of
a court"). For further discussion, see FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 97-98;
Davison M. Douglas, The Jeffersonian Vision of Legal Education, 51 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 185, 188-92 (2001); Craig Evan Klafter, The Influence of Vocational
Schools on the Origin of American Legal Thought 1779-1829, XXXVII AM. J.
LEGAL HIS. 307, 310-13 (1993); Moline, supra, at 776-91.
60. The commentaries appear to vary in their understanding of the term
"clerkship" (and the counterpart term "clerk"), some regarding it as
synonymous with "apprenticeship" and others regarding it as an inferior form
of apprenticeship.
61. See Stevens, supra note 2, at 3. The one exception was Virginia, which
relied instead upon the bar examination to maintain the quality and
educational qualifications of the bar. See STEVENS, supra note 2, at 3 & n.6;
REED I, supra note 2, at 85, 96-97.
62. See Stevens, supra note 2, at 7-10, 25.
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everywhere bar examinations were oral and usually casual.' In
addition, very few states required even a rudimentary general
education, although many states did impose a minimum age
requirement of twenty-one for admission to the bar.'
Consequently, it seems that, due to the absence in most
jurisdictions of any meaningful requirements for admission to the
bar, many of those practicing law during the latter part of the
period' may have received no formal legal education at all."6
63. Id. at 7-8, 25 (citing REED I, supra note 2, at 86-87). For an indication
of the length of the required period of apprenticeship in those jurisdictions
requiring apprenticeship at some time during this first phase, see REED I,
supra note 2, at 83-84 (listing fifteen states and the Northwest Territory
requiring periods of preparation of three years or more at any time before the
Civil War, and also indicating a reduction in the period, in some states, for
college graduates). For discussion of the recognition, in some states, of work
done at a local law school as a complete or partial substitute for a prescribed
period of apprenticeship, see id. at 243-48 (discussing as well the possibility, in
various states, of receiving credit for apprenticeship or law school work done
out of state). For discussion of the exemption from Bar examinations, in some
states, for graduates of certain law schools (the so-called "diploma privilege"),
see id. at 248-53.
64. See REED I, supra note 2, at 314-15. For further details regarding
requirements for admission to the bar, and their decline during the course of
this period, see id. at 67-90.
65. Relying upon figures for the U.S. census, which was first completed in
1850, Reed gives statistics on the number of lawyers for three dates during our
period: 1850: 23,939 (103 lawyers per 100,000 population); 1860: 34,839 (111
lawyers per 100,000 population); 1870: 40,736 (105 lawyers per 100,000
population). REED I, supra note 2, at 442 app. II, tbl.1 (noting, however, the
considerable inaccuracy of the 1870 census, id. at 442 n.2). Reed also gives
comparative figures for physicians and clergymen. Id. at 442 app. II, tbl. 2.
Although Reed notes the difficulty of obtaining figures for years before 1850,
he considers that the figures for the number of lawyers in the state of New
York in 1818 suggest the same sort of ratio, i.e., 100 lawyers per 100,000
population. Id. at 442 n.2. Accord FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 304 (explaining
that "after the Revolution... the number of lawyers grew fantastically" as
illustrated by the situation in Massachusetts and Virginia, and giving figures
for Massachusetts demonstrating the dramatic increase in the number of
lawyers, both absolutely and in ratio to the population, across the years 1740,
1790, 1800, 1810, and 1840).
66. Perhaps the most famous example of a self-educated lawyer during this
period is Abraham Lincoln, who studied law in the early 1830s, being
admitted to the Illinois bar in 1836.
See AMERICAN HERITAGE: THE
PRESIDENTS 190-91 (Michael Beschloss ed. 2003). In 1858, Lincoln famously
advised that "the cheapest, quickest and best way" to become a lawyer was to
"read Blackstone's COMMENTARIES, Chitty's Pleadings, Greenleafs Evidence,
Story's Equity and Story's Equity Pleading,get a license, and go to the practice
and still keep reading" (as quoted in FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 606).
Of greatest concern, perhaps, to those advocating the need for formal legal
training were the so-called "pettifoggers," who were defined by one observer in
1842 as follows:
Pettyfoggers are those who without any preparatory study enter our
lower courts with a few snatches of what they call law picked up at the
Corners of Streets. These they rant & rave - quibble upon words -
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As suggested above, and as we shall see in greater detail in
Subsection 2 below, throughout the whole period most lawyers
who did in fact receive some type of formal legal education
received it in the form of an apprenticeship (or clerkship) rather
than in the form of institutionalized legal education (and indeed
continued to do so until the end of the century)." Some of them
combined the two.' Many of them, moreover, spent a period of
study at a college before beginning their formal legal education.69
As far as college education itself is concerned, the number of
colleges expanded from 9 on the eve of the Revolution to 46 by
1831, 119 by 1850, and 217 by 1860.0 Seven of the nine preRevolutionary colleges were denominational, as were many
(perhaps most) of the colleges founded during our period.7
Although suffering a decline in rigor during the two generations
preceding the Civil War, the standard college curriculum during
the period has been described in the following terms:
Students were admitted whenever they acquired sufficient skills in
Latin and Greek, and they went through four years of study as a
unified class. The first two years were heavily devoted to Latin and

stammer & quarrel & raise often not a petty fog, but a great one - to
the total eclipse of Common Sense & the discomfiture ofjustice.
LAPIANA, supra note 2, at 44-45 (quoting Aaron Barlow Olmstead, Diary of
Aaron Barlow Olmstead, microformed on Misc. Microfilms, reel 14 (New York
Historical Society)). On the other hand, the number of those who received
some type of formal legal education may be significantly higher than might be
suggested by the absence in most states of meaningful formal educational
requirements for admission to the bar. This is because the continued
existence of various visible and invisible barriers to beginning a successful law
practice may have operated to favor those with a formal legal education over
those who lacked such an education. See, e.g., LAPIANA, supra note 2, at 45-48
(identifying barriers in the form of: cooperation by the judiciary responsible for
examining those without formal educational qualifications, professional
ostracism, start-up costs, the role of family connections, domination of the bar
by a few influential practitioners, and the importance of obtaining the goodwill
of established practitioners, for example, through clerkship).
67. See Stevens, supra note 2, at 24 and 95; Friedman, supra note 2, at 322.
68. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 320, 606; REED I, supra note 2, at
243-48.
69. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 606; Bailey, supra note 59, at 312; see
also infra notes 79, 96, 128, 168 and accompanying text.
70. THE READER'S COMPANION TO AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 4, at 316,

320-22. In 1860, sixty percent of the colleges were in the Midwest or
Southwest; and "[miost were small, impecunious, and faithful to the classical
curriculum." Id. at 322. Although more elitist in the East, college education
was more popularly based nearer the frontier. Id. at 321-22. Estimates of
attendance percentages during the antebellum period seem to vary. Compare
id. at 316 ("5 percent of the population" during the antebellum period), with
id. at 322 ("1 percent of white males" by 1860). For further discussion of the
'classical curriculum," see infra note 72 and accompanying text.
71. See THE READER'S COMPANION TO AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 4, at

321-22.
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Greek, and the third and fourth included a sampling of philosophy
(metaphysics, ethics, logic), history, and natural science.
The
curriculum grew more secular over time with the inclusion of
science, especially Newtonian mechanics.
The chief practical
12
emphasis was public speaking or oratory.
2.

Formal Legal Education Settings

Subsection a below will examine apprenticeship training, and
Subsection b will then examine institutionalized legal education
(independent law school programs, and college/university law
programs, and methods of instruction).
a.

Apprenticeship training

The usual method of apprenticeship training seems to have
involved some combination of directed reading, conversation with
one's mentor, observation of the practice, and the performance of
routine office tasks, particularly the copying of legal documents.73

72. Id. at 320-21. For developments towards the very end of the period, see
id. at 322 (explaining that "[aifter the Civil War, the principal types of higher
education took form: agricultural colleges, institutes of technology, colleges for
women, and universities appeared. The old-time colleges became liberal arts
colleges"). The reference to the appearance of universities in the quotation
seems to be concerned with the modern university, possessing such
characteristics as student choice among courses, new pedagogical methods, the
encouragement of faculty scholarship, full-time faculty in professional schools,
and the promotion of research and graduate education. Id. at 322. As will be
seen in the remainder of this Section, the term "university" already had been
used to refer to institutions of higher education before the Civil War.
However, it seems that such institutions were still essentially colleges. See
Stevens, supra note 2, at 35.
For a discussion of general developments in education during our
period, see THE READER'S COMPANION TO AMERICAN HISTORY, at 313-17. For
a discussion of women's education in particular, see id. at 324-26.
73. For a general description of apprenticeship training, see FRIEDMAN,
supra note 2, at 318-19; Bailey, supra note 59, at 312-13, 315-16, 319-22;
Levine, supra note 59, at 271. A more concrete impression of the nature of
apprenticeship training may be obtained by considering some individual
apprenticeship experiences. For a description of James Kent's experience, see
James Kent, Letter of October 6, 1828, reprinted in 1 THE HISTORY OF LEGAL
EDUCATION, supra note 2, at 120; Langbein, supra note 2, at 210; Sheppard,
Lecture Hall, supra note 2, at 10. For a description of Joseph Story's
experience, see Sheppard, Lecture Hall, supra note 2, at 9-10; Joseph Story,
Autobiography, reprinted in 1 THE HISTORY OF LEGAL EDUCATION, supra note
2, at 124, 127-28; William Story, Life and Letters of Joseph Story, reprinted in
1 THE HISTORY OF LEGAL EDUCATION, supra note 2, at 130-37. For a
description
of some
other individual
experiences,
see Hunter,
Institutionalization, supra note 2, at 408 (describing the apprenticeship
experience of George Badger in North Carolina); id. at 417-19 (describing
apprenticeship experiences under Badger himself); see also Stevens, supra
note 2, at 3 n.5, 24 n.28, 24 n.33 (the latter references discuss experiences
later in the nineteenth century).
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Reading the descriptions of individual apprenticeship experiences
would suggest that apprenticeship training varied significantly in
quality. 4 It is very difficult to reach any firm conclusions about
the general quality of apprenticeship training. In this regard,
Robert Stevens observes that "[o]ne of the difficulties of analyzing
the controversy about apprenticeship (or clerkship) is that there
are relatively few descriptions about how the system worked in the
nineteenth century that can be regarded as typical. Generally,
atypical eulogies or blatant attacks have survived.""5 It is possible,
nevertheless, to articulate an operating ideal or model that
different apprenticeship experiences may have approximated to a
greater or lesser extent. Thus, Mark Warren Bailey considers that
"the course of studies pursued in the first half of the nineteenth
century" remained remarkably similar to the curriculum set by
William Smith of New York in the mid-1750s, a curriculum that
"accurately represented the humanistic ideal that underlay legal
studies in the apprenticeship system."76 More specifically, Bailey
explains that:
Smith's curriculum included general studies in English, Latin, and
French; writing; mathematics, including geometry and accounting;
history and geography; logic and rhetoric; divinity; and the law of
nature and nations. In addition to reports of cases in common law
and equity, precedents, and entries, Smith assigned to his students
general treatises... [on the common law] ...as well as works on

natural and civil law .... This curriculum offered an ambitious
course of study comprising a broad sampling of the arts and sciences
(a requirement otherwise fulfilled by a Bachelor of Arts degree), an
introduction to a general knowledge of law, and finally an in-depth
study of both the theory and practice of law.77

74. See supra note 73. For further discussion of the varying quality of
apprenticeships, and of the criticisms leveled at the apprenticeship system,
see, for example STEVENS, supra note 2, at 24, 25 & n.41; Bailey, supra note
59, at 314-15; Hoeflich, Theory and Practice, supra note 2, at 863; Hunter,
Institutionalization,supra note 2, at 409, 418-19. For a discussion of the
varying quality of apprenticeships during the earlier, colonial period, see
FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 97-98.

For a description of some individual

apprenticeship experiences during the colonial period, see Hunter, George
Wythe, supra note 2, at 140 (Wythe's experience); id. at 142-43 (Jefferson's

experience under Wythe); Coquillette, supra note 2, at 76-80 (John Adams'
apprenticeship experience
and post-admission
quasi-apprenticeship
experience). See also Douglas, supra note 59, at 190-91 (focusing on negative
descriptions during the colonial period).
75. Stevens, supra note 2, at 24 n. 28.
76. Bailey, supra note 59, at 320-21.
77. Id.
The terms "precedents" and "entries" may require some
explanation. The term "precedents" refers to collections of common-form
instruments providing forms for use in pleading and conveyancing. See
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1215 (8th. ed. 2004). The term "entries" refers to

various kinds of record-keeping notations. See id. at 574.
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Although apparently absent from the Smith curriculum in the
1750s, it seems that many apprenticeship experiences during our
period included a specific consideration of political theory as a
separate subject as well. 8 As the passage above suggests, an
apprentice may have received a college education before beginning
his apprenticeship, in which case, presumably, the general studies
in the arts and sciences would be unnecessary. Indeed, Bailey
explains that "[1]egal education from the 1740s onward frequently
consisted of a period of study at a college followed by a law-office
apprenticeship" and that "[tihis pattern of education did not
change markedly until the last quarter of the nineteenth
century."7 9
b.

Institutionalized legal education

Parallel to apprenticeship training, a number of different
foundations were laid for the institutionalization of legal education
78. See Bailey, supra note 59, at 323. Such specific consideration of
political theory presumably would have been in addition to whatever general
treatment such matters received in various treatises on the law of nature or
on the common law that mentors also assigned to their apprentices. For
discussion of the treatment of matters of political theory in Blackstone's
COMMENTARIES, see infra notes 184-86 and accompanying text.
Apart from the apparent absence of a specific consideration of political
and governmental theory and of certain natural sciences, Smith's curriculum
is also remarkably similar in breadth to the course of independent study that
Thomas Jefferson continued to recommend for almost fifty years, from the
early 1770s until the early 1820s. For a general discussion of Jefferson's
recommendations, see Cohen, supra note 2, at 169-78. Douglas summarizes
Jefferson's recommendations as follows:
When asked, as he frequently was, what an aspiring lawyer should read,
Jefferson recommended basic legal texts such as treatises, statutes, and
case reports, but also insisted that the aspiring lawyer engage in much
broader study: languages (particularly French), mathematics, science
(astronomy, physics, natural history, anatomy, botany and chemistry),
political theory, ethics, and history. He also urged broad exposure to the
theories of government - both ancient and modern.
Douglas, supra note 59, at 199. Robert Ferguson observes that Jefferson's
recommended reading lists constituted "virtual bibliographies of The
Enlightenment, requiring fourteen hours of reading a day across a five-year
period."

ROBERT FERGUSON, LAW AND LETTERS IN AMERICAN CULTURE 28

(1984) (as quoted in Douglas, supra note 59, at 199).
It is perhaps telling that, rightly or wrongly, and despite his own
positive apprenticeship experience under George Wythe, see supra note 74,
infra note 102, Jefferson himself considered it preferable to pursue such a
course of independent study rather than to train as an apprentice, because
"the services expected in return [are] more than the instructions [are] worth."
Cohen, supra note 2, at 171-72. However, Jefferson was certainly not opposed
to formal instruction in law. For discussion of Jefferson's ideas regarding
institutionalized legal education, see infra notes 111, 158, 402 and
accompanying text.
79. Bailey, supra note 59, at 312. For a description of the standard college
curriculum, see supra note 72 and accompanying text.
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during this first phase.
(1) Independent law school programs
To begin with, it was possible to study law at an independent,
or proprietary, law school. In these independent law schools,
which developed out of the apprenticeship system, a lawyer offered
instruction to more students than could be taught in an office.8 °
Indeed, in some cases there may have been very little, if any,
functional difference between an independent law school and a law
office providing apprenticeship experiences to several apprentices
simultaneously.81
The first independent law school to be established, and
probably the most well-known, was the Litchfield School of
Tapping Reeve and James Gould, which is generally considered to
have been founded by Judge Reeve in 1784, and which lasted until
1833.2 Litchfield's graduates wielded considerable social and
political influence. As Steve Sheppard explains, the Litchfield
School "had over a thousand graduates, many of whom were
drawn from the social elite and led the young republic, including
three U.S. Supreme Court members, fifty-six state supreme court
judges, twenty-eight Senators, one hundred and one Congressmen,
fourteen governors, six U.S. Cabinet members, and eight
80. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 47, at 16; Pound, supra note 2, at 686.
For a description of the process whereby such a school might develop out of a
law office providing apprenticeship experiences, see FRIEDMAN, supra note 2,
at 319. For a general discussion of these independent law schools, see id. at
319-20; REED I, supra note 2, at 128-33; Klafter, supra note 59, at 322-31;
McManis, supra note 59, at 617-20. For more detailed discussion of the
Litchfield School, see infra notes 82-83, 90-95 and accompanying text. For a
detailed discussion of independent law schools in North Carolina during this
period, see Hunter, Institutionalization,supra note 2, at 413-17, 424-25, 43246.
81. See REED I, supra note 2, at 132; Hunter, supra note 2, at 415.
82. See REED I, supra note 2, at 128-30, 132. For descriptions of the
Litchfield School, and its program of instruction, see id. at 130-32, 453-54;
FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 319-20; STEVENS, supra note 2, at 3-4, 39 n.36;
Ames, supra note 2, at 1004-05; Hunter, Institutionalization,supra note 2, at
412; Sheppard, Final Exams, supra note 2, at 820; Sheppard, Lecture Hall,
supra note 2, at 13-14; Peden, supra note 2, at 1107-08; Andrew Siegel, "To
Learn and Make Respectable Hereafter":-The Litchfield School in Cultural
Context, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1978 (1998). Gould became Reeve's partner in 1798.
REED I, supra, at 130. For Judge Gould's own description of the aims and
methods of the Litchfield program in 1822, see James Gould, Law School at
Litchfield, 3 U.S. L. J. 400 (1823), reprinted in THE HISTORY OF LEGAL
EDUCATION, supra note 2, at 187, 187-89. For documents related to the
Litchfield School, see THE HISTORY OF LEGAL EDUCATION, supra, note 2, at
181-86 (reproducing an "Advertisement of the Litchfield School" from the
school's 1828 Catalog, the "Rules of the Debating Society of Law Students in
Mr. Reeve's Office 1794-98," and the "Laws of the Office and Library
Catalogue 1800-1810"); id. at 190-204 (reproducing several students' "Letters
Home from 1827-28", and listing "Litchfield Law Students 1790-1830").
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professors, not counting educator Horace Mann."' The Litchfield
School served as a model for several other independent law schools
in a number of states.' Thus, Sheppard reports that "by 1835,
there were, or had been, eighteen other law schools independent of
a university, each offering programs of instruction resonant with
Reeve's and Gould's" at Litchfield.85
Although most independent law schools seem to have lasted
for only a few years, such schools were a continuing phenomenon
throughout the whole period.86 It seems that, as in the case of
Litchfield, many of the graduates from other independent law
schools also may have been drawn from the wealthy social elite
87
who could afford to pay the expenses of such an education.
Moreover, again as in the case of Litchfield, it also seems that a
disproportionate number of these graduates subsequently "became
the leaders of the American bar and held prominent political
positions."" By 1900, however, the Litchfield type of independent
law school had virtually disappeared due to competition from the
increasing number of university law schools.89
In these independent law schools, the law school curriculum
itself appears to have been rather narrow in scope. To take
Litchfield as an example, although neither Reeve nor Gould
published their lectures, ° various manuscript lecture notes convey
some idea of the topics covered in the Litchfield curriculum, as
well as the degree of emphasis given to each one. For instance, the
topics covered in the Baldwin manuscript of 1813, and the number
of manuscript pages devoted to those topics, are as follows:
Introductory (50), Domestic Relations (194), Executors and
Administrators (69), Sheriffs and Gaolers (41), Contracts with Its
Actions (378), Torts (74), Evidence (72), Pleading (281), Practice

83. Sheppard, Lecture Hall, supra note 2, at 13 (citing MARIAN C.
MCKENNA, TAPPING REEVE AND THE LITCHFIELD LAW SCHOOL xvi, 175
(1986)). For statistics on attendance in selected years, see REED I, supra note
2, at 130, 450 app. II, tbl. II.
84. See REED I, supra note 2, at 132-33.
85. Sheppard, Lecture Hall, supra note 2, at 14. See also id. at 13 ("The
Litchfield lectures established the framework for instruction in the

professional law school.").
86. See REED I, supra note 2, at 132-33, 431-33 app. I.B (providing a stateby-state chronological listing of independent law schools); Klafter, supra note

59, at 323 n.83 (listing proprietary law schools founded before 1830).
87. See Klafter, supra note 59, at 324-25.
88. Id. at 330-31 (citing figures regarding the legal profession in the state of
Connecticut between 1820 and 1830 as being suggestive of the influence of
proprietary law schools in general).
89. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 606-07. The competitive advantage of
university law schools derived not only from their prestige but also, and more
especially, from their power to award degrees. See REED I, supra note 2, at
189.

90. See REED I, supra note 2, at 131.
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(68), The Law Merchant (266), Equity (51), Criminal Law (64),
Real Property with Its Actions (364).91
The curriculum also
included optional moot courts and debating societies,92 and it
seems to have required one year or fourteen months to complete
(depending on whether or not the student intended to take
Connecticut Practice). 3 With respect to the apparently narrow
focus of the curriculum, Steve Sheppard comments that "[t]he
course was rooted in the practicalities of the common law
governing private disputes, skipping public law topics of
Constitutional government and politics, Roman civil law, and
'stately lectures on the great principles of the Laws of Nature.' 94
Rather clearly, then, it appears to lack the breadth of the William
Smith "model" curriculum in the apprenticeship setting.9 On the
other hand, it seems that most students at the independent law
schools about whom information exists had graduated from college
and that, at least at some schools, those who had not attended
college were given a brief course of general instruction before
beginning their legal studies.'

91. See id. at 453 (also noting variations among different manuscripts).
The curriculum was based on Blackstone, adapted to American conditions.
See id. at 131, together with STEVENS, supra note 2, at 3.
92. REED I, supra note 2, at 131. It seems that the moot courts, although
optional under Reeve, became required sometime after Gould joined him at
Litchfield. See Siegel, supra note 82, at 2008.
93. REED I, supra note 2, at 131. This was based upon a daily lecture of
seventy-five to ninety minutes and two vacations of four weeks each. Id.; see
also id. at 453 (referring to Litchfield under Reeve as a "one-year school").
94. Sheppard, Lecture Hall, supra note 2, at 13 (quoting MCKENNA, supra
note 83, at xvi). For a description of other such independent law schools, and
their programs of instruction, in North Carolina, see Hunter, supra note 2.
95. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
96. See Klafter, supra note 59, at 325. For a description of the standard
college curriculum, see supra note 72 and accompanying text. With respect to
the alternative brief course of general instruction, Klafter describes a plan for
such a course, developed by Peter Van Schaak, "which suggested six categories
of learning which law students would have frequent occasion to use in their
study and practice of law," namely: (1) English, Latin and French; (2) Writing,
Arithmetic, Geometry, Surveying, Merchants Accounts or Bookkeeping; (3)
Geography, Chronology, History; (4) Logic and Rhetoric; (5) Divinity (including
Ethics); (6) Economics and Politics. Id. It will be noted that, with the
exception of Economics and Politics, these subjects are virtually identical to
the general studies subjects included in the William Smith curriculum in the
apprenticeship setting. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. But see
supra note 78 with regard to the study of political theory in many
apprenticeship experiences. Van Schaak operated a proprietary law school at
Kinderhook in New York between 1786 and 1828 or 1830. See REED I, supra
note 2, at 431 app. I.B (1828); Kiafter, supra, at 323 n. 83 (1830).
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(2) College/University Law Programs
(i) Early Law Programs
It was also possible to study law at a college or university.
During the early part of the period, however, professional law was
taught only at a small number of colleges and universities," and
the law program was part of the general curriculum.98 Chairs of
law were established at the College of William and Mary (1779),
the College of Philadelphia (1790) (which merged, shortly
thereafter, with the University of Pennsylvania), Columbia College
(1793), Transylvania University (1799), and the University of
Maryland (1816).9 Some of the past incumbents are especially
97. See REED I, supra note 2, at 423 app. L.A (providing a chronological
listing of "institutions offering residential instruction in professional law").
The relevant entries in the present context are: William and Mary College
(1779-1861, 1920-), University of Pennsylvania (College of Philadelphia)
(1790-92, 1817-18, 1850-), Columbia University (1794-98, 1824-26, 1858-),
Transylvania University (Kentucky University) (1799-1861, 1865-79, 1892-95,
1905-12), and, University of Maryland (1823-32, 1870-). Id. It should be
noted that the dates given by Reed are the dates of actual operation rather
than the date on which a Chair of Law was established, and that some of these
dates occur beyond our time period.
98. See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 320-21; Sheppard, Lecture Hall,
supra note 2, at 14-17.
99. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 320-21, together with Sheppard,
Lecture Hall, supra note 2, at 14-17. It seems that, for Reed, these five law
programs qualified to be on Reed's list of institutions offering "instruction in
professional law," see supra note 97, because they included instruction in
"municipal law," in particular the common law, and because they were all at
least partly intended to help prepare students to become, and/or to help
existing practitioners to become better, practicing members of the legal
profession. See REED I, supra note 2, at 116 (apparently equiating
"professional law" with "municipal law"); id. at 120 (explaining that the term
"municipal law" includes in particular the common law); id. at 134
(characterizing the programs or other initiatives at various New England and
other colleges between the Revolutionary War and the War of 1812 as offering
instruction in "[nion-professional [1law" because they did not aim at educating
lawyers but only at providing such instruction in subjects such as
jurisprudence, politics, natural law and the law of nations as should be part of
everyone's general education); id. at 116-18, 120-27 (describing the law
programs at William and Mary, Transylvania, Columbia, Philadelphia, and
Maryland).
Arguably, the law program at Harvard College, which began operation
in 1816, also belongs on Reed's list because, as Reed explains elsewhere, the
program included instruction in municipal law and was also intended to
appeal to "prospective lawyers" as well as others. See id. at 137. Reed may
have omitted it from his list, however, because the envisaged minimum of
fifteen lectures was so manifestly inadequate, and because a separate
professional law school was established at Harvard the following year, in
1817. See id. at 137-39. For further discussion of the law program at Harvard
College, see infra note 122. For further discussion of the establishment and
development of Harvard Law School, see infra notes 134, 144-56, 167-68 and
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important figures in the history of U.S. legal education. Examples
include Judge George Wythe and his successor Henry St. George
Tucker at the College of William and Mary (1779-89, 1789-1804
respectively); Chancellor James Kent at Columbia College
(1793-97, 1824-26); and David Hoffman at the University of
Maryland (1816-32)."°
Wythe's importance stems in particular from the crucial role
he played in forming the mind and character of his students, many
of whom became important leaders in the young Republic.''
Among the most famous are Thomas Jefferson, who was Wythe's
apprentice in 1762-65; John Marshall, who was in Wythe's first
law class at William and Mary in 1780; and Henry Clay, whom
The importance
Wythe tutored for four years beginning in 1793.
of Tucker, Kent, and Hoffman, on the other hand, resides more in
their publication of important texts, which they developed in
connection with their teaching activities and which then became
influential in legal education. Tucker published an Americanized
edition of Blackstone's Commentaries in 1803;' 3 Kent published
accompanying text.
100. See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 320-21; Sheppard, Lecture Hall,
supra note 2, at 14-17; see also Paul D. Carrington, The Revolutionary Idea of
Legal Education,31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 527, at 533-38 (1990) (Wythe); id. at
538-40 (Tucker); id. at 552-54 (Kent); id. at 566-68 (Hoffman); Douglas, supra
note 59, at 200-03, 206-07 (Wythe); id. at 203-06 (Tucker); id. at 207-08 (Kent).
Of all these early law programs, Hoffman's may have been the most
segregated from the rest of the university and arguably, therefore, could also
perhaps be considered together with the university law schools (and
equivalent programs) established during the second part of the period, see
infra notes 133-34 and accompanying text, particularly as Hoffman did not
actually begin delivering lectures until 1823. See REED I, supra note 2, at
123-24. For a discussion of the precursors of these early law programs in
colonial colleges, see id. at 112-14; Douglas, supra note 59, at 197-99.
101. See Hunter, George Wythe, supra note 2, at 151-54.
102. Id. at 142-43, 149, 160. As far as Wythe's William and Mary students
are concerned, Davison Douglas explains that they "assumed an extraordinary
variety of executive, legislative, and judicial offices;" thus, one became
secretary of state (John Marshall), another became attorney general and U.S.
senator, seven others became U.S. senators, another became an associate
justice on the U.S. Supreme Court (in addition to John Marshall who became
Chief Justice), and many became members of the U.S. House of
Representatives. In addition, of the forty-three judges who were members of
the Virginia Court of Appeals before the Civil War, twenty-five received a legal
education at William and Mary. Douglas, supra note 59, at 186 n.4 (citing
Hunter, George Wythe, supra note 2, at 138, 151-53, 154 n.141). James
Monroe may also have been one of Wythe's William and Mary students for a
brief period. Id. (citing Hunter, George Wythe, supra note 2, at 150). The list
may be considerably longer because about ninety percent of Wythe's students
are still unknown. Hunter, supra note 2, at 154 n.141.
103. REED I, supra note 2, at 117; Carrington, supra note 100, at 540;
Sheppard, Lecture Hall, supra note 2, at 14; see HENRY ST. GEORGE TUCKER,
BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE TO THE
CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED
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his own Commentaries on American Law in 1826-30, which went
through six editions before his death in 1847 (the final, fourteenth
edition of which appeared in 1896);'0' and Hoffman published his
comprehensive and exhaustive A Course of Legal Study in 1817,
which served as a treatise as well as an organized collection of
readings and references (with a revised, second edition in 1836).05
There seems to be some question how far the purpose of these
early college/university law programs was to help prepare
students for legal practice, and how far it was to help prepare
them for a career in public life as future leaders of the Republic."°

STATES AND OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA (New York, Augustus Kelly
1969) (1803) [hereinafter TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES]. Although
edited and annotated by Tucker, his edition of BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES

also indicates Blackstone's original pagination.
Tucker's edition of the COMMENTARIES, see

For further discussion of
infra notes 185-86 and

accompanying text.
104. See REED I, supra note 2, at 121, together with Sheppard, Lecture Hall,
supra note 2, at 16-17, and Langbein, supra note 2, at 213-14. See also KENT,
supra note 56. For further discussion of Kent's COMMENTARIES, see supra
note 56, infra notes 187-93 and accompanying text.
105. REED I, supra note 2, at 124-25, 454-55 app. III; Sheppard, Lecture
Hall, supra note 2, at 15; Carrington, supra note 100, at 566-68; see DAVID
HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY (1817) [hereinafter HOFFMAN (1817)];
DAVID HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY (Joseph Neal 1836) (1817)
[hereinafter HOFFMAN (1836)].
106. For a general discussion of these early college/university law programs,
see, for example FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 320-21; REED I, supra note 2, at
116-27, 134-38; STEVENS, supra note 2, at 4-5; Ames, supra note 2, at 1003;
Brainerd Currie, The Materialsof Law Study, 3 J. LEGAL EDUC. 331, 344-46,
350-59 (1951); Klafter, supra note 59, at 313-22; McManis, supra note 59, at
606-17; Moline, supra note 59, at 791-95; Sheppard, Lecture Hall, supra note
2, at 14-17. For further discussion, see also Bailey, supra note 59, at 317-19;
Carrington, supra note 100, at 527-41, 546-50, 552-54, 557-59, 566-74; Paul D.
Carrington, Teaching Law and Virtue at Transylvania University: The George
Wythe Tradition in the Antebellum Years, 41 MERCER L. REV. 673, 673-76
(1990) [hereinafter Carrington, Transylvania University]; Paul D. Carrington,
The Theme of Early American Law Teaching: The Political Ethics of Francis
Lieber, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 339, 339-55 (1992) [hereinafter Carrington, Francis
Lieber]; Douglas, supra note 59, at 185-88, 192-209, 210-11.
For materials relating to Wythe's program at William and Mary, see
John Marshall, Entries in a Commonplace Book, in THE PAPERS OF JOHN
MARSHALL (Charles Cullen ed., 1974), reprinted in 1 THE HISTORY OF LEGAL
EDUCATION, supra note 2, at 107, 107-18. For materials relating to Kent's
program at Columbia, see James Kent, A Summary of the Course of Law
Lectures in Columbia College: Commenced November 8, 1824 (1824), reprinted
in 1 THE HISTORY OF LEGAL EDUCATION, supra note 2, at 239, 239-49
[hereinafter Kent, Summary]. For materials relating to Hoffman's program at
Maryland, see David Hoffman, Syllabus of a Course of Lectures on Law:
Proposed to Be Delivered in the University of Maryland, Addressed to Students
of Law in the United States (1821), reprinted in 1 THE HISTORY OF LEGAL
EDUCATION, supra note 2, at 250, 250-77 [hereinafter Hoffman, Syllabus];
David Hoffman, A Lecture, Introductory to a Course of Lectures, Now
Delivering in the University of Maryland (1823), reprinted in 1 THE HISTORY
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Some appear to emphasize the purpose of preparing students for
legal practice."7
Paul Carrington, however, emphasizes the
purpose of training future political leaders."' For Carrington, the
law programs at William and Mary, Philadelphia, Columbia,
Transylvania, and Maryland were part of a broader effort that was
undertaken by law teachers in university/college law programs in
general (and thus not only in those offering instruction in
professional law), to inculcate public virtue in future leaders of the
Republic." Others take a more balanced approach, emphasizing
both purposes and recognizing variations among different
programs in this respect."' Insofar as the purpose was to inculcate
public virtue in future leaders of the Republic, the effort has been
seen, by Carrington and others, as involving an attempt to
implement Thomas Jefferson's vision of legal education in the new
Republic."'

OF LEGAL EDUCATION, supra note 2, at 278, 278-316 [hereinafter Hoffman,
IntroductoryLecture].

107. See, e.g., Currie, supra note 106, at 350-51, 356-57 (discussing the
eighteenth-century professorships at William and Mary, Pennsylvania,
Columbia, and Transylvania).
108. See generally Carrington, supra note 100; Carrington, Francis Lieber,
supra note 106, at 339-41. See also Paul D. Carrington, Hail! Langdell!, 20
LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 691, 695-96 & n.22 (1995) [hereinafter Carrington, Hail!
Langdell].
109. For Carrington's detailed examination of the early college/university
law programs (either planned or implemented, many of the latter continuing
into and further developing during the second part of the period, in some cases
after a period of interruption), together with his assessment of the extent to
which their purpose was to inculcate public virtue in future leaders of the
Republic, see generally the corpus of articles by Carrington cited supra notes
100 and 106. More specifically, with regard to individual programs, see
Carrington, supra note 100, at 533-73 (College of William and Mary, Yale,
Princeton, University of Pennsylvania, Brown University, Columbia
University, the University of North Carolina, Transylvania University,
Middlebury College, Dartmouth College, the University of Vermont, the
University of Maryland, and Harvard College); Carrington, Transylvania
University, supra note 106, at 677-97 (in-depth examination and assessment of
the program at Transylvania). For a summary overview of these early law
programs, see Carrington, Francis Lieber, supra note 106, at 341-47
(discussing programs at the College of Charleston, the University of Georgia,
Dickinson College, and South Carolina College as well).
110. See, e.g., Douglas, supra note 59, at 197-209; Klafter, supra note 59, at
313-22; McManis, supra note 59, at 609-17; see also REED I, supra note 2, at
116-27, 134-38.
111. For a discussion of Jefferson's vision of legal education as being
concerned with the inculcation of public virtue in future leaders of the
Republic, see, for example Carrington, supra note 100, at 527-33; Carrington,
Transylvania University, supra note 106, at 673-74; Douglas, supra note 59, at
185, 193-200 (discussing Jefferson's vision of public education as well); see also
Currie, supra note 106, at 353-54 (discussing Jefferson's views regarding the
relationship between legal education and general education, stressing that
"law is treated as a branch of government" and that legal studies and other
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Whatever the purpose, certainly the curricula followed in
these early college/university law programs appear to have been
broader than the Litchfield type of curriculum followed in the
independent law school setting.'
In this respect, therefore, they
were closer to William Smith's "model" curriculum in the

university studies can be pursued concurrently); infra notes 112, 129, 402,
412, 418 and accompanying text. Douglas appears to consider that Jefferson's
vision of legal education was also concerned with preparing students for the
practice of law. See Douglas, supra note 59, at 198, 199, 211. Yet Carrington
appears to consider that it was not. See Carrington, supra note 100, at 529-30;
Carrington, TransylvaniaUniversity, supra note 106, at 674.
It is clear that Jefferson's vision of legal education was directly and
consciously implemented at the College of William and Mary under George
Wythe and his successors. See Carrington, Revolutionary Idea, supra note
100, at 533-41; Douglas, supra note 59, at 197, 200-07 (also explaining that in
1779 Jefferson, who was the Governor of Virginia at that time, reorganized the
College and selected his old mentor, George Wythe, for the new chair in Law
and Politics (i.e., law and government)); see also Currie, supra note 106, at
352, 358. It seems clear, too, that Jefferson's vision of legal education was also
directly and consciously implemented later, during the second part of the
period, at the University of Virginia, which opened in 1825 and where law and
politics were taught together by the same Professor of "Law and Politics." See
Douglas, supra note 59, at 210 (discussing Jefferson's "second experiment with
legal education"), together with Carrington, FrancisLieber, supra note 106, at
346, and REED I, supra note 2, at 118-19. See also infra note 158 and
accompanying text. Moreover, Wythe's law program at William and Mary was
the model for the program at Transylvania University. Carrington, supra note
100, at 557-59; Carrington, Transylvania University, supra note 106, at 67797. It is perhaps not entirely clear, however, how far various other law
programs (for example, those at Philadelphia under James Wilson, and
Columbia under James Kent) were directly inspired by Jefferson's vision of
legal education or, alternatively, were inspired by similar views held
independently by others. Compare Douglas, supra note 59, at 185-87, 207-09
(apparently taking the former position) with Carrington, FrancisLieber, supra
note 106, at 341, 355 (apparently taking the latter position). See also
McManis, supra note 59, at 612-15 (discussing the law programs at
Philadelphia and Columbia and noting that Kent and Wilson were both
Federalists).
For discussion of the nature of "public virtue" as involving the
subordination of individual interests to the common good, see infra notes 322,
362, 364-66 and accompanying text. Regarding the elitist element in
Jefferson's vision of legal education, see infra note 402 and accompanying text.
112. For a discussion of the breadth of these programs, see, for example,
Currie, supra note 106, at 357-59; McManis, supra note 59, at 609-17. Currie
states that wherever the eighteenth-century professorships at William and
Mary, Pennsylvania, Columbia and Transylvania had an influence on
subsequent legal education, "positive professional values were attached to
nontechnical elements of university training," including a "Blackstonian
element... [that] emphasized ethics, as a basis of natural law - a component
of law and equity as applied in the courts," and a "Jeffersonian element [that]
emphasized political theory, the instrument of the legislator and the
administrator." Id. at 357. For a discussion of the Litchfield curriculum, see
supra notes 90-95 and accompanying text.
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apprenticeship setting."' Once again it may be possible, as in the
case of apprenticeship training, to identify an ideal curriculum
that the different programs approximated to a greater or lesser
extent. Although David Hoffman did not publish his Syllabus of a
Course of Lectures on Law at the University of Maryland until
1821, its comprehensively broad approach may fairly be regarded
as representing such an ideal curriculum."4
Except for the
addition of Title XI, and the omission of sections on Political
Economy, and the Constitution and Laws of the Several States,
the scope of coverage in Hoffman's Syllabus seems to have been
very similar to the scope of coverage in A Course of Legal Study,
which he had published a few years earlier in 1817 and which
Joseph Story described, in a review that same year, as "the most
perfect system for the study of law which has ever been offered to
the public.""' 5
Hoffman's Syllabus organized his course into eleven main
titles: Title I: General and Introductory (including political
philosophy, natural law, and certain other aspects of
jurisprudence, as well as feudal law); Title II: Real Rights and
Real Remedies; Title III: Personal Rights and Personal Remedies;
Title IV: Equity; Title V: Crimes and Punishments; Title VI: Lex
Mercatoria (including international trade); Title VII: Law of
Nations; Title VIII: Maritime and Admiralty Law; Title IX: Civil or
Roman Law; Title X: The Constitution and Laws of the United
States of America; Title XI: Legal Biography and Bibliography;
Professional Deportment (i.e., Legal Ethics). Several of these
titles included specific coverage of the historical development of
the area(s) of law in question.
There was also coverage of
procedure in Title II, and of procedure and evidence in Titles III,
IV, and V."6 Pleading was also covered in various titles. In

113. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
114. Hoffman, Syllabus, supra note 106. Hoffman only began lecturing in
1823, however, and the law program at Maryland ended when he stopped
lecturing in 1832. REED I, supra note 2, at 124-25, 423 app.
115. See REED I, supra note 2, at 124 (quoting from Story's review, originally
published in the 1817 North American Review, as reprinted in JOSEPH STORY,
MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS 223 (1835)). Story estimated that Hoffman's A
COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY would take seven years to complete. Id. A revised,
expanded and updated edition was published in 1836. REED I, supra note 2, at
125. See also supra note 105 and accompanying text. Hoffman's Syllabus,
although designed for a two year course centered around a daily lecture of one
hour, proved to be too ambitious for Hoffman to complete within this time
period.
REED I, supra note 2, at 124-25; see also infra note 126 and
accompanying text. For further discussion of Hoffman's pioneering work in
legal ethics, i.e., his Resolutions in Regard to Professional Deportment,
published in the 1836, second edition of his A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY, see
infra note 391 and accompanying text.
116. Hoffman, Syllabus, supra note 106.

20061

A History of U.S. Legal EducationPhase I

addition, Hoffman supplemented his lectures with moot court
exercises, debating exercises, and writing competitions."'
The curricula adopted in the law programs at William and
Mary,"8 Philadelphia,"' Columbia, 2' and Transylvania 2' varied in

117. Hoeflich, Theory and Practice, supra note 2, at 865-66; Hoffman,
Introductory Lecture, supra note 106, at 289-90. For further discussion of
Hoffman's program at Maryland, see Thomas L. Shaffer, David Hoffman's Law
Lectures 1822-1833, 32 J. LEG. EDUC. 127, 127-38 (1982).
118. It seems that, in addition to the common law (based in particular on
Blackstone's COMMENTARIES), the curriculum at William and Mary under
George Wythe (1779-89) also included the study of the Virginia constitution
and statutes, American constitutional law, political theory, and political
economy, as well as a moot court and a moot legislature. See Carrington,
supra note 100, at 535, together with Douglas, supra note 59, at 201-02.
Wythe also emphasized the technique of historical inquiry in understanding
the basis of the common law and evaluating the reasons why it may have
been, or may need to be, revised in the United States. See Klafter, supra note
59, at 316-17, 319.
Similarly, in addition to the common law (again based in particular on
Blackstone's COMMENTARIES), Wythe's successor at William and Mary, Henry
St. George Tucker (1789-1804), continued the curricular emphasis on Virginia
statutory law, constitutional law, and the science of government, as well as
political theory. See Douglas, supra note 59, at 203-04. Such coverage was
reflected also in Tucker's 1803 American edition of Blackstone's
Commentaries. See infra notes 185-86 and accompanying text. Like Wythe,
Tucker "engaged his students in debate on some of the leading political and
legal issues of the day." Id. at 204. It seems, however, that he did not
continue Wythe's practice of holding moot courts and moot legislatures. See
Carrington, supra note 100, at 539. Moreover, Tucker relied in particular on
European natural law writers (in contrast to Wythe's emphasis on classical
scholarship) in evaluating the suitability of foreign law for the United States.
See Klafter, supra note 59, at 319.
Those students at William and Mary who wanted to earn a law degree
(which was probably already an option under Wythe) not only had to satisfy
the requirements for the law degree itself, they also had to satisfy the
requirements for the Bachelor of Arts degree as well. For the law degree itself
a student had to be "well acquainted with civil history, both Ancient and
Modern, and particularly with municipal law and policy." For the Bachelor of
Arts degree, the student had to be "acquainted with [the various] branches of
the Mathematics, both theoretical and practical ... Natural Philosophy [,]...
Logic, the Belles Lettres, Rhetoric, Natural Law, Law of Nations, ....
Geography and of Ancient and Modern Languages." See Hunter, George
Wythe, supra note 2, at 146-47 & n.73 (quoting from the college statutes and
referencing Robert M. Hughes, William and Mary, The First American Law
School, WM. & MARY Q., 2d. Ser. II, 40, 42-43 (Jan. 1922)); Douglas, supra note
59, at 205; see also McManis, supra note 59, at 611 (discussing the
requirements for two degrees and observing that the law program "appears to
have been fairly rigorous" under "Tucker and his immediate successors").
Tucker was unsuccessful in his attempt to expand the requirements for the
law degree to include knowledge of additional subjects such as ancient and
modern constitutions, ethics, and legal procedure, as well as mastery of the
skill of oral advocacy and the writing for publication of a thesis on some
feature of American law. Douglas, supra note 59, at 205.
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According to Carrington, the law program at William and Mary
continued in much the same form as under Wythe and Tucker (although
Carrington does not mention the degree requirements). Carrington, supra
note 100, at 540-41; Carrington, Transylvania University, supra note 106, at
675. The program ceased operation in 1861, with the onset of the Civil War.
REED I, supra note 2, at 44, 423 app I.A.
119. James Wilson began lecturing at the College of Philadelphia in 1790.
Sheppard, Lecture Hall, supra note 2, at 15. Regarding the scope of Wilson's
course, Sheppard states that:
His scope was essentially that set by Blackstone, beginning with a
lecture on the study of law, and then moving to the general principles of
law and obligation, the law of nature, the law of nations, municipal law,
man as a member of a community and a state, and then the common law
in general, evidence, corporations, judicial procedure, and property.
Id. The course included coverage of constitutional law, as part of the law of
persons, as well as criminal law. See REED I, supra note 2, at 122, together
with Carrington, supra note 100, at 549. And it emphasized the comparative
and historical examination of law, moral philosophy, and political economy.
Douglas, supra note 59, at 207.
Wilson stopped lecturing at the College two years later, in 1792, when it
merged with the University of Pennsylvania, and his successor, Charles Hare,
was not appointed until 1817. Sheppard, supra note 2, at 15. Although Hare
devised a program as ambitious as Wilson's, he remained in the position for
only a year. See id., together with Carrington, supra note 2, at 550. The law
program at Pennsylvania only reopened in 1850, under the leadership of
George Sharswood. Sheppard, supra note 2, at 15, 19.
120. James Kent lectured at Columbia College initially from 1794 until 1798.
McManis, supra note 59, at 614. Kent gave an indication of the general scope
of his planned course in his Introductory lecture, stating that the course was
"intended to explain the principles of our constitutions, the reason and history
of our laws, to illustrate them by a comparison with those of other nations,
and to point out the relation they bear to the spirit of representative
republics." Id. (quoting James Kent, Kent's Introductory Lecture, reprinted in
3 COLUM. L. REV. 330, 341 (1903)).
More specifically, Kent explained
elsewhere that the coverage included the history, nature, forms and just ends
of government, the law of nations, the U.S. Constitution, federal criminal and
civil law, state courts, and the New York Constitution and municipal law, in
particular the rights of property and persons, and civil and criminal
procedure. See Sheppard, Lecture Hall, supra note 2, at 15, in particular at 15
nn.105, 110 and accompanying text. Kent's Introductory lecture indicated
that he also sought to cultivate the skills of close reasoning and public
speaking and to familiarize his students with the doctrines of moral
philosophy. See id. at 15; see also REED I, supra note 2, at 121 (discussing
Kent's outline for the course, published in 1795, and indicating how it
distributed his total of thirty-seven lectures over the various main heads of
coverage).
Kent resigned his professorship in 1794 but returned to Columbia to
revive the course in 1824. Id. Kent's Summary of the Course, published in
1824, included coverage of the law of nations, the government and
constitutional jurisprudence of the United States, the sources of municipal law
(including the Civil Law), and the law concerning personal and domestic
rights, real property, and personal property and commercial contracts. See
generally Kent, Summary, supra note 106. Kent stopped lecturing after a year
and a half, using the time to prepare the first edition of his four-volume
COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAw, which were published between 1826 and
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the degree to which, and the precise ways in which, they
approximated the comprehensive breadth of David Hoffman's
curriculum at Maryland.'
These early law programs also varied

1830 and were based on his lectures at Columbia. See REED I, supra note 2, at
121, together with McManis, supra, at 614; see also supra note 56 and
accompanying text (also reproducing a biographical note on Kent). Although
Kent retained his professorship until his death in 1847, he gave no more
lectures, and the law program only reopened in earnest in 1858, under
Theodore Dwight. REED I, supra note 2, at 121, 158, 423 app. I.A.
121. At Transylvania, the course in "Law and Politics" was modeled on
George Wythe's program at William and Mary, and the first three incumbents,
George Nicholas (1799-1800), James Brown (1800-1804), and Henry Clay
(1804-1807), were all graduates of that program. See Carrington, supra note
100, at 557-58, together with Carrington, Transylvania University, supra note
106, at 678-84. For discussion of George Wythe's program at William and
Mary, see supra note 118. It was Brown who organized the program, following
Nicholas' death shortly after his appointment, with a curriculum that included
Political Economy, International Law, a study of the U.S. and Kentucky
constitutions, and a review of Blackstone.
Carrington, Transylvania
University, supra note 106, at 679. The moot courts and moot legislatures for
which there is later evidence were probably initiated by Brown as well. Id. at
679, 689. Certainly by the 1830s the curriculum also included Civil Law
(including Comparative Law), and Jurisprudence. See id. at 691. These
subjects, too, presumably may have been initiated earlier. The law program at
Transylvania continued until at least 1858. See id. at 684-99 (describing the
history of the program after the first three incumbents). Compare id. at 699
(stating that the law department "expired in 1858") with REED I, supra note 2,
at 118, 423 app. L.A (noting dates of operation during our period as 1799-1861
and 1865-79).
122. For discussion of Hoffman's curriculum at Maryland, see supra notes
114-17 and accompanying text. Although Hoffman published his Syllabus in
1821, he did not begin lecturing until 1823, and the law program at Maryland
came to an end when he stopped lecturing in 1832, only reopening at the very
end of our period, in 1870. REED I, supra note 2, at 124-25, 423 app. I.A.
At Harvard, in 1816 the Chief Justice of Massachusetts, Isaac Parker,
was appointed to the Royall Professorship of Law (endowed with a 1781
bequest from Isaac Royall that had been allowed to accumulate until 1815).
Id. at 136-37. Regarding Parker's program, Reed explains that:
[Parker] was required to deliver, primarily for the benefit of the senior
class, a course of not less than fifteen lectures covering the constitution
and government of the United States and Massachusetts, the history of
Massachusetts jurisprudence, the common law as modified by usage,
judicial decisions and statutes, "and, generally, those topics connected
with law as a science which will best lead the minds of the students to
such inquiries and researches as will qualify them to become useful and
distinguished supporters of our free systems of government, as well as
able and honorable advocates of the rights of the citizens."
Id. at 137. As already discussed, Reed may have omitted Parker's program
from his list of institutions offering "instruction in professional law" because
the envisaged minimum of fifteen lectures was so manifestly inadequate and
because a separate professional school was established at Harvard the
following year, in 1817. See supra note 99. For further discussion of the
establishment and development of Harvard Law School, see infra notes 134,
144-56, 167-68 and accompanying text.
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in their length, with a one year course being envisaged at William
and Mary,'23 Transylvania'24 and Columbia, 12 a two year course at
Maryland, 26 and a three year course at Philadelphia.1 27 In addition
123. REED I, supra note 2, at 170. It seems that Wythe lectured twice a
week. See Hunter, George Wythe, supra note 2, at 145. Tucker gave lectures
and held discussions daily. See Carrington, supra note 100, at 539. Wythe
taught under two hundred students (a figure that includes students, such as
Jefferson and Henry Clay, whom he taught privately as a tutor or mentor),
and Tucker probably taught more than one hundred and fifty students just at
the College. Carrington, supra note 100, at 537 (Wythe); id. at 539 (Tucker).
For earlier discussion describing the program at William and Mary, see supra
note 118 and accompanying text.
124. REED I, supra note 2, at 170. During the second part of the period the
course was lengthened to two years. Carrington, Transylvania University,
supra note 106, at 693. It seems that forty students were enrolled in the law
program in 1822 and that enrollments varied between thirty and seventy
during the next three decades. Id. at 688. For earlier discussion describing the
program at Transylvania, see supra note 121 and accompanying text.
125. At Columbia, Kent also originally envisaged a one-year course. REED I,
supra note 2, at 121 n.1; Carrington, supra note 100, at 553. However, it
seems that, even by the end of the second year, Kent had addressed less than
half of the planned coverage. See Sheppard, Lecture Hall, supra note 2, at 15
(noting that "[olver the two years, Kent had covered only federal and state
constitutional law, the law of nations, and real property"). Kent had planned
to give two one-hour lectures each week throughout the winter. Id. at 14. But
in his first academic year in 1794-95 he delivered only twenty-six lectures.
REED I, supra, at 121 n.1. His enrollment consisted of seven college students,
together with thirty-six lawyers and students not belonging to the college. Id.
The next year he gave thirty-one lectures to two students and his clerk. Id.
He had no students at all the following year, and six or eight students the year
after that. Id. As already noted, Kent resigned in 1794. See supra note 120.
When he returned to Columbia in 1824, he offered fifty public lectures over
one year together with two private lectures for enrolled students; he gave only
private lectures the following year and then stopped lecturing altogether.
Sheppard, Lecture Hall, supra note 2, at 16. For earlier discussion describing
Kent's program at Columbia, see supra note 120 and accompanying text.
126. REED I, supra note 2, at 170-71. Hoffman planned to cover his Syllabus
in two years by lecturing daily for one hour during ten months each year. Id.
at 124. Like Kent at Columbia, however, Hoffman greatly underestimated the
time required to achieve the planned coverage. Thus, he was still lecturing on
the third title at the beginning of the third year. Id. It seems that enrollment
varied between twenty and forty students from different states during the
several years in which Hoffman struggled with the course. See Sheppard,
Lecture Hall, supra note 2, at 15-16. For earlier discussion describing
Hoffman's program at Maryland, see supra notes 114-117 and accompanying
text.
127. REED I, supra note 2, at 122. This was based on three evening lectures
a week together with "law exercises" on Saturdays. Id. Like Kent and
Hoffman after him, Wilson underestimated the time required for his planned
coverage. Thus, he spent the whole of the first year on introductory matters,
including international law, and by the time he abandoned the course before
the end of the second year he had only covered American constitutional law
and some criminal law. See REED I, supra note 2, at 122, together with
Carrington, supra note 100, at 548-49. It seems that Wilson may have
abandoned the course, at least in part, because of lack of interest. See
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to this exposure to a broad curriculum in their legal studies, it
seems that many students had already received a general college
education (or its equivalent) before beginning the law program."'
Sometimes, too, students were encouraged to attend other courses
outside the law program itself.'29
Carrington, supra note 100, at 549-50; Douglas, supra note 59, at 207. For
earlier discussion describing Wilson's program at Philadelphia, see supra note
119 and accompanying text.
128. For example, at the College of William and Mary, in order to earn a law
degree, a student not only had to satisfy the requirements for the law degree
itself but had to satisfy the requirements for the Bachelor of Arts degree as
well. See supra note 118; see also McManis, supra note 59, at 611 (discussing
the requirements for two degrees and observing that, consequently, "the
instruction in law seems to have been a kind of graduate work, even though it
was open to those who were not degree candidates"). Regarding attendance of
the law program by students who were not seeking a law degree, see also id.
at 610 (noting that Wythe's lectures were "not limited to prospective
practitioners" but were "open to undergraduates, aspiring attorneys, and
civilians alike").
The law program at Transylvania University was also postgraduate in
nature. See Klafter, supra note 59, at 315-16 (explaining that Transylvania
"offer[ed] legal instruction on the post-graduated level, making it unnecessary
for it to provide a liberal arts education and giving the law faculty the
opportunity to focus on practical legal instruction"). Nevertheless, it seems
there were significant reading lists for those who had not already studied at
college. Andrew Siegel, Legal Education at Transylvania University: The
Surprisingly Familiar Story of a Surprisingly Unfamiliar Law School,
Presentation at the Southeastern Association of Law Schools Annual Meeting
(July 31, 2004).
With respect to the law program at Columbia, Carrington explains that
"Kent... made clear that he expected his students to be well-read in Greek
and Latin, to be masters of logic and mathematics, and to be well-grounded in
moral philosophy." Carrington, supra note 100, at 553. Although Kent's
lectures were open to all, it seems that most of his students were already
members of the bar who wanted help in organizing their legal knowledge.
McManis, supra note 59, at 613-14; see also supra note 125.
In his examination of Hoffman's program at Maryland, Shaffer states
that "[Hoffman's] lectures assumed that each of his students already had a
liberal education." Shaffer, supra note 117, at 133. Wilson at Philadelphia
most likely held similar expectations regarding the educational background of
his students. It seems that young apprentices comprised at least part of
Wilson's audience at Philadelphia. See Carrington, supra note 100, at 549.
For a description of the standard college curriculum, see supra note 72
and accompanying text.
129. At William and Mary, for example, students were encouraged, at least
under Wythe, to attend other lectures at the college. Carrington, supra note
100, at 535. This policy appears to reflect Jefferson's views regarding the
relationship between legal education and general education. Thus, according
to Brainerd Currie:
The Jeffersonian relation between legal and general education has two
aspects: (1) law is treated as a branch of government, and the course of
legal study embraces constitutional law, political economy, and
legislation; (2) the curriculum is so organized that the study of law can
be pursued, as the field of special interest, concurrently with other
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Assessments of these early college/university law programs
have varied. Some scholars, especially those writing in earlier
decades, have tended to be quite dismissive of all these efforts.13 °
Other scholars have argued, however, that the programs at
William and Mary and its offspring Transylvania in fact were
quite successful, while recognizing that for various reasons the
same cannot be said of the programs at Philadelphia, Columbia,
and Maryland.' Two related measures of comparative success are
the level of enrollment in, and the duration of, the respective
programs.
In this regard, although enrollments were not
particularly high at William and Mary or Transylvania,
enrollments were especially low at Philadelphia, Columbia, and
Maryland, and312these latter programs were also of comparatively
short duration.
(ii) Later law programs
Although the tradition of teaching law as part of the general
curriculum continued during the latter part of the period,
universities also established law schools (or equivalent law
programs) that were separate from the rest of the university
curriculum.'
This development began with the establishment of
university studies.
Currie, supra note 106, at 353-54. As discussed earlier, Jefferson's vision of
legal education was directly and consciously implemented at William and
Mary. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
130. For a brief survey of several of these dismissive assessments, see
Douglas, supra note 59, at 186 n.3 (reviewing assessments by Charles Warren
in 1911, Roscoe Pound in 1927, Robert Stevens in 1980, and Amy Colton in
1996).
131. See, e.g., McManis, supra note 59, at 609-17; Sheppard, Lecture Hall,
supra note 2, at 14-16. On the characterization of the law program at William
and Mary as successful, see Carrington, supra note 100, at 536, 537-38, 53940; on the characterization of the law program at Transylvania as successful,
see id. at 558-59. On the success of the program at William and Mary, see also
ERWIN GRISWOLD, LAW AND LAWYERS IN THE UNITED STATES 39 (1974)
(quoted in Douglas, supra note 59, at 186 n.3); Douglas, supra note 59, at 202,
206. For an ambivalent assessment of the programs at William and Mary, and
Transylvania, see Klafter, supra note 59, at 322. The discussions supra notes
125-27 are indicative of some of the difficulties encountered at Columbia,
Maryland, and Philadelphia respectively.
132. For data regarding enrollments, see supra note 123 (William and
Mary); supra note 124 (Transylvania); supra note 127 (Philadelphia); supra
note 125 (Columbia); and, supra note 126 (Maryland). See also REED I, supra
note 2, at 450-51 app. II, tbls.11 & 12 (providing statistics for selected schools
and years). For information regarding the duration of these programs, see
supra notes 123-127 and accompanying text. See also REED I, supra note 2, at
423 app. L.A (providing a chronological listing of "institutions offering
residential instruction in professional law"); supra note 97 and accompanying
text.
133. Regarding this development, see, for example, FRIEDMAN, supra note 2,
at 321-22, 606-09; REED I, supra note 2, at 140-42, 151-55. See also REED I,
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Harvard Law School in 1817."" These university law schools (and
equivalent programs) expanded at an increasing rate towards the
end of the period. Thus, Alfred Zantzinger Reed reports that by
1840, of the twelve law programs offering instruction in
professional law started since the Revolution, seven were still in
existence; by 1860, thirty such law programs had been started and
twenty-one were still in existence; by 1870, the number of law
programs started had risen to forty-one and those still in existence
to thirty-one. 3 ' However, the total attendance at all of these
schools was not particularly high. Reed gives rough estimates of
400 in 1850, 1200 in 1860, and a reported figure of 1,653 in 1870.136
Some universities established their law schools by absorbing an
already existing independent law school.'37 By 1840, the LL.B.
supra note 2, at 157-59, 324 (discussing some remaining connections between
undergraduate college programs and separate law programs).
134. For a listing of relevant programs established during the second part of
the period, see REED I, supra note 2, at 423-24 app.I.A (providing a
chronological listing of "institutions offering residential instruction in
professional law"). The relevant entries in the present context are: Harvard
University (1817-), Yale University (1824-), University of Virginia (1826-),
George Washington University (1826-27, 1865-), Dickinson College (1834-50,
1862-82, 1890-), University of Cincinnati (1835-41, 1842-), New York
University (1838-39, 1858-), Lafayette College (1841-52, 1875-84), Indiana
University (1842-77, 1889-), St. Louis University (1842-47, 1908-),
University of Georgia (1843-61, 1865-), University of North Carolina (184568, 1877-), University of Alabama (1845-46, 1873-), University of Louisville
(1846-), Princeton University (1846-52), Tulane University (1847-62, 1865-),
Cumberland University (1847-61, 1866-), Albany Law School (1851-),
University of Nashville (1854-55, 1870-72), University of Mississippi (1854-61,
1867-70, 1871-74, 1877-), De Pauw University (1854-62, 1884-94), Hamilton
College (1855-87), Baylor University (first location: 1857-59, 1865-72; second
location: 1920-), Northwestern University (1859-), University of Michigan
(1859-), McKendree College (first location: 1860-1901; second location: 189195), Iowa Law School (1865-68), Washington and Lee University (1866-),
Washington University (1867-), University of South Carolina (1867-68, 186973, 1873-77, 1884-), Howard University (1868-), State University of Iowa
(1868-), University of Wisconsin (1868-), Trinity College (first location:
1868-81; second location: 1890-94; third location: 1904-), University of Notre
Dame (1869-), St. Lawrence University (1869-72). Id. It should be noted
that the dates given by Reed are the dates of actual operation of the programs,
and that some of these dates extend beyond our time period. See also supra
notes 97 and 118-22 (for dates pertaining to the programs that continued at
William and Mary, and Transylvania, and the later programs that began
operation at Pennsylvania, Columbia and Maryland, during the second part of
the period).
135. REED I, supra note 2, at 152-53, 193, 444 app. II, tbl. 6.
136. Id. at 442 app. II, tbl. 1. The figure for 1870 is as reported to the U.S.
Commissioner of Education. Id. at 442 n.4.; see also id. at 450-51 app. II, tbls.
11-12 (giving attendance figures for individual schools). For Reed's statistics
on the number of lawyers in 1850, 1860, and 1870, see supra note 65.
137. STEVENS, supra note 2, at 5; see also supra note 134 (citing Reed's
chronological listing of institutions, which also indicates those institutions
that established their law schools in this manner).
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became the usual form of the first degree in law awarded by
universities."'
Once again, there seems td be disagreement regarding how
far the purpose of these later law programs was to help prepare
students for the practice of law and how far it was to train them
for a career in public life as future leaders of the Republic.'39 As is
138. For a discussion of this development, see REED I, supra note 2, at 16069.
139. For general discussion of these later university law school programs,
see FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 606-12; REED I, supra note 2, at 118-19, 13759, 453-56 app.III; STEVENS, supra note 2, at 21-22; Currie, supra note 106, at
359-67, 374-83; Levine, supra note 59, at 272; McManis, supra note 59, at 62031; Moline, supra note 59, at 797-800; Sheppard, Lecture Hall, supra note 2, at
16-23. See also George A. Matile, Letter of October 26, 1863 to Professor
EdouardLaboulaye, Concerning Law Schools in the United States (Brian Gill
tr.), reprinted in 1 THE HISTORY OF LEGAL EDUCATION, supra note 2, at
319-27; Carrington, Francis Lieber, supra note 106, at 339-55; Carrington,
Hail!Langdell!, supra note 108, at 695-701; Paul Carrington, Teaching Law in
the Antebellum Northwest, 23 U. TOL. L. REV. 3, 10-30 (1991) [hereinafter
Carrington, Antebellum Northwest]; Douglas, supra note 59, at 209-10;
Sheppard, Final Exams, supra note 2, at 820-23. For a discussion of the
situation in North Carolina, see Hunter, Institutionalization,supra note 2, at
422-32.
For materials relating to Harvard Law School's program under Story
and Greenleaf, see Joseph Story, A Discourse Pronounced Upon The
Inauguration of the Author, as Dane Professor of Law in Harvard University
(Aug. 25, 1829), reprinted in 1 THE HISTORY OF LEGAL EDUCATION, supra note
2, at 297-316; Simon Greenleaf, A DiscoursePronouncedat the Inaugurationof
the Author as Royall Professor of Law in Harvard University (Boston, Mass.
1834), reprintedin THE GLADSOME LIGHT, supra note 2, at 134-44.
For materials relating to the University of Virginia Law School, see
Catalogue of the University of Virginia Law School, 1851 [hereinafter Virginia
Catalogueof 1851], reprinted in Sheppard, supra note 2, at 317-18.
For materials relating to the law program at the College of William and
Mary under Beverly Tucker, see Nathaniel Beverly Tucker, A Lecture on the
Study of Law; Being an Introduction to a Course of Lectures on That Subject in
the College of William and Mary, 1 SOUTHERN LITERARY MESSENGER 145-54
(1834), reprinted in THE GLADSOME LIGHT, supra note 2, at 118-33.
For materials relating to the law program at Transylvania University
under Mayes, see Daniel Mayes, An Address to the Students of Law in
Transylvania University (1834), reprinted in THE GLADSOME LIGHT, supra
note 2, at 145-64.
For materials relating to Columbia Law School under Dwight, see
Theodore Dwight, Our Municipal Law, and the Best Mode of Acquiring a
Knowledge of It (1858) [hereinafter Dwight, Best Model, reprinted in 1 THE
HISTORY OF LEGAL EDUCATION, supra note 2, at 328-44; Theodore Dwight,
Municipal Law: Lecture Notes (1861-1871) [hereinafter Dwight, Lecture
Notes], in 1 THE HISTORY OF LEGAL EDUCATION, supra note 2, at 345-48;
Theodore Roosevelt, Lecture Notes (1880), in 1 THE HISTORY OF LEGAL
EDUCATION, supra note 2, at 377-86 (Roosevelt was one of Dwight's students).
For further discussion see Charles, supra note 2, at 349-76.
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the case for the early part of the period, 4 ° some appear to
emphasize the purpose of preparing students for legal practice.""
Paul Carrington considers that most of these law programs
represented a continuation of the more general effort to inculcate
public virtue in future leaders of the Republic.'
Others take a
more balanced position, emphasizing both purposes and
43
recognizing variations among different programs in this respect.'
In contrast to the early part of the period, however, there
appear to be two competing curriculum models, one narrower (the

For materials relating to the University of Michigan Law School under
Thomas Cooley, see Thomas Cooley, Address: Hints to Young Lawyers
(March 24, 1870), in 1 THE HISTORY OF LEGAL EDUCATION, supra note 2, at
387-97.
For materials relating to the University of California's Hastings College
of Law under John Pomeroy, see John Pomeroy, InauguralAddress (August 8,
1878), in 1 THE HISTORY OF LEGAL EDUCATION, supra note 2, at 398-405.
For materials relating to Tulane University Law School, see Christian
Roselius, Introductory Lecture (1854), in THE GLADSOME LIGHT, supra note 2,
at 224-40.
For materials relating to Benjamin Butler's plan to open a law school at
New York University in the mid-1830s, see Benjamin Butler, A Plan for the
Organizationof a Law School in the University of the City of New York (1835),
reprintedin THE GLADSOME LIGHT, supra note 2, at 165-82.
140. See supra notes 106-11 and accompanying text.
141. See, e.g., Currie, supra note 106, at 360-61, 375.
142. See, e.g., Carrington, Hail! Langdell!, supra note 108, at 699 (claiming
that "[w]ith few exceptions, antebellum law students did not study law in
universities to gain entry to a private profession, or to acquire credentials; if
their purpose was serious, they came to prepare themselves for public life").
See also Carrington, Francis Lieber, supra note 106, at 339-41 (asserting as
well that law programs "before 1870 often emphasized public law, frequently
as a companion to political economy and political ethics, and generally
included the law of nations as well as American constitutional law").
For Carrington's detailed examination of individual law programs
(planned or implemented), together with his assessment of the extent to which
their purpose was primarily to inculcate public virtue in future leaders of the
Republic, see Carrington, Antebellum Northwest, supra note 139, at 10-30
(discussing law programs at Ohio University, Miami University, Indiana
University, University of Cincinnati, Oberlin College, DePauw University, and
Case Western Reserve University); Carrington, Hail! Langdell!, supra, at 697
(discussing the law program at Harvard under Joseph Story); id. at 699-701
(discussing the programs at Columbia Law School and the University of
Michigan Law School). See also Carrington, FrancisLieber, supra note 108, at
344-46 (describing or listing programs at Hamilton, New York, Lafayette,
Cumberland, Louisiana (later Tulane), Mississippi, South Carolina, and
Virginia, in addition to the programs at Miami, Indiana, and Cincinnati);
Carrington, Transylvania University, supra note 106, at 698 (further
discussing the programs at Indiana, Louisiana, Mississippi, Cincinnati, and
Cumberland).
143. See, e.g., Douglas, supra note 59, at 209-10; McManis, supra note 59, at
620-31; see also REED I, supra note 2, at 118-19, 137-59 (discussing the
establishment of the law programs at Virginia, Harvard, and Yale, and the
eventual spread of a standardized law program).
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Harvard model) and one significantly broader (the Virginia model).
In the North, the typically narrower approach towards the law
school curriculum appears to reflect the great influence of Harvard
Law School after its reorganization by Joseph Story.!" With
respect to Story's general reorganization of Harvard during the
years following his appointment as Dane Professor in 1829, Reed
explains that Story demanded no particular level of prior
education for admission to the law school, developed a narrow
curriculum focusing on the common law and the Constitution, and
set the residence requirements for the degree at eighteen months
(twelve months for those already admitted to the bar).145
Moreover, Harvard exercised great influence on other law schools
in these three respects.146 It seems that, despite a residence
requirement of only eighteen months, the entire course of studies
at Harvard in fact required two years to complete, and that Story

144. See REED I, supra note 2, at 148-49, 155, 156; Currie, supra note 106, at
361, 366, 374-75; McManis, supra note 59, at 621. For a biographical note on
Story, see supra note 57.
145. REED I, supra note 2, at 142-51, 173; accord Currie, supra note 106, at
361-67; McManis, supra note 59, at 628-31. To a great extent, in these
respects Story was reinforcing tendencies that already existed at Harvard.
For a discussion of the 1817 establishment of the Harvard Law School on the
initiative of Chief Justice Parker, and of its development and difficulties
(including low enrollments) under the direction of Asahel Stearns prior to the
resignation of Parker and Stearns and the appointment of Story, see REED I,
supra note 2, at 137-40, together with McManis, supra note 2, at 626-27.
The professorship held by Story was endowed with a gift from Nathan
Dane, who made it a condition that Judge Story be the first incumbent. REED
I, supra note 2, at 142. Dane was the author of an Abridgment of American
Law, and in accordance with his central purpose of developing the law, he
stipulated expressly that Story be given time to publish as well as teach. Id.
at 142-43. John Hooker Ashmun joined Story at Harvard in 1829 to take care
of the more burdensome routine work. Id. Ashmun was succeeded by Simon
Greenleaf, and Story died in 1845; among the next generation of Harvard
professors, comprising Theophilus Parsons, Joel Parker, and Emory
Washburn, both Parsons and Washburn, like Greenleaf before them,
continued the Harvard tradition of scholarly publication begun by Story. See
id. at 142-43, 184 n.2, together with Sheppard, Lecture Hall, supra note 2, at
17-18. Moreover, Harvard was also very successful in terms of attendance,
with its enrollment exceeding that of Yale, Transylvania, and Virginia already
by the 1830s, and reaching the "enormous" figure of 163 in 1844, just before
Story died. REED I, supra note 2, at 143. Following Story's death in 1845,
however, there was "a quarter century of staleness" and a serious reduction in
attendance for a while, although enrollment rose again to 166 at the beginning
of the Civil War. Id. at 153, 186, 450-51 app. II, tbls.11 & 12.
146. See REED I, supra note 2, at 142-51. Currie notes that, particularly as a
result of Story's successful reorganization of Harvard Law School, "for the next
fifty years the necessity of university education as preparation for law study
was to be denied, and the scope of the university law curriculum was given a
narrowly professional definition which was to be controlling for more than a
century." Currie, supra note 106, at 361.
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reconciled
the two time periods by adopting a type of elective
147
system.
As far as the curriculum itself is concerned, 48 the pertinent
data given by Reed suggest that, by 1852, the Harvard curriculum
included the following subjects (the undated subjects already being
in the curriculum by 1835, and the other subjects being introduced
at the dates indicated): Blackstone and Kent, Property, Equity,
Contracts,
Bailments,
Corporations, Partnership, Agency,
Shipping, Constitutional Law, Pleading, Evidence, Insurance,
Sales, Conflicts, Bills (and, 1844, Notes), Criminal Law (1848),
Wills (1848), Arbitration (1848), Domestic Relations (1848),
Bankruptcy (1852). "' The curriculum did not expand again until
Torts was added in 1870.' 50 These subjects were supplemented by
moot court exercises.'
Interestingly, the development of a

147. See REED I, supra note 2, at 173, 361-63, 307. For statistics on the
pattern among law schools generally, regarding the length of the degree
course, see id. at 171. Thus, before the Civil War most law schools were oneyear schools. Of twenty-one schools in 1860, for example, twelve were oneyear schools, two were eighteen-month schools, and only six were two-year
schools (and one was unknown). Id. After the Civil War, however, the twoyear standard became general. Of the thirty-one schools in 1870, for example,
twelve were one-year schools, two were eighteen-month schools, and seventeen
were two-year schools; and of the sixty-one schools in 1890, only eight were
one-year schools and one an eighteen-month school, but forty-five were twoyear schools and seven were three-year schools. Id. Reed cautions, however,
that a comparison of law schools in terms of the length of their degree course
in academic years is unreliable "[a ] s a basis for estimating the relative amount
of training secured by the students in the several schools" due to considerable
differences in the length of the academic year, as well as various other factors.
Id. at 170, 172.
148. For data comparing the subjects included in the Harvard curriculum,
and the number of year-hours allotted to those subjects (or to the "teaching
compartment[s]" in which some of them were combined with each other) at
various selected dates, see REED I, supra note 2, at 457-58 app. IV.A-B
(1835-36, 1841-42, and 1859-60, as well as 1879-80, 1889-90, and 1916-17).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 284, 457 app. IV.A. Reed deliberately omitted moot court work
from his statistical data. Id. at 457-58 app. IV.A-B; supra notes 148-50. For a
description of the Harvard law program (including the curriculum),
presumably in 1863, see Matile, supra note 139, at 323-24.
For data
comparing the coverage in the Harvard curriculum at various times during
this period with the coverage in Blackstone's COMMENTARIES and in David
Hoffman's 1817 A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY, as well as with the coverage in
the curriculum of various other law schools (Litchfield, Virginia, and
Columbia), see REED I, supra note 2, at 453-56, app. III. It should be noted
that, at Harvard at least, most of the subjects in the curriculum were electives
(the elective principle having been introduced by Story to deal with the
problem of compressing a two-year course of study into eighteen months). Id.
at 307; see also supra note 147 and accompanying text. For a list of the
required and elective courses in Harvard's curriculum during the years 187072, see Sheppard, Final Exams, supra note 2, at 824 n.90 (giving a slightly
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comparatively narrow curriculum under Story (who died in 184515)
appears to be in tension with other indications given by him, in
particular his inaugural address in 1829 stressing the value for
lawyers of a broad legal education."
Indeed, Brainerd Currie
considers it "one of the paradoxes of the history of legal education"
that Story, who had "a lively appreciation of the professional
relevance of nontechnical studies" (for example, echoing
Blackstone in his inaugural address and admiring Hoffman's A
Course of Legal Study), should have been at least partly
responsible for the narrowing of law school curricula and the lack
of law school entrance requirements for the next fifty years.TM
On the other hand, from 1830 until 1869 the Harvard Law
School catalogues continued to include a bibliography of
recommended texts which apparently reflected the classification
and breadth of coverage in Hoffman's A Course of Legal Study. 5

different listing and nomenclature from that given by Reed).
152. See REED I, supra note 2, at 143, 153.
153. Thus, Story indicated in his inaugural address in 1829 that he
proposed, as Dane Professor, to give lectures on the Law of Nature, including
political philosophy, and the Law of Nations, in addition to Maritime and
Commercial Law, Equity Law and U.S. Constitutional Law. Story, supra note
139, at 309-13. However, Story already stated in his address that he would
speak only very briefly on many of the topics falling within the Law of Nature,
in part because, in his view, these topics were sufficiently addressed in prelegal "elementary education." Story, supra note 139, at 310; accord Currie,
supra note 106, at 364-65. Moreover, although Story included International
Law (i.e., the law of nations) and indeed Civil Law, as well as Criminal Law,
in the first curriculum published in 1830, these additional subjects were
dropped from the regular curriculum in 1832 and moved into an optional third
year. See REED I, supra note 2, at 146, together with Currie, supra note 106,
at 365-66.
In his inaugural address, Story also emphasized the value for lawyers of
becoming liberalized through the study of philosophy, history, and literature,
as well as the value of studying the art of rhetoric. Story, supra note 139, at
306-08. However, as Reed points out, not only did Story fail to include these
subjects in the law school curriculum; he also failed to insist upon college
study as well. REED I, supra note 2, at 146.
154. Currie, supra note 106, at 361-62. See also supra notes 48, 53, and 103
and accompanying text; infra notes 175-86, 191-93 and accompanying text
(discussing Blackstone's COMMENTARIES);
supra note
114-17 and
accompanying text (discussing Hoffman's Syllabus, whose general scope of
coverage was very similar to that of A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY, as well as
Story's characterization of Hoffman's A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY as "the most
perfect system for the study of law which has ever been offered to the public").
For identification of three central features of Story's reorganization of Harvard
Law School, including the development of a narrow curriculum and the lack of
law school entrance requirements, see supra note 145 and accompanying text.
See also REED I, supra note 2, at 144-50 (discussing Story's pragmatic reasons
for retreating, in his actual reorganization of Harvard, from the educational
ideals he had expressed so eloquently in his inaugural address).
155. REED I, supra note 2, at 454-56; see also supra notes 105, 115 and
accompanying text (discussing Hoffman's A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY).
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It is another question, of course, what effect such a recommended
reading list actually had. In addition, after Story's death in 1845
there were efforts to broaden the curriculum through the
introduction of courses or lectures in other subjects, including
International Law, Civil Law, and Parliamentary Law. It seems,
however, that such additions to the curriculum were only
occasional and temporary. 5 ' A further question concerns the
extent to which these two practices at Harvard - the provision of
a recommended reading list and occasional temporary additions to
the curriculum - were emulated by other law schools." 7
Several university law schools, particularly in the South,
adopted a significantly broader approach towards legal education
and thus represented something of a countertrend, at least for
much of this period.
These law schools were influenced in
particular by the University of Virginia, which opened in 1825 and
which implemented Jefferson's educational ideals.'58 Virginia was
similar to Harvard in that a prior college education was not a
requirement for admission to the law school,5 9 and the entire
course was originally intended to be completed in one year"'
(compared to eighteen months at Harvard), which soon expanded
to two years.161
156. See REED I, supra note 2, at 354 n.3 ("After Story's death an effort to
broaden the curriculum showed itself, among other ways, in the offering from
time to time of courses or lectures in International Law, Civil Law,
Parliamentary Law, Currency, etc., all ruthlessly eliminated by Langdell").
157. Comments by Reed, although not entirely unambiguous, suggest that
the provision of a bibliography of recommended readings indeed may have
been emulated by other law schools. See id. at 455 ("This list of recommended
texts, perpetuating an unhappily illogical scheme of classification continued to
be printed in the Harvard catalogues until 1869, and because of the custom of
exchanging catalogues between school and school undoubtedly spread
confusion throughout the country."). With respect to the confusion resulting
from illogical schemes of classification during this period, which is instanced
in this quote from Reed, see infra notes 471-72 and accompanying text.
158. See REED I, supra note 2, at 118-19, 154-56, 157, 324-26; McManis,
supra note 59, at 621-26; Currie, supra note 106, at 353-55, 357-58, and
374-83 (discussing as well the broader approach that developed at Columbia
towards the very end of the period and at Yale just after the end of the period).
For further discussion of Jefferson's educational ideals, see supra notes 11112, 129 and accompanying text, infra notes 402, 418 and accompanying text.
See also Douglas, supra note 59, at 185-87, 199, 211 (discussing the
liberalizing purpose of Jefferson in advocating a broad curriculum).
159. See REED I, supra note 2, at 144-45, 151; see also id. at 324-25, 326.
160. See id. at 170-71.
161. See McManis, supra note 59, at 625 (explaining that after 1830 the
broader liberal subjects were grouped into the junior year and the technical
subjects of "municipal law" were grouped into the senior year and that
completion of both years was required for graduation). But see Currie, supra
note 106, at 360-61 (stating that "the 'municipal law' studies were collected in
the regular course and the broader ones were relegated to an optional year")
(emphasis added).
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It seems that, like the slightly later Harvard list of
recommended texts, the original Virginia curriculum of 1825 also
reflected the classification and breadth of coverage in David
Hoffman's A Course of Legal Study.'62 Although the Virginia
curriculum became narrower over the years, it remained
For
significantly broader than the Harvard curriculum.'63
example, the following course of study, described in Virginia's
1851 Law School Catalogue, indicates the breadth of the Virginia
curriculum at that time: Junior Class: Vattel's International Law,
Lectures on Government, Federalist, Madison's Report of 1799,
Blackstone's Commentaries; Intermediate Class: Stephen on
Pleading, Barton's Suit in Equity, Coke on Littleton, Smith's
Mercantile Law, Greenleafs Evidence, Holcombe's Equity; Senior
Class: Story's Equity, Chitty on Contracts, Mitford's Equity
Pleadings, Lomax on Executors, etc., Byles on Bills and Notes,
White and Tudor's Leading Cases, Smith's Leading Cases,
Lectures on Civil Law.' These subjects were supplemented by a
comprehensive moot court program that included litigation and
drafting exercises and thus required students "to perform most of
the functions of a practicing lawyer."'
162. Thus, under the original curriculum plan, enacted by the Rectors and
Visitors of the University in 1825, the curriculum to be covered by the
Professor of Law and Politics included "the common and statute law, that of
the Chancery, the laws Feudal, Civil, Mercatorial, Maritime, and of Nature
and Nations; and also the principles of Government and Political Economy."
REED I, supra note 2, at 118 n.3. The subject of "Government" addressed
federal and state constitutional law. Id. at 456. As indicated in the article
text, it seems that this original curriculum closely followed Hoffman's A
COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY, and was just as comprehensive in its scope. Id. at
454-56. See supra note 105, 114-17 and accompanying text (discussing
Hoffman's A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY, and Hoffman's Syllabus). For further
discussion of the influence of A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY on the Harvard list
of recommended texts, see supra note 155 and accompanying text.
163. Thus, by 1851, nontechnical subjects such as "[plolitical economy and
history" had been crowded out of the curriculum; however, when the rapid
growth of case law threatened the same fate for the subjects of "politics, and
statutes, and international law," the University appointed a second professor
in that year to prevent this from occurring. REED I, supra note 2, at 119, 155;
McManis, supra note 59, at 626. The term "politics," in Reed's enumeration,
presumably refers to the subject of "Government," addressing the area of
federal and state constitutional law. See REED I, supra note 2, at 456.
164. Virginia Catalogue of 1851, supra note 139, at 317-18. The subject of
"Government" addressed federal and state constitutional law. REED I, supra
note 2, at 456.
165. Virginia Catalogue of 1851, supra note 139, at 317. Addressing the
general nature of each of these three classes, the Virginia Catalogue explains
that the Junior class is concerned with "studies... essential to the
professional student, and form[ing] a highly useful branch of general
education;" the Intermediate class is concerned, "exclusively, with the theory
and practice of law, as a profession;" and the Senior class involves "efforts ...
to impart a professional cultivation as liberal as the growing wants of the
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Consistent with their broader approach towards the law
school curriculum, several law schools influenced by the Virginia
curriculum model also followed Virginia in encouraging their
students to take parallel courses in other departments of the
university simultaneously with their law school work.'
It seems
that, from the beginning, there was considerably less opportunity
to take such parallel courses at Harvard.'6 7 However, many
students at Harvard and elsewhere had already received a college
education before attending law school."
(3) Methods of Instruction
The most common method of instruction at both the
independent law schools and in the college/university law
programs1 69 seems to have combined the reading of assigned texts
with classroom lecture. 7 ' Frequently, students were also required
county [sic] shall demand, or allow." Id. The Virginia Catalogue does not
appear to explain, however, whether the entire course of study remained a
two-year program, or was now envisaged to extend over three years. See
supra note 161 and accompanying text.
166. See REED I, supra note 2, at 119, 324-26; Currie, supra note 106, at 37576. Ultimately, Reed explains, this particular approach was not sustainable
due to the increasing volume of technical law (although it seems to have been
abandoned at Virginia itself at a somewhat earlier date, 1851, than was the
case at many other southern law schools). REED I, supra note 2, at 325-26;
accord Currie, supra, at 376-77. Once again, Virginia's approach in this
respect would appear to reflect Jefferson's views regarding the relationship
between legal education and general education. See supra note 129 and
accompanying text. However, the emulation of Virginia's example by other
southern law schools seems to have been supported on the basis of a different
underlying theory. See Currie, supra note 2, at 376 (discussing the desire of
these southern law schools "to preserve, as far as possible, the academic
element in legal education").
167. See REED I, supra note 2, at 145, 157-58; accord Currie, supra note 106,
at 363.
168. See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 606 ("No state made a law degree,
or a college degree, absolutely necessary for admission to the bar, either in
1850 or 1900. Yet many lawyers, even in the 1850s, did go to college, and
more and more students who could afford it chose law school as well."); REED I,
supra note 2, at 146 n.1 (giving figures for the proportion of law students at
Harvard with a prior college education, ranging from between usually twothirds and three-quarters in the earlier years, to fifty-six percent in 1844 and
forty-seven percent in 1869 and 1870). For a discussion of the standard
college curriculum, see supra note 72 and accompanying text.
169. For discussion of the methods of instruction used in these various
settings, see generally the references given in notes 80, 106, 139, many of
which discuss the pedagogical methods used by law teachers in the
independent law schools, the early college law programs, and the later
university law schools, respectively.
170. For a generalized discussion of the lecture-textbook method, see, for
example Levine, supra note 59, at 272 (noting that "[tihe first American law
schools that grew up to supplement apprenticeship training provided their
students with lectures and common law treatises or printed versions of the
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to read law reports, 7' and some teachers ensured the more active
participation of students in the classroom by requiring student
recitations or engaging in other dialogue. 7' In many cases, this
instruction was supplemented by moot court and certain other
The law teachers at the independent
types of practical exercises.'
law schools and in most of the college/university law programs
were practitioners or judges, some of whom were retired but many
of whom were still active; for the latter group, therefore, teaching
was just one part of a busy professional life.'

teachers' lecture notes"); Sheppard, Lecture Hall, supra note 2, at 18 (noting
that "most American law schools at mid-century employed relatively similar
lecturing styles, all more or less in the broad swathe of monologue styles");
Swygert and Bruce, supra note 2, at 979 n.299 (noting that "[tihe textbooklecture mode of instruction had been used almost exclusively in American law
schools from the time Litchfield Law School, the nation's first law school,
opened its doors in 1784," and that "[elarly law teachers utilized treatises [and
later their own texts] as the basic instructional tool," while "[iun the classroom,
law teachers lectured and law students took copious notes").
171. With respect to the assignment of cases for study, see, for example
Sheppard, Lecture Hall, supra, note 2, at 25 (noting that "[liecturers from
Wythe to Dwight expected students to read cases from the reports and to link
principles to cases" although "the cases were still secondary to the more
general principles and logical relationships between them"). See also STEVENS,
supra note 2, at 52 & n.14 (suggesting that the case method of instruction
itself was not original to Langdell, and explaining that John Pomeroy used the
case method at New York University in the 1860s); Levine, supra note 59, at
275 (same).
172. See, e.g., Sheppard, Lecture Hall, supra note 2, at 29 (observing, with
respect to Langdell's pedagogy, that "[an interrogative approach to the
classroom was certainly no innovation. Dwight and Hammond relied upon it,
Parsons had experimented with it, and Greenleaf had exercised students with
it"); Swygert and Bruce, supra note 59, at 979 n.299 (noting that although
"[tihere was little, if any, dialogue.... some teachers quizzed students about
their rote memory of the assignment"); see also LAPIANA, supra note 2, at 4849 (discussing the "classroom dialogue" employed at Harvard, including
dialogue employed by Story and Parker); STEVENS, supra note 2, at 5 n.21, 53
n.18 (discussing other law teachers, such as Pearson, Lomax, and Dwight who
used a "Socratic" method of teaching).
173. See, e.g., REED I, supra note 2, at 284 (referring to the type of "practical
training which is represented by moot courts and by drill in the drafting of
written instruments," and noting that "[firom the very beginning, all schools
had included this first feature in their curriculum, and several had included
the second"); Hoeflich, Theory and Practice,supra note 2, at 861-75 (discussing
the integration of theory and practice in antebellum legal education);
Sheppard, Final Exams, supra note 2, at 832-33 (discussing moot courts as
well as various kinds of student writing requirements and opportunities); see
also Matile, supra note 139, at 324 (reproducing the Syllabus for the program
offered at Harvard, presumably in 1863, and noting that the Syllabus (which
also included Moot Court) "is a good illustration of what legal instruction in
the United States is like").
174. See, e.g., REED I, supra note 2, at 132-33 (independent law schools);
Sheppard, Lecture Hall, supra note 2, at 14-16 (briefly profiling many of the
professors in the early college law programs); FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 609-
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Significant Legal Literature:Blackstone, Kent, and Story

In the passage quoted earlier in Part I.B'75 Farnsworth singles
out Blackstone's Commentaries, Kent's Commentaries, and Story's
series of treatises as especially important within the legal
literature of the period. 7 ' Study of these and other works was
typically part of a formal legal education (Blackstone during the
early part of the period; and Blackstone, together with Kent and
Story, during the latter part).'77 Because of their importance in the
legal education of the period, and in order to provide a reference
for the subsequent discussion, it may be helpful here to elaborate
upon certain central features of Blackstone's Commentaries,
Kent's Commentaries, and Story's treatises.
With respect to the general character, structure, and content
of Blackstone's Commentaries,'78 Sheppard explains that:
10; REED I, supra note 2, at 182-84; STEVENS, supra note 2, at 38 (later
university law schools).
175. See supra notes 52-58 and accompanying text.
176. For a useful study of the types of English and American legal literature
that were available during this period, focusing especially on the genre of the
treatise, see generally A.W.B. Simpson, The Rise and Fall of the Legal
Treatise: Legal Principles and the Forms of Legal Literature, 48 U. CHI. L.
REV. 632 (1981). See also ROSCOE POUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN
LAW 138-72 (1938) (surveying the treatise genre); Swygert and Bruce, supra
note 59, at 967-70 (surveying, briefly, the treatise genre).
For a survey focusing on the American legal literature of the period
(including law reports and legal periodicals as well as treatises), see
FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 322-33, 621-29. See also Swygert and Bruce,
supra note 59, at 970-76 (law reports and legal periodicals); Sheppard, Lecture
Hall, supra note 2, at 16-18 (treatises). Regarding the variable understanding
of the term "treatise," see infra notes 191-93 and accompanying text.
For additional discussion of particular authors and their works, see
REED I, supra note 2, at 110-12 (Blackstone's COMMENTARIES); Langbein,
supra note 2, especially at 211, 213-14, 219-23 (Kent's COMMENTARIES, and
Blackstone's COMMENTARIES); Sheppard, Lecture Hall, supra note 2, at 10-13
(Coke's The First Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England, and
Kent's
COMMENTARIES,
Blackstone's
COMMENTARIES).
Blackstone's
COMMENTARIES, and Story's series of treatises are all examples of early legal
See infra notes 267-73 and
science and are discussed further below.
accompanying text (discussing early American legal science).
177. See, e.g., POUND, supra note 176, 144, 163-64 (1938); Sheppard, Lecture
Hall, supra note 2, at 16-17. See also Matile, supra note 139, at 324
(observing, still in 1863, that "Blackstone and Kent are the two pivots around
which the studies of the young American turn"); Moline, supra note 59, at 791
("Blackstone remained an essential component of legal training, in both
academia and law offices, for a century and a half after its first publication");
id. at 794-95 ("Kent's Commentaries dominated legal thinking in this country
for many years"); id. at 799 ("Story's Commentaries were a basic staple of legal
education in America for many years"); Simpson, supra note 176, at 670
(explaining that "[flrom Story's time, the production of treatises was
associated with organized, systematic legal education").
178. For earlier general discussion of Blackstone's COMMENTARIES, see
supra notes 48, 53 and accompanying text.

1092

The John Marshall Law Review

[39:1041

Blackstone's outline is derived in part from that of Matthew Hale's
1716 The Analysis of the Law, on which Blackstone had also

modeled his syllabus. The Commentaries are organized into four
interdependent books, considering the rights of persons, the rights
of things, private wrongs, and public wrongs. The sections are
broken into subheadings, each considering some particular subject
in detail with surprisingly clear and readable prose. The sum of the
work is so comprehensive that one might imagine there was little
law left undescribed... Reading Blackstone in the late twentieth
century is a bit like reading a current treatise; one is left with a
reasonably, but not overly, detailed understanding of a host of
related legal doctrines and their applications. 7 9
Blackstone's Commentaries were based on his lectures at
Oxford; 8 ° and the content and methodology of both are usefully
summarized by Blackstone himself in the following statement
advertising his proposed lectures:
[Ilt is proposed to lay down a general and comprehensive plan of the
laws of England; to deduce their history; to enforce and illustrate
their leading rules and fundamental principles; and to compare
them with the laws of nature and of other nations; without entering
into practical
niceties or the minute distinctions of particular
181
cases.
Half of Book I of the Commentaries, on the Law of Persons, deals
with governmental functions, in particular the monarch,
parliament, and executive powers."' Moreover, Book I begins by
addressing, in about 115 pages, various introductory general
matters, including the study of law, the nature of laws in general,
the grounds and foundations of the laws of England, and the
countries subject to the laws of England."u With regard to the first
three topics, it should be noted that (a) Blackstone's treatment of
the study of law includes a discussion of the history of legal
education in England and the value of studying the common law at
a university; (b) his jurisprudential treatment of the nature of
laws in general includes a discussion of four main types of law:
natural law, divine law, the law of nations, and municipal law
(including certain matters of political theory, such as the origins,
nature, and basis of civil society and of government, sovereignty,
and forms of government); and (c) his treatment of the grounds
and foundations of the laws of England includes a discussion of the
179. Sheppard, Lecture Hall, supra note 2, at 12.
180. Id.

181. Moline, supra note 59, at 789 (quoting Blackstone); see also 1 TUCKER,
BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES, supra note 103, at 34-35 (to the same effect).
182. See Langbein, supra note 2, at 222.

183. Blackstone's own analytical tables for his COMMENTARIES are
reproduced in Duncan Kennedy,
The Structure of Blackstone's
COMMENTARIES, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 209 (1979). See id. at 224 (Book I); id. at
225 (Book II); id. at 228 (Book III); id. at 230 (Book V).
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nature of the two main sources of English law - the unwritten
law (general customs or the common law, particular customs, civil
law, and canon law) and the written or statute law - as well as
the role of equity in supplementing or modifying these sources.
Moreover, in accordance with his stated intent regarding content
and methodology," Blackstone's treatment of substantive law
throughout the remainder of the Commentaries explicitly
identifies and discusses rules and principles originating in these
different types and sources of law.
It should also be noted that Volume One of St. George
Tucker's influential 1803 American edition of Blackstone is
devoted to the first part of Book I of the Commentaries in which
Blackstone addresses the various general introductory matters
identified above,'85 and that it also includes an extensive Appendix
in which Tucker discusses at considerable length the matters of
political theory briefly addressed by Blackstone in the first part of
Book I, as well as the Virginia Constitution, the U.S. Constitution,
and the status of English common law in America."
Turning now to
Kent's
Commentaries,"' Sheppard
summarizes the general character, structure, and content of Kent's
work as follows:
Kent's Commentaries were both an American version of Blackstone
and more. Following a theme he developed in his lectures, he
included significant sections on international law, as well as the
history and government of the United States. There are six major
sections: the law of nations, United States government, municipal
law, personal rights, personal property, and real property. Part I
was innovative, as there seems to be no earlier treatise of
international law originally in the English language. Although Part
II is largely a paraphrase of Supreme Court opinions, the remaining
volumes are a clear narrative of commercial and property law, with
a then-unusual emphasis on commercial transactions. The critical
facet of the Commentaries was Kent's care to keep it updated in
response to new opinions. He oversaw six editions between 1830
and his death in 1847, and each edition reflected state and federal
opinions in each area up to that time. 86

184. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
185. See supra note 183 and accompanying text. For earlier discussion of
Tucker's 1803 American edition of Blackstone's COMMENTARIES, see supra
notes 53, 103, 118 and accompanying text.
186. The Appendix, which comprises more than three-quarters of Volume
One (some 443 pages), also contains a short discussion of various matters
relating to statutes in Virginia, including the status of British statutes. The
other four volumes of Tucker's edition contain their own, albeit considerably
shorter, appendices.
187. For earlier discussion of Kent's COMMENTARIES, see supra notes 56,
104, 120 and accompanying text.
188. Sheppard, Lecture Hall, supra note 2, at 16-17.
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It should also be noted that Kent's treatment of the sources of
municipal law in Part III of his Commentaries includes a
discussion of the nature of statutes and the common law, as well
as a discussion of legal literature and the civil law. l"9 In the
Commentaries Kent was particularly concerned to adapt English

common law to American conditions."
The reader will note that in the passage quoted in Part I.B
Farnsworth uses the term "treatise" to describe Blackstone's
Commentaries and Kent's

Commentaries.9'

John Langbein,

however, considers that Blackstone's Commentaries and Kent's
Commentaries are more appropriately viewed as "institutes of
national law" rather than as legal treatises, the crucial distinction
being that an institute deals with a broad range of subjects, and
indeed seeks to be comprehensive, whereas a treatise examines
one topic in much greater depth.1"
In addition to being
comprehensive, such institutional writing is systematic in a very
particular way (adopting the basic persons-things-actions format
of Justinian's Institutes), and seeks to provide an introduction to
the law9 3 as well as to help create and unify a national legal
system.

The use of the term "treatise" to describe Joseph Story's nine
Commentaries is uncontroversial, given the limited scope and indepth treatment of the area of law being addressed in each book.9

189. Part I ("Of the Law of Nations"), Part II ('Of the Government and
Constitutional Jurisprudence of the United States"), and Part III ("Of the
Various Sources of the Municipal Law of the Several States") are all contained
in the first volume of Kent's four-volume COMMENTARIES.
190. Moline, supra note 59, at 795, states:
Kent's COMMENTARIES stressed the English common law foundation of
American law, but emphasized that it was to be followed only to the
extent it would prove suitable for American conditions. Kent drastically
modified English land law, for example, declaring much of it
inapplicable to America.
Feudal land law, with its complicated
doctrines of estates tail, primogeniture, and other medieval rules that
restricted transfer and descent of real property, had no place in
American law.
191. See supra notes 53, 56 and accompanying text. Sheppard may
represent another example of such a usage in the passages quoted supra notes
179, 188 and accompanying text. See also infra note 193 (referencing
additional examples).
192. Langbein, supra note 2, at 219-22.
193. Id. On the distinction between institutes and treatises, see also
Simpson, supra note 176, at 633-34, 652, 670. Practice in the use of the term
"treatise" is variable. For example, Simpson uses the term (like Langbein) in
the narrower sense. Id. Swygert and Bruce, Pound, and Friedman, on the
other hand, use the term (like Farnsworth) in the broader sense, including
"institutes." See the sources cited supra note 176.
194. For earlier discussion of Story's series of COMMENTARIES, see supra
note 57 and accompanying text.
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The following passage by Sheppard will serve to summarize their
general character and contents:
[Story's] series of treatises ... ultimately included books on
bailments, constitutional law, conflicts of law, equity principles,
equity pleadings, agency, partnership, and bills and notes. These
commentaries [were] produced at a furious rate while Story was also
serving on the Court .... The commentaries are narrative, but with
numerous arguments and illustrations derived from cases and their
facts, although cases were usually cited merely, if copiously, as
authority for specific points in the narrative. He argued for
particular points, notably in the constitutional law treatise, on
which there was no case law or prior commentary. While Story
certainly echoed the form of the works before his, the
comprehensiveness of his books and his uniformity of treatment
across a host of subjects were unusual and seem to have solidified
the form of the modem subject-area treatise. Most later treatises,
even into
the twentieth century, have very much followed the same
195
course.
As several of the titles of Story's Commentaries themselves
suggest, Story valued comparative inquiry, often examining
solutions adopted under foreign law, and especially under the civil
law."
B. PrevailingJurisprudenceand PrevailingProfessionalIdeal
In this section we explore the jurisprudential ideas and the
professional ideal that appear to have prevailed for much or most
of the period, and consider how law students would have been
exposed to those ideas and that ideal as part of their formal legal
education. Subsection 1 addresses the prevailing jurisprudential
ideas, and Subsection 2 addresses the prevailing professional
ideal.
1.

PrevailingJurisprudence

The prevailing jurisprudence of the period comprised several
different elements with which early American lawyers would have
been familiar. The first five subsections below elaborate on the
nature of various of these jurisprudential elements. Subsection a
addresses the nature of the common law tradition. Subsection b
examines some central elements of classical common law thought:
specifically, the nature of common law reason as understood in
classical common law thought, and three related notions that
represent some further ways in which the common law was
conceptualized in that thought. Subsection c then discusses the
character of associated natural law thinking in early American

195. Sheppard, Lecture Hall, supra note 2, at 17.
196. See supra note 57 (listing the titles of Story's COMMENTARIES).
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legal thought. Subsection d considers the extent to which the
three related notions of classical common law thought and the
associated natural law thinking in early American legal thought
may (or may not) have been displaced, particularly during the
latter part of the period, by the emergence of a new,
instrumentalist conception of law. Subsection e addresses the
character of early American legal science.
Following the
discussion of these various jurisprudential elements, Subsection f
discusses how students of the law would have become familiar
with them during their legal education.
Certain additional
elements of the prevailing jurisprudence dealing with matters of
political theory will not be discussed here, but will be addressed in
Section B.2 below on the prevailing professional ideal, to which
they are especially pertinent.
a.

General Nature of the Common Law Tradition

Early American lawyers would have been familiar, of course,
with the nature of the common law tradition in which they were
the central participants. In her book A Nation Under Lawyers
Mary Ann Glendon provides us with a brief, but useful and lively
description of the common law tradition.'97 Glendon claims that
the historical development of the common law is "a textbook
example" of a "living tradition" as defined by Alasdair
MacIntyre.98 A living tradition, explains Glendon, is:
[Olne that is "historically extended" and "socially embodied," whose
development constantly points beyond itself. To be a traditionalist
in such a tradition is not to be frozen in the past, or mired in the
status quo, but rather to participate in an intense ongoing
conversation
about what it is that gives the tradition its point and
199
purpose.
197. See MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS: HOW THE CRISIS
IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION IS TRANSFORMING AMERICAN SOCIETY
179-83

(1994).
198. Id. at 182.
PAULO

G.

See also MARY ANN GLENDON, MICHAEL W. GORDON &
CAROZZA, COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS IN A NUTSHELL 14 (2d

ed., 1999) ("The Anglo-American common law tradition and the RomanoGermanic civil law tradition are operating examples of philosopher Alasdair
MacIntyre's concept of a living tradition."). MacIntyre provides the following

definition of a "living tradition": "A living tradition.., is an historically
extended, socially embodied argument, and an argument precisely in part

about the goods which constitute that tradition.

Within a tradition the

pursuit of goods extends through generations, sometimes through many
generations." ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 222 (2d ed., 1984); see
also GLENDON, supra note 197, at 179 (reproducing McIntyre's definition of a
"living tradition"); GLENDON, GORDON & CAROZZA, supra, at 14 (same); MARY
ANN

GLENDON,

MICHAEL

W.

GORDON

AND

CHRISTOPHER

OSAKWE,

COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS: TEXT, MATERIALS AND CASES 17 (2d. ed.,
1994) (same); see also infra notes 313 (further discussing MacIntyre).
199. GLENDON, supra note 197, at 182 (quoting MacIntyre, supra note 198).

2006]

A History of U.S. Legal Education Phase I

1097

In the following passage, Glendon elaborates upon the nature
of the common law tradition and upon its distinctive mode of
evolution, observing that "[tihe common law is an evolving body of
principles built by accretion from judicial decisions, rendered in
the context of countless individual disputes," and that the key to
common law evolution is "a distinctive set of habits and practices"
shared by its participants:
The expression "common law tradition" refers to the type of law, and
the mode of lawmaking, that historically distinguished the English
legal system from the Romano-Germanic legal systems of
continental Europe. The common law is an evolving body of
principles built by accretion from judicial decisions rendered in the
context of countless individual disputes. Because those principles
are embedded in concrete cases, they are highly fact-sensitive, and
not too general. Until relatively recent times, the common law and
the craft techniques associated with it were transmitted from one
generation to the next chiefly by practitioners ....

Over centuries that saw the rise and fall of feudalism, the
expansion of commerce, and the transition to constitutional
monarchy and representative government, judges and lawyers
adapted English law to each new circumstance, neither erasing
prior arrangements completely nor becoming captives of them ....
The key to the common law's ability to change and grow while
maintaining its coherence and continuity was a distinctive set of
habits and practices which its participants learned through doing
and by observing and imitating others. To try to describe those
methods is a bit like trying to describe swimming or bicycle riding.
But the conventional understanding goes something like this: the
common law judge is supposed to be a virtuoso of practical reason,
weaving together the threads of fact and law, striving not only for a
fair disposition of the dispute at hand but to decide each case with
reference to a principle that transcends the facts of that case - all
with a view toward maintaining continuity with past decisions,
deciding like cases alike, and providing guidance for other parties
similarly situated; and all in the spirit of caring for the good of the
legal order itself and the polity it serves.200
In the above passage Glendon is addressing the general nature of
the common law tradition and she identifies several specific
features of that tradition. One way to approach the discussion of
individual jurisprudential elements below is to regard that
discussion as illuminating the particular forms taken by some of
these features during our period. Thus, the nature of "practical
200. Id. at 179-81. Taking her cue from Karl Llewellyn's in-depth analysis of
appellate judging in his book The Common Law Tradition:Deciding Appeals,
Glendon considers that "[tihe best times were those marked by what Llewellyn
called the 'Grand Style."' Id. at 181 (discussing KARL LLEWELLYN, THE
COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS (1960)). For further discussion

of Llewellyn's account of Grand Style appellate judging, see infra note 253 and
accompanying text.
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reason" and common law "principles" are illuminated in
Subsection b(1), the relationship between "coherence and
continuity" and "change and grow[th]" in Subsection b(2), and "the
good of the legal order ... and the polity it serves" in Subsections
c, d, and e. The transmission of the "common law and the craft
techniques associated with it" from one generation to the next,
chiefly by practitioners, is of course largely addressed in Section A
above, which provides an overview of legal education settings.
b.

Elements of Classical Common Law Thought

Early American lawyers would have been familiar with the
central elements of classical common law thought. In particular,
they would have been familiar with the nature of common law
reason as understood in classical common law thought and with
three related notions that represent some further ways in which
the common law was conceptualized in that thought.
The
discussion of these elements of classical common law thought in
this subsection, and especially the discussion of the three related
notions in b(2), draws in large part upon Gerald Postema's
authoritative account of classical common law theory in his work
on Jeremy Bentham and the common law tradition.2 "1 Postema
uses the term "classical common law theory" to refer to a
jurisprudential theory about the nature of law that "begins to take
distinctive shape with Coke" in the late sixteenth and early
seventeenth centuries. 2 This period marks the beginning of the
201. See GERALD POSTEMA, BENTHAM AND THE COMMON LAW TRADITION,
especially at 3-39, 60-80 (1986); see also ROGER COTTERRELL, THE POLITICS OF
JURISPRUDENCE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 21-37

(1989) (discussing the theory of common law).
The discussion in this
subsection focuses on the common law. For a useful discussion of the system
and science of "equity" as it developed in the United States, see PERRY
MILLER, THE LIFE OF THE MIND IN AMERICA FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE

CIVIL WAR 171-82 (1965).
202. See POSTEMA, supra note 201, at 3 n.1. Postema elaborates upon the
origins of "classical common law theory" as follows:
Classical common law theory was born at a time when, emerging from
feudalism, modern English society and the modern state were taking
shape. Political power was increasingly centralized and the ideology of
absolutism was making inroads not only on the continent of Europe, but
also in England... Common Law theory arose, in part, in response to
the threat of centralized power exercised by those who proposed to make
law guided by nothing but their own assessments of the demands of
justice, expediency, and the common good. Against the spreading
ideology of political absolutism and rationalism, Common Law theory
reasserted the medieval idea that law is not something made either by
king, Parliament, or judges, but rather is the expression of a deeper
reality which is merely discovered and publicly declared by them... But
Common Law theory gave this medieval doctrine a distinctively
historical twist. For the deeper reality manifested in the public statutes
and judicial decisions was not a set of universal rational principles, but
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great debate between classical common law theory and legal
positivism, which has continued, in one form or another, until the
present time. 3 From this perspective, the confrontation between
Coke and James I, and the confrontation between Hobbes and
common lawyers such as Coke, as represented in Hobbes'
Dialogue, discussed in b(1) below, can be seen as early opening
salvos in this continuing debate identified by Postema.2"
(1) Nature of Common Law Reason in Classical Common Law
Thought
As Mary Ann Glendon explains in the passage above, the
common law judge is considered to be "a virtuoso of practical
reason."0 5 Central to classical common law thought is the idea
that the common law is "artificial reason." 6 This idea was
famously articulated by Lord Coke in the early seventeenth
century. In a memorable confrontation with King James I in 1608,
concerning authority to decide the scope of ecclesiastical court
jurisdiction, Coke (who was then Chief Justice of the Court of
Common Pleas) expounded on the difference between "natural
reason" and the "artificial reason" of the common law:
Then the King said, that he thought the law was founded upon
reason, and that he and others had reason, as well as the Judges: to
which it was answered by me, that true it was, that God had
endowed His Majesty with excellent science, and great endowments
of nature; but his Majesty was not learned in the laws of his realm
of England, and causes which concern the life, or inheritance, or
goods, or fortunes of his subjects, are not to be decided by natural
reason but by the artificial reason and judgment of law, which law is
an art which requires long study and experience, before that a man
can attain to the cognizance of it: that the law was the golden metwand and measure to try the causes of the subjects; and which
protected His Majesty in safety and peace: with which the King was
greatly offended, and said, that then he should be under the law,
which was treason to affirm, as he said; to which I said, that
Bracton saith, quod Rex non debet esse sub homine, sed sub Deo et

lege ["the king should not be under man but under God and the

rather historically evidenced national custom.
Id. at 3-4.

203. See id. at 3-4, 39-40, 60-61 (evidencing the debate between classical
common law theory and legal positivism); see also id. at vii-ix (discussing the
importance of understanding the debate).
204. See infra note 207 and accompanying text (discussing the confrontation
between Coke and James I); infra notes 220-22 and accompanying text
(discussing Hobbes' DIALOGUE).
205. See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
206. For an explanation of the term "classical common law theory," see supra
note 202 and accompanying text.
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law"] .207

Glendon elaborates further upon Coke's understanding of the
"artificial reason" of the common law, linking it to the "habits and
attitudes" (i.e., the "shared legal culture") of the participants in
the common law tradition. Indeed, she seems to suggest that this
"artificial reason" is the very expression of those habits and
attitudes:
Practicing lawyers, as participants in that tradition, framed their
instruments and arguments with such habits and attitudes in view.
It was that shared legal culture that stood behind Lord Coke's
famous insistence: "Reason is the life of the law; nay, the common
law itself is nothing else but reason." To Coke, "reason" did not
mean deductive logic, or self-interested calculation, or any activity of
an individual mind in isolation. It was, rather, an extended
collaborative dialogue, a group achievement, "an artificial perfection
of reason gotten by long studie, observation and experience... fined
and refined [over
the ages] by an infinite number of grave and
208
learned men."

207. Prohibitions del Roy, 12 Coke Rep. 63, 65, 77 Eng. Rep. 1342, 1343
DANIEL R. COQUILLETTE, THE ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL

(1608); see also

HERITAGE: INTRODUCTORY MATERIALS

315-17 (2d. ed., 2004) (quoting and

discussing Prohibitions del Roy); id. at 338-39 (reproducing the full report).
Coquillette explains the background of the case as follows:

It is also less a report of a law case, than an account of an ongoing
dispute between the King and the common law judges, represented by
Coke. The dispute began because the Archbishop of Canterbury greatly
resented the writs of prohibition which were being issued by the

common law courts to limit Church courts' jurisdiction. Ecclesiastical

patronage was valuable to both Archbishop and the King, and the King,
in his role as the Head of the Anglican Church, took the Archbishop's
side. The King finally lost his patience with the common law judges,
and sought to intervene directly in what he saw as a dispute between
two branches of his "own" court system.
Id. at 315. When he inherited the English throne as Elizabeth I's closest heir,
James I of England was already King James VI of Scotland and head of the
House of Stuart. Id. at 311. Coming to the English throne with certain
"inherent disadvantages," James I asserted his "famous 'Divine Right' theory,
and his concept of the modern absolute monarchy as the cornerstone of the
modern centralized state." Id. at 311-12.
As Coquillette also explains, the confrontation between Coke and
James I recorded in Prohibitionsdel Roy "has become a symbol of the rule of
law courageously defying totalitarianism, and was invoked by American
revolutionaries and English parliamentarians alike." Id. at 316. Although the
actual encounter may have gone rather differently, Coke was "the one who
conveyed the report to posterity." Id. at 316-17; see also id. at 340 (recounting
James I flying into a rage and Coke prostrating himself and begging
forgiveness).
208. GLENDON, supra note 197, at 181 (quoting EDWARD COKE, THE FIRST
PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 97b, § 138) (alteration in
Glendon).
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Gerald Postema provides further insights into the nature of
common law reason in his work on Jeremy Bentham and the
common law tradition. 0 9 Postema explores the nature of common
law reason in the context of his discussion of classical common law
theory.1 0 He detects "two conceptions of reason (or reasoning) at
work in th[is] theory" - a "particularist" conception, which focuses
on the concrete situations of particular cases, and in which
"reasoning is analogical, arguing from particular case to particular
case, reflecting 'upon the likenesses and dissimilarities of
particular instances, either actual or hypothetical, particular to
particular'"; and a broader conception, which focuses on "general
justifying principles... instanced in, and illustrated by, particular
decisions and settled rules," and in which reason is "reflective,"
capable of transforming the common law into a "rationalscience
based on first principles."21' Addressing these two conceptions of
reason, Roger Cotterell explains that because the first conception
of reason "could ... tolerate broad illogicalities arising out of
particular analogical linkages of ideas or cases," while the second
conception emphasizes "'general and extensive principles,'" the
common law "might permit illogicalities of detail within an overall
framework of broad principle."21' Consequently, "[t]here is... no
simple key to unlock the assumed rationality of the common
law."213 Arguably, Glendon has both conceptions of reason in mind
when she describes the common law as "an evolving body of
principles" that are "highly fact sensitive, and not too general."14
209. See POSTEMA, supra note 201, at 30-38.
210. For an explanation of the term "classical common law theory," see supra
note 202 and accompanying text.
211. Id. at 30-33 (quoting Roy Stone, Ratiocination Not Rationalisation,74
MIND 481 (1965)) (emphasis in original).

According to Postema, the broader

conception became particularly important by the mid-eighteenth century. Id.

at 30, 33.
212. COTTERRELL, supra note 201, at 34 (quoting William Blackstone, 1
COMMENTARIES 2 (E. Christian ed., 15th ed., 1809), 2 COMMENTARIES 425 (E.
Christian ed., 15th ed., 1809)).

213. Id.
214. See supra note 200 and accompanying text. Thus, with regard to the
first, "particularist" conception of reason, and Glendon's characterization of
the common law as an "evolving body of principles," Glendon may be using the
term "principles" here to include rules as well as broader "principles." With
regard to the second conception of reason, and Glendon's characterization of

'principles" as "highly fact sensitive, and not too general," this would appear
to be consistent with Postema's understanding of general principles as

"instanced in, and illustrated by, particular decisions and settled rules." See
supra note 211 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 239 and 241 and
accompanying text (discussing further Postema's understanding of this aspect
of general principles). Neither Glendon nor Postema, however, seems clearly
to address the distinction between lower-level principles and higher-level
principles. For a very helpful discussion of the role of "principles" in the
history of the common law, see Simpson, supra note 176, at 641-55, 658-79.
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Similarly, Cotterell appears to understand the term "artificial
reason" to include both conceptions of common law reason, 15 while
Postema may understand it to include only the first, particularist
conception."'
As suggested in the two passages above," 7 "experience" plays
a crucial role in common law reasoning in two main ways. First, a
proper understanding of the "artificial reason" of the common law
requires "long study and experience."
Second, the "artificial
reason" of the common law is itself the result of the experience of
an "infinite number of grave and learned men." The crucial role of
experience in the first sense, as well as of certain other factors, is
emphasized by Anthony Kronman in an interesting comparison of
the "artificial reason" of the common law tradition with the
Aristotelian tradition of political thought.'
Kronman explains
that these two traditions resemble each other in three main
respects.
Thus, they both emphasize the necessity of long
experience (to acquire the relevant knowledge, which is complex
and disorderly), the difficulty of attaining mathematical precision
(with the result that there is always room for "reasonable
disagreement"), and the importance of sound character (in
particular, the virtue of prudence or practical wisdom) as well as
intellectual acuity, in achieving true understanding.2 19
More specifically, Kronman elaborates upon these three
characteristics of "artificial reason" in the context of a discussion
of Thomas Hobbes' A Dialogue Between a Philosopher and a
Student of the Common Law of England, in which the
"philosopher," who represents Hobbes himself, advocates the use
of "natural reason" (i.e., "the universal powers of ratiocination that
every human being possesses") to resolve legal questions, while
the "student," who represents the common lawyers, in particular
Coke, argues that such matters can only be rightly decided by the
215. See COTIERELL, supra note 201, at 34 (explaining, immediately
following the language quoted supra notes 212-13 and accompanying text, that
"[iun particular, there is no key which an untrained person could use ....
According to common law thought, law is not natural reason but refined or
artificial reason which, as Coke asserted, 'requires long study and experience,
before that a man can attain to the cognisance of it.'" Id. (quoting Prohibitions
del Roy, 12 Coke Rep. 63, 65, 77 Eng. Rep. 1342, 1343).
216. Compare POSTEMA, supra note 201, at 30, 33 (seeming to equate
"artificial reason" with the first, "particularist" conception, the "reason... of
the law," as contrasted with the second, broader conception, or "reason in the
law") (emphasis in original), with id. at 36 (explaining that both types of
reason are "traditional reason, that is, reason shaped by the tradition in which

it is exercised" and therefore are to be "distinguished sharply from 'natural
reason'").

217. See supra note 207-08 and accompanying text.
218. See ANTHONY KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE
LEGAL PROFESSION 175-79 (1993).
219. Id. (emphasis in original).
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use of the common law's "artificial reason."2 °' The student explains
that "the artificial reason of the professional lawyer must be
acquired through experience" and professional training, because
the common law consists of "a vast historical accumulation" of
complex and disorderly precedents, evolving around concepts,
many of which "have themselves been fortuitously determined by
the historical circumstances in which they originally took
shape. " " For the same reason, the precedents are "ambiguous," so
that legal judgments "are necessarily inexact and therefore
inherently controversial."" Moreover, Kronman claims, various
other texts from the same period as the Dialogue suggest that
"sound character" is also necessary for good judgment in law. 3
(2) Three Central Notions of Classical Common Law Thought
Three related notions represent some further and central
ways in which the common law was conceptualized in classical
common law thought. For illustrative purposes, the discussion of
each notion below will be followed by a note citing to some relevant
passages, in Blackstone's Commentaries and Kent's Commentaries
as well as other sources, manifesting recognition of that notion
during this first phase in the history of U.S. legal education.2
220. Id. at 177 (citing THOMAS HOBBES, A DIALOGUE BETWEEN A
PHILOSOPHER AND A STUDENT OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND (Joseph

Cropsey ed., 1971)).
221. Id. at 177-78. Hobbes' preference for the use of "natural reason" over
the use of the common law's "artificial reason" to resolve legal questions
clearly implies his rejection of the doctrine of stare decisis as well. See id. at
179-80.
222. Id. at 178-79.
223. Id. at 179; see also POSTEMA, supra note 201, at 31-33 (discussing the
importance of experience and prudence for Postema's first, or "particularist,"
conception of common law reason and reasoning, see supra note 211 and
accompanying text).
Although Kronman does not appear to do so in clear, explicit terms,
some scholars have advanced the claim that common law reasoning was
directly influenced by Aristotelian modes of practical reasoning. See, e.g.,
Stephen A. Siegel, The Aristotelian Basis of English Law 1450-1800, 56 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 18-59 (1981) (discussing how Aristotelian modes of thought, in
particular Aristotelian epistemology in Aristotelian theoretical and practical
science, undergirded premodern legal reasoning with respect to the various
sources or grounds of English law (right reason or the law of nature,
revelation, common law custom, and statute) and, during the course of that
discussion, illuminating the influence of these Aristotelian modes of thought
on the aspects of common law reason examined here and on the notions of
classical common law theory examined below).
224. As suggested in the text, these citations are intended to be illustrative
only. For a discussion of the central notions of classical common law theory as
manifested
in
eighteenth-century
American
legal
thought, see
MORTON HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860 7-9
(1977).
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The first notion is that the common law is "common and
immemorial custom," its rules and principles being accepted and
used by an historical community extending through many
generations out of a shared sense of their reasonableness, and
representing, in some way, the "collective wisdom" of that
community.225 Postema explains that it is this acceptance and use
of common law rules and principles in the continuous practice of
the historical community, out of a shared "tradition-shaped sense
of [their] reasonableness," that gives these rules and principles
their validity and authority.22 It should be emphasized that this
first notion is not necessarily inconsistent with the idea of the
common law as an evolving body of law.227 In this respect, Postema
refers to the dominance of Hale's more dynamic view over Coke's
more static view, explaining that, on the former view, even though
"the law is in a constant process of change, adjustment, influence,
development, decline, and rebirth," nevertheless "it is the same
body of law" because "[tihe key is2 8not identity of components but a
steady continuity with the past."
The second notion is that the role of the judge, acting as the
community's authoritative spokesman, is "not to make, but
publicly to expound and declare, the law" of the historical
community in accordance with common law reason and, having
found the law, to apply that pre-existing law in deciding the case
before the court.229 Cotterrell explains that, according to this
declaratory theory of common law judging, "[tihe judge expresses a
part of the total, immanent wisdom of the law which is assumed to
For further discussion of the general character, structure, and contents
of Blackstone's COMMENTARIES (including the 1803 Tucker edition) and of
Kent's COMMENTARIES, see supra notes 178-86 and accompanying text
(Blackstone), notes 187-90 and accompanying text (Kent), notes 191-93 and
accompanying text (Blackstone and Kent).
225. POSTEMA, supra note 201, at 4-9, 10, 60-80; accord COTTERRELL, supra
note 201, at 22-25, 26-28.
226. POSTEMA, supra note 201, at 4-9, 10.
227. See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
228. POSTEMA, supra note 201, at 6; see also COTTERRELL, supra note 201, at
28-30 (discussing the dynamic nature of the common law and the problems
with, and potential and actual historical responses to, viewing the common
law as static). For a discussion of how classical common law theory sought to
account for the phenomenon of legislation, see COTTERRELL, supra note 201, at
30-33, 35-36; POSTEMA, supra note 201, at 14-29.
For expression of this first notion by Blackstone, Kent, and Story, see,
for example 1 TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES, supra note 103, at 5,
63-68, 73; 4 TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES, supra note 103, at 442; 1
KENT, supra note 56, at 439-40; Story, supra note 139, at 298, 305. For an
additional expression of elements of this first notion by a leading American
legal educator of the period, see Hoffman, Introductory Lecture, supra note
106, at 279.
229. POSTEMA, supra note 201, at 9-13, 194-95; accord COTTERRELL, supra
note 201, at 25-26.
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be already existent before his decision."" ° Moreover, although
previous judicial decisions are entitled to great weight, in
particular because they are "the best available evidence of the
collective wisdom of the common law," nevertheless, as Hale stated
clearly in the seventeenth century, they are not themselves law.23'
Thus, classical common law theory "does not dictate a slavish
adherence to precedent;" indeed, the doctrine of precedent in
classical theory is "complex" and "also perhaps much more flexible
than it is typically portrayed as being. "' 2
Cotterell and Postema elaborate upon the flexibility inherent
in the doctrine of precedent. Thus, unjust or absurd decisions are
not declaratory of the law; 233 prior judicial formulations of a rule or
principle may be mistaken and therefore may require correction
through a reformulation of that rule or principle;234 and judges may
need to deal with novel problems by fashioning new legal rules,
albeit out of existing legal materials. 235 The necessary flexibility in
adjudication in this last respect was achieved, it seems, not only
through the use of legal fictions,236 but also through the creative
use of common law "general principles. " 7
The final notion is that the common law itself demonstrates,
and is declaratory of, natural law, because the norms of natural
law are immanent within common law reason."
In classical
common law thought natural law is reflected in particular in the
230. COTTERRELL, supra note 201, at 25.
231. Id. at 25-26; accord POSTEMA, supra note 201, at 9.
232. COTTERELL, supra note 201, at 26; accord POSTEMA, supra note 201, at
9-10.

233. COTTERELL, supra note 201, at 25-26.
234. See POSTEMA, supra note 201, at 9-11, 194-95; see also COTTERELL,
supra note 201, at 26 (stating that common law judges are bound not by
previous decisions, but "by the principles implicit or explicit in them").
235. See POSTEMA, supra note 201, at 11-13; COTTERRELL, supra note 201, at
26.
236. POSTEMA, supra note 201, at 12.
237. Id. at 12-13, 34-35; COTTERRELL, supra note 201, at 22-25. Compare
KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 36-37,
431-37 (1960) (discussing the use of "principle" in Grand Style judging in
general, and by Cardozo in particular). For further discussion of the different
conceptions of "reason" (and reasoning) in classical common law theory,
including the role of "general principles," see supra notes 209-16 and
accompanying text.
For expression of this second notion by Blackstone, Kent, and Story,
see, for example 1 TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES, supra note 103, at
69-71; 1 KENT, supra note 56, at 440, 442-45, 456; Story, supra note 139, at
298. For an additional expression of this notion by a leading American legal
educator during the latter part of our period, see, for example Dwight, Best
Mode, supra note 139, at 333; Dwight, Lecture Notes, supra note 139, at 345.

For discussion of the expression of this notion in judicial decisions, as well as
in the works of legal authors, see LAPIANA, supra note 2, at 34-37.
238. See POSTEMA, supra note 201, at 33-37, 268-69; COTTERRELL, supra
note 201, at 36-37, 121-22.
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"general justifying principles which are instanced in, and
illustrated by, particular decisions and settled rules."239 Postema
stresses the immanence of natural law norms within common law
reason: "[T]he reason of general principles is not a priori, and
historical, it is practical and historical; the 'natural law' involved
is not external to the tradition, but implicit in it, not socially
transcendent, but immanent."4 ° The general principles "are
uncovered through reflection on the particular cases- through
experience and the reflection of many on that experience," so that
"[g]eneral rules not yet confirmed by experience... must be
treated as hypotheses, open-ended proposals, and not as firm and
binding law."241 Thus, "[n]atural law... appears not as a 'higher
law' standing in constant judgment on positive human law, but as
the light of reason shining through that law," and "[it] is best
discovered through evolutionary refinement."" ' Postema goes on
to observe that all this "reveals a deep ambiguity in Common Law
theory" as to whether common law standards are regarded as
"autonomous and self-justifying" or as "appeal[ing] ultimately to a
transcendent source of validation."2 .
c.

Character of Associated Natural Law Thinking in Early
American Legal Thought
Consistent with the third notion of classical common law

239. POSTEMA, supra note 201, at 33-35 (emphasis in original); see also
supra notes 211-14 and accompanying text (discussing the second, broader
concept of reason at work in classical common law theory).
240. POSTEMA, supranote 201, at 36.
241. Id. (emphasis in original).
242. Id. at 37.
243. Id. Cf Simpson, supra note 176, at 648 (noting, with respect to common
law maxims, the existence of the theory that "the principles were the basis of
decided cases, not the reverse," as well as "the idea that maxims needed proof
by the authority ofjudicial decisions").
For expression of this third notion by Blackstone, Kent, and Story, see,
for example 1 TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES, supra note 103, at 32,
38-43, 53-56 (general considerations); id. at 122-45 (natural or "absolute"
rights and liberties, i.e., "the right of personal security, the right of personal
liberty, and the right of private property"); 2 id. at 1-15 (property); 4 id. at
7-12 (punishment); 1 KENT, supra note 56, at 439, 446; Story, supra note 139,
at 305, 309-10. For further discussion of the apparent acceptance of this
particular notion by Blackstone, Kent, and Story, see RUSSELL KIRK, THE
ROOTS OF AMERICAN ORDER 369-71 (4th ed., 2003) (Blackstone, Kent, and
Story); Bailey, supra note 59, at 314, 323-24 (same); FELDMAN, supra note 4,
at 49-50 (Blackstone); id. at 52, 78 (Kent); id. at 54-55, 75, 81-82 (Story);
POUND, supra note 176, at 107, 147-48 (Kent and Story); Langbein, supra note
2, at 215 (Kent). For an additional expression of this notion by a leading
American legal educator of the period, see Hoffman, Introductory Lecture,
supra note 106, at 288. For discussion of the expression of this notion in
judicial decisions, see, for example FELDMAN, supra, at 54-56, 78-79, 81-82;
POUND, supra note 176, at 104-05, 109-10.
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theory, the prevailing jurisprudence of the period seems to have
included some variant of natural law theory as one of its central
elements. Roscoe Pound, for example, noted the general
acceptance of natural law thinking by members of the American
legal profession for much of this period.244 There appear to be
various views, however, regarding the precise form of natural law
thinking involved. Some of the alternatives suggested include:
Judaeo-Christian natural law, with its emphasis upon divine
revelation and the use of human reason;245 a succession of varying
forms, ranging from natural rights to idealized positive law

244. See POUND, supra note 176, at 3, 12, 99 (noting the prevalence of
natural law thinking among lawyers, judges, and law teachers for much of the
"formative era of American law," which lasted from the time of independence
until the Civil War). Reflecting his own views regarding the type of natural
law thinking involved, see infra note 245 and accompanying text, Stephen
Feldman suggests there were at least three reasons why "Americans readily
received the Blackstonian faith in natural law as the foundation of the legal
system, a faith they generally maintained until the Civil War era": (1) natural
law provided a "convenient and useful justification" legitimizing the adoption
of English common law in America; (2) such thinking was consistent with the
late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century American social context, in
which many considered society to be "naturally stratified or ordered," and in
which "distinct social hierarchies" continued to exist notwithstanding great
economic changes and the progress of democracy and equality; and (3)
"religiously rooted natural law" resonated readily with the deep commitment
of many Americans to Protestant Christianity. FELDMAN, supra note 4, at
50-52.
245. See, e.g., FELDMAN, supra note 4, at 50 (explaining that "tnlatural law,
according to Blackstone, is either revealed by God or discoverable through
human reason."); William LaPiana, Honor Langdell, 20 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY
761, 762 (1995) (observing that before the Civil War "there was widespread
agreement that the principles of private law were congruent with and dictated
by the absolutely true requirements of Christian morality.
Law was
principles, and properly decided cases reflected those principles, which
themselves, in the end, were God's plan for governing the nation"). See
generally MILLER, supra note 201, at 186-206 (reviewing the many expressions
of the view throughout the entire period that Christianity was part of
American law, and noting some expressions of a contrary viewpoint); see also
KIRK, supra note 243, at 369-70 (noting the mingling in Blackstone of "two
streams of 'natural law' thought ... that of Cicero, the Schoolmen, and
Richard Hooker, and that of the seventeenth-century scholars Grotius and
Pufendorf and the eighteenth-century Swiss jurist Burlamaqui," and
commenting that "Blackstone himself, and the Americans whose legal
concepts he helped to form, made few nice distinctions concerning the natural
law"); Bailey, supra note 59, at 316, 318-23, 325-28 (discussing the emphasis
upon moral philosophy, natural law, and the Christian faith, as well as the
centrality of works on natural law theory by such writers as Grotius,
Pufendorf, and Burlamaqui to legal education in the antebellum college and
apprenticeship settings).

1108

The John MarshallLaw Review

[39:1041

(suggested by Pound himself);2 46 and a search for "the best reason a
court can find" (according to Karl Llewellyn).2 7
Given their apparent acceptance of natural law thinking,
members of the legal profession would have been familiar, of
course, with the natural law claim conditioning the validity and
authority of human law upon its conformity with natural law
norms. 24
In an era before the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution, such ideas were invoked to attack successfully
various state statutes in the state courts, especially during the first
third of the nineteenth century.249 On the other hand, with respect
to the common law, the belief that the common law is declaratory
of natural law could potentially result, of course, in a certain
246. See POUND, supra note 176, at 17, 21-23, 104-08 (identifying a number
of varying forms that were at work during the period, including natural rights,
consensual natural law, moral precepts determined by reason, the nature of
American institutions, of free institutions or of free government, principles of
classical political economy, a universal commercial law set forth in
Continental treatises, and idealized positive law (both Common and Civil
Law)).
247. See LLEWELLYN, supra note 237, at 421-23 (characterizing the essence
of the "Natural Law" thinking of the period as "a conscious and sustained
quest for and accounting to the best reason a court can find... It is a
technique, plus an attitude; and it is quite independent.., of any philosophy
as to the proper sources of 'Right Reason' which may be held by any 'Natural
Law' philosopher"). Llewellyn suggests that an appellate judge's search for
"the best reason" involves "careful and conscious responsibility to the going
legal heritage of the society around him, and to its reckonable future
ordering." Id. at 422. He also suggests that Pound, see supra notes 244, 246
and accompanying text, in fact has a similar understanding to his own
regarding the "Natural Law" thinking of the period. Id. Llewellyn quotes
with approval Levin Goldschmidt's identification of the appropriate task:
Every fact-pattern of common life, so far as the legal order can take it in,
carries within itself its appropriate, natural rules, its right law. This is
a natural law which is real, not imaginary; it is not a creature of mere
reason, but rests on the solid foundation of what reason can recognize in
the nature of man and of the life conditions of the time and place; it is
thus not eternal nor changeless nor everywhere the same, but is
indwelling in the very circumstances of life. The highest task of lawgiving consists in uncovering and implementing this immanent law.
Id. at 122 (quoting Levin Goldschmidt, Preface to Kritik des Entwurfs eines
Handelsgesetzbuchs, in 4 KRIT. ZEITSCHR. F.D. GES. RECHTSWISSENScHAFT 289
(1857)).
248. Blackstone's views in this regard are expressed in the following famous
and forceful statement:
This law of nature, being coeval with mankind and dictated by God
himself, is of course superior in obligation to any other. It is binding
over all the globe in all countries, and at all times; no human laws are of
any validity, if contrary to this: and such of them as are valid derive all
their force, and all their authority, mediately or immediately, from the
original.
1 TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES, supra note 103, at 41.
249. See POUND, supra note 176, at 56-57 (providing examples from the
Supreme Courts of Connecticut, Massachusets, and Tennessee).
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tendency towards conservatism, or even complacency, regarding
existing common law.2" However, following Pound's account, any
such belief that may have been held by American lawyers, judges,
and doctrinal writers, such as Kent and Story, during this period
certainly did not prevent them from using what Pound calls the
"creative" side of natural law in order to adapt English common
law, and other legal materials, to American conditions, and
thereby to develop an indigenous American law, although another,
"stabilizing" side of natural law also had an important influence,
particularly after the creative work was completed.25 '
d.

The Emergence of an Instrumentalist Conception of Law

Arguably, the preceding account should be qualified,
particularly as far as the latter part of the period is concerned, in
recognition of the emergence of a new, instrumentalist conception
of law, according to which law (including judge-made law) was
seen pragmatically as an instrument of progress, and especially as
an instrument for the advancement of commerce.252 The "Grand
Style" of appellate judging that Karl Llewellyn considers to have
prevailed during the first half of the nineteenth century, reflected
an instrumentalist conception of law."' It might seem that such a
250. See, e.g., COTTERRELL, supra note 201, at 119. Bentham and Austin,
Cotterrell explains, criticized Blackstone for his confusion of legal and moral
analysis in the COMMENTARIES. To condition the validity and authority of
human law upon its conformity with natural law norms is a double-edged
sword. On the one hand, "[slince ethical views vary, the way is opened for
anyone to claim the right to 'second guess' the authority of law and state." On
the other hand:
To confuse moral and legal authority allows reactionaries to claim 'this
is the law; therefore, it must be right;' existing law is assumed to
possess not only authority as law but also moral authority. Blackstone's
primary failing in Bentham's eyes was, thus, his tendency to merge legal
and moral authority, which went along with a complacency implying
that English law as expounded in the COMMENTARIES was the best law
of all for the best of all possible worlds.
Id. Cf FELDMAN, supra note 4, at 55 (observing that "[m]ost American
jurisprudents presumed that positive law generally comported with natural
law").
251. See POUND, supra note 176, at 12-13, 16-18, 20-23, 26-27, 29-30 (general
considerations); id. at 102-110 (adjudication in particular).
For further discussion of the role of general principles and associated
natural law thinking in the work of early American textbook writers, see
FELDMAN, supra note 4, at 52, 78 (Kent); id. at 54-55, 75, 81-82 (Story);
Simpson, supra note 176, at 670-74 (legal writing generally); Swygert and
Bruce, supra note 59, at 961 n.86 (same).
252. See generally HORWITZ, supra note 224. For a succinct discussion of the
new, instrumentalist conception of law, focusing especially upon "[jiudicial
instrumentalism," see COQUILLETE, supra note 207, at 500-06. See also id. at
506-09 (discussing the associated instrumentalist codification movement in
America).
253. On the Grand Style of appellate judging, see generally LLEWELLYN,
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pragmatic, instrumentalist conception of law must certainly have
displaced the three, perhaps rather mystical, classical common law
notions and associated natural law thinking discussed above." 4
Indeed, several scholars appear to have reached this conclusion.
For example, in discussing Oliver Wendell Holmes' late
nineteenth-century and John Chapman Gray's turn-of-the-century
refutations of such notions as expressed by Blackstone, Paul
Carrington suggests that, in fact, "[i]t is... unlikely that many of
the antebellum law teachers ... often lapsed into the delusion that
American law was other than the embodiment of the practical
moral judgment and experience of the men who expressed and
enforced it." 55 Similarly, Morton Horwitz claims that by 1820 the
conception of law as "an eternal set of principles expressed in
custom and derived from natural law," and as "a body of rules
designed to achieve justice in the individual case," had been
displaced by an "instrumental conception of law" in which "judges
supra note 237.
Llewellyn considers that the Grand Style prevailed in
America during the first half of the nineteenth century (more specifically,
"from Jefferson's administration up roughly until Grant's") but was then
displaced by what Llewellyn calls the "Formal Style" during the latter part of
the nineteenth century, although there were clear signs at the time of writing
that appellate adjudication was in the process of moving back in the direction
of the earlier Grand Style. Id. at 5, 37, 40-41. Interestingly, and significantly,
these periods correspond roughly to the first, second, and third phases in the
history of U.S. legal education as identified in this article. See supra note 1
and accompanying text.
As far as the nature of the Grand Style of appellate judging is
concerned, Llewellyn explains that the Grand Style "is a way of ongoing
renovation of doctrine," in which "the better and best law is to be built on and
out of what the past can offer" through "a constant re-examination and
reworking of a heritage," with a view to "the on-going production and
improvement of rules which make sense on their face." LLEWELLYN, supra
note 237, at 35-38. In this Grand Style, although precedents are "welcome and
very persuasive," a precedent is "test[ed] ... almost always against three types
of reason before it is accepted": (1) "the reputation of the opinion-writing
judge;" (2) "principle," meaning "a broad generalization which must yield
patent sense as well as order;" and (3) "policy," meaning the "prospective
consequences of the rule under consideration ... and [of] its application." Id.
at 36; see also id. at 62-72 (reporting the results of his examination of the
Grand Style at work in various state jurisdictions from the 1820s until the
1860s); R. RANDALL KELSO & CHARLES D. KELSO, STUDYING LAW: AN
INTRODUCTION 113 (1984) (equating Llewellyn's "Grand Style" with
"pragmatic instrumentalism"); supra note 237 (referencing Llewellyn's
discussion of the use of "principle" in Grand Style judging in general, and by
Cardozo in particular).
254. See supra notes 224-43 and accompanying text (classical common law
notions); supra notes 244-51 and accompanying text (natural law thinking).
Such a pragmatic, instrumentalist conception of law clearly is not
incompatible, however, with Llewellyn's own account of the "natural law"
thinking of the period as involving a search for "the best reason a court can
find." See supra note 247 and accompanying text.
255. Carrington, Hail! Langdell, supra note 108, at 725, 732-34.
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came to think of the common law as equally responsible with
legislation for governing society and promoting socially desirable
conduct."256
If scholars such as Carrington and Horwitz are correct in
their assessment of the status of classical common law notions and
associated natural law thinking following the emergence of
pragmatic instrumentalism, it might tend to suggest that any
continued expressions or espousal of such notions are likely to
represent no more than lip service paid to ideas that were not
taken seriously.25 ' On the other hand, it can be argued that the
emergence of an instrumentalist conception of law is not
necessarily incompatible with a continuing real influence of such
ideas within American legal thought. For example, Stephen
Feldman sees no incompatibility between instrumentalism and
natural law theory during the second part of this period. Thus,
although the "idea of progress... was most often manifested by an
instrumental and pragmatic conception of law," legal thinkers
"understood progress
in
premodernist
or eschatological
terms ... as movement toward the realization of eternal and
universal principles."2" He explains further:
[LIegal principles are universal and separate from the cases, which
represent imperfect manifestations of the principles. From this
perspective, natural law principles provided a metaphysical
foundation for the American legal system, including the common
law. Yet, the principles still had to be specifically interpreted and
applied in concrete judicial disputes, and as judges did so, they were
to be practical and instrumental ....

256. HORWITZ, supra note 224, at 30.
257. Indeed, Carrington seems to make this very suggestion, and even
regards it as a possibility with regard to Blackstone himself. See Carrington,
Hail! Langdell, supra note 108, at 733.
258. FELDMAN, supra note 4, at 75; see also id. at 79-80 (to similar affect); id.
at 75-78 (illustrating this combination of ideas in various contexts). In
Feldman's account, the "eternal and universal principles" are "principles
derived from nature and Protestant Christianity." Id. at 75; see also supra
note 245 and accompanying text. Cf LAPIANA, supra note 2, at 34 (discussing
Dorothy Ross' exploration of nineteenth-century American "historical
consciousness," and explaining that this historical consciousness was "'static,'
emphasizing "'long-standing and moral'" processes, in particular due to its link
with republicanism and Protestantism, "both of which helped invest America
with millenial significance;" consequently, "it is possible to see antebellum
expression of belief in the progress of nations or peoples through various
stages of development, culminating in the passage from a feudal to a modern,
liberal, and commercial society, as compatible with a belief in universal
principles and in a divine hand behind the historical process" (quoting Dorothy
Ross, HistoricalConsciousness in Nineteenth-Century America, 89 AMERICAN
HISTORICAL REVIEW 909, 911-20 (1985))).
For further discussion of
republicanism, see infra Part II.B.2.
259. FELDMAN, supra note 4, at 78. Feldman characterizes the relationship
between the legal principles and the cases as "Platonic," explaining that,
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Because of the instrumental approach to judicial decision making,
the natural law principles faded into the juridical background in
many and even most instances. Yet although in specific cases the
principles would only rarely be referred to, they always remained
significant as a foundation for the legal system - a foundation of
principles that could fade into the background only because so many
American judges, lawyers and jurisprudents willingly
agreed on and
• • 260
accepted the idea of broad natural law principles.
Feldman's

understanding"6 '

is

certainly

consistent

with

'[a]ccording to Plato, the Ideas exist separately from the particular instances.
The Ideas are universal and unchanging, while the particular instances vary,
manifesting but never perfectly exemplifying the Ideas .... [P]remodern
jurisprudents understood the relation between legal principles and cases in a
similar fashion."
Id.; see also infra note 273 and accompanying text
(discussing Feldman's account of the legal science of the period).
260. FELDMAN, supra note 4, at 79. Feldman also explains that, throughout
the period, in addition to being the "metaphysical foundation" for the legal
system, see supra note 259 and accompanying text, natural law principles also
"provide[d] the specific source for deciding a case" in the absence of a common
law precedent that was applicable directly or by analogy, and thus, during the
second part of the period, helped to justify instrumental decision-making by
the judiciary. Id. at 55, 79.
261. Feldman maintains, too, that the combination of instrumental decisionmaking by judges and an eschatological idea of progress was characteristic of a
second stage in premodern jurisprudential thought. Thus, "second-stage
premodern jurisprudents, like their first-stage predecessors, comprehended
the common law as a science, a rational system of principles grounded in
natural law." FELDMAN, supra note 4, at 79; see also infra note 273 and
accompanying text. However:
[P]remodern jurisprudence moved from its first to its second stage when
a different notion of time and history took hold early in the nineteenth
century. First-stage jurisprudents had tended to dwell upon the rise
and fall of civilizations and the potential decay of the American republic.
Second-stage jurisprudents, though, fully embraced an idea of progress
that assumed a human capability to constantly approach a more
complete and perfect realization of the natural and universal principles.
To achieve such progress, jurists and jurisprudents were to
instrumentally apply the principles in a pragmatic fashion, paying
particular attention to the promotion of commerce.
FELDMAN, supra note 4, at 79-80; see also id. at 80-82 (illustrating secondstage premodern legal thought in the writings of Chipman and Story). This
eschatological notion of progress, characteristic of second-stage premodern
jurisprudential thought, not only contrasts with first-stage premodern
jurisprudential thought, but also contrasts with "a modernist idea of progress,
which would posit a human capability to advance endlessly. Instead, the
eternal and universal principles provided, in a sense, a goal and a limit for
progress." Id. at 75.
The movement from first to second-stage premodern jurisprudential
thought was the result of various modernizing forces that were sufficiently
opposed, however, by various countervailing forces and factors that the legal
thought of the entire period retained its premodern character, in particular
due to its continuing commitment to natural law thinking. See id. at 65-71
(modernizing forces); id. at 71-74 (countervailing forces and factors). Of
particular importance in explaining the persistence of natural law thinking
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Roscoe Pound's observations regarding the general acceptance of
natural law thinking by members of the legal profession for much
of the "formative era of American law," lasting from the time of
independence until the Civil War,262 and regarding use of the
"creative" side of natural law."3 It is also compatible, of course,
with the third notion of classical common law thought, that the
common law is declaratory of natural law.2 In addition, perhaps
one can push the logic of Feldman's argument further. Perhaps
the first two notions of classical common law theory, or at least
important elements of those notions, also continued to lurk
"beneath the surface" as it were, although rarely articulated in the
cases. 265 This suggestion is bolstered by the consideration that
there is a desire and felt need for stability, which frequently exist
alongside, and in tension with, the desire and perceived need for
change, and which may result, therefore, in a conscious or
unconscious willingness to employ fictions and other devices that
tend to promote such stability while at the same time
Pound's comments regarding the
accommodating change.
"stabilizing" side of natural law are certainly suggestive in this
regard.2
are religious factors. Thus, while the Second Great Awakening "transformed
and spread American Protestantism and thus contributed to (and manifested)
the growing individualist and populist ethos of the nineteenth century," it also
"simultaneously... further Christianized American society and culture...
[and] seemed to strengthen the American resolve to follow religiously rooted
natural law." Id. at 72-73; see also supra notes 36-41 and accompanying text
(discussing the general historical situation); infra notes 381-87 and
accompanying text (discussing the persistence of premodern civic republican
elitism).
262. POUND, supra note 176, at 3, 12, 99; see supra note 244 and
accompanying text.
263. POUND, supra note 176, at 16-18, 22-23; see supra note 251 and
accompanying text.
264. As we have already seen, Karl Llewellyn also recognized the existence
See supra note 247 and
of natural law thinking during the period.
accompanying text. Apparently, however, he did not consider that it involved,
as Feldman puts it, a movement toward "the realization of... natural and
universal principles." FELDMAN, supra note 4, at 80; see also supra notes 25861 and accompanying text.
265. Cf. Bailey, supra note 59, at 324 ("The belief that decided cases were
observations upon the practical workings of natural laws was the tie that
Cases were the material 'from
bound legal science to moral philosophy ....
which the true theory is to be inferred .... .' This understanding reflected the
traditional view of common lawyers that judex est lex loquens - the judge is
the mouthpiece of the law."). Id. (quoting William G. Hammond, Preface, in 1
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, at xviii

(William G. Hammond ed., 1890)) (1765).
266. See POUND, supra note 243, at 16-18, 21-23, 104-07, 109-10, 117; see
also supra note 251 and accompanying text.
Obviously, these three notions of classical common law thought were
eventually transcended and transformed. As far as natural law thinking is
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Early American Legal Science

A final element in the prevailing jurisprudence of the period
with which early American lawyers would have been familiar is
that of early American legal science. Writing in 1968, one scholar,
Calvin Woodard, identified four different stages in the
development of a rational, secularized "science of law," the first
two of which are pertinent to this first pre-Langdellian phase in
the historical development of U.S. legal education." 7 During the
first stage (from 1750 until 1800), Blackstone's Commentaries
provided "the simplest and yet most fundamental scheme for
classifying laws" and "put the chaos of the law into a semblance of
order."" This prepared the way for the second stage (from 1800
until 1870), during which some writers (such as St. George Tucker,
Kent, and Sharswood) continued to produce works in the spirit of
Blackstone, while others (such as Story) "undertook to systematize
particular branches of law as Blackstone had done the whole," and
"still others gave their attention to reforming the haphazard

concerned, Feldman identifies a number of factors that "contributed to the
demise of natural law and the ascension of positivism during and immediately
after the Civil War," thereby helping to pave the way for Langdellian legal
science in the 1870s. See FELDMAN, supra note 4, at 85-91 (noting the
existence of various modernizing social and cultural forces, and identifying
specifically several intellectual factors: a general "trend toward secularization"
in intellectual matters; an "emerging historicist sensibility" among American
intellectuals; the increased intellectual prestige of positivism following John
Austin's attack on Blackstone's conception of natural law; and most especially,
the deployment of mutually antagonistic and incompatible natural law-based
arguments and natural rights-based arguments by southern defenders and
northern attackers of the institution of slavery respectively); see also supra
note 41 and accompanying text; infra note 386 and accompanying text.
As far as the first two notions of classical common law thought are
concerned, it is interesting to observe that Langdell's conception of legal
science bears a striking formal resemblance to these notions, even though the
content is obviously different. Thus, as Kronman explains, the judge discovers
and applies the "latent logic" of an historically evolving common law in the
form of general principles that are to be induced from the cases and from
which detailed rules can be logically derived by a process of geometrical
reasoning. See KRONMAN, supra note 218, at 170-74. Langdellian legal
science will be addressed in a subsequent article.
267. See Calvin Woodard, The Limits of Legal Realism: An Historical
Perspective, 54 VA. L. REV. 689 (1968), reprinted in HERBERT PACKER &
THOMAS EHRLICH, NEW DIRECTIONS IN LEGAL EDUCATION 331-48 (1972). For
Woodard's explication of the notion of "secularization" that has influenced the
historical development of Anglo-American law, see id. at 333.
By
"secularization" Woodard means "a cluster of three interrelated propensities
which, together, have become increasingly characteristic of western thought
during the past four hundred years," namely "the growth of rationalism, the
development of a scientific outlook, and the invention of new technology." Id.
268. Id. at 339. For further discussion of the general character and contents
of Blackstone's COMMENTARIES, see supra notes 178-84, 191-93 and
accompanying text.
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method of reporting cases," resulting in a "formidable body of
systematic knowledge [being] amassed over the incredibly brief
span of five to six decades."269
Early American legal scientists, then, sought to classify and
to systematize the law on the basis of its inherent principles.27 °
Some scholars consider that this early American legal science
reflected natural law suppositions; others suggest a more eclectic
character. These differing views appear to parallel the contrasting
perceptions discussed in Subsection d immediately above.27' For
example, after referring to Perry Miller's demonstration of "the
dominance of the equation of law with science in all antebellum
legal theorizing," Horwitz asserts that "[e]xcept for the
identification
of
'science'
with
systematization
and
classification.., there is no coherent content or methodology to be
found in these persistent claims to the scientific character of
law."'7' Feldman, on the other hand, claims that "premodern
jurisprudents understood the common law as a science, a rational
system of principles grounded in natural law ....The whole of
jurisprudence could be rationally classified into a system that
included not only the natural law principles but also a multitude
of low-level legal rules that reflected the common law forms of
action."'73 The remaining stages in the development of a rational,
269. Woodard, supra note 267, at 339-41. For further discussion of the
general character and contents of the Tucker edition of Blackstone's
COMMENTARIES, Kent's COMMENTARIES, and Story's series of treatises, see
supra notes 185-86 and accompanying text (Tucker edition of Blackstone);
supra notes 187-93 and accompanying text (Kent); supra notes 194-96 and
accompanying text (Story). See also supra note 53 and accompanying text
(addressing various American editions of Blackstone).
270. See, e.g., Simpson, supra note 176, at 668-74; see also Sheppard, Lecture
Hall, supra note 2, at 20 (seeming to suggest that early American legal science
aimed to catalogue legal principles within a system of laws whose proper
organization and classification would become evident once all the laws had
been discovered).
271. See supra note 256 and accompanying text (Horwitz and the
"instrumental conception of law"); supra notes 258-61 and accompanying text
(Feldman and the continued influence of natural law principles).
272. HORWITZ, supra note 224, at 257 (citing MILLER, supra note 201, at 15664).
273. FELDMAN, supra note 4, at 57; see also id. at 79 (similar language); id.
at 52-57 (suggesting that this legal science combined a Baconian scientific
methodology that emphasized inductive reasoning, generalization from
particular instances, and classification and systematization, with recognition
of a Platonic metaphysical relationship between universals and particulars);
see also supra note 259 and accompanying text. For a very similar analysis,
although one without express reference to Plato, see LAPIANA, supra note 2, at
29-37.
For a discussion of the emergence of modern scientific methodology, in
particular an analytical-synthetical geometric method of deductive reasoning,
and of its relationship to premodern Aristotelian modes of thought, within
legal reasoning in the common law tradition, see Siegel, supra note 223, at 45-

The John Marshall Law Review

1116

[39:1041

secularized "science of law" as identified by Woodard lie beyond
our time period and therefore beyond the scope of this article." 4
f.

Elements of the Prevailing Jurisprudence in Legal Education

The discussion in the preceding five subsections has identified
six main elements in the prevailing jurisprudence of the period.
The first five elements concerned the general nature of the
common law tradition; the nature of common law reason in

59. See also id. at 18-59 (discussing Aristotelian modes of thought in
premodern legal reasoning); supra note 223 (referencing Siegel's discussion).
For extended discussions of the legal science of various early nineteenthcentury American legal scholars, including the varying sources from which
they derived first principles, situated within the broader context of AngloAmerican and Western legal science as a whole, see Hoeflich, Law and
Geometry, supra note 2, at 589-605 (discussing the work of Legar6, Hoffman,
and Mayes, and their adoption of the deductive "geometric paradigm" in law);
Schweber, supra note 2, at 606-57 (discussing the work of Hoffman, Mayes,
Field, Greenleaf, Beverly Tucker, and Sharswood, and the various features of
their legal science, as well as the ways in which their legal science differed
from that of writers such as Joseph Story). See also Woodard, supra note 267,
at 342 n.24 (characterizing Story's legal science as "a 'deductive science' based
on principles derived from truth, be it found in cases, Christianity, Judaism,
Roman Law or wherever"). For a discussion of the origins of Western legal
science in the medieval jurists' application of the scholastic method of analysis
and synthesis to the rediscovered texts of Justinian's Corpus Iuris Civilis, and
to the canon laws of the Catholic Church during the late eleventh, twelfth, and
thirteenth centuries, see HAROLD BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE

FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 120-64 (1983). For Berman's
account of some later central developments in the history of Western legal
science, see HAROLD BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION II: THE IMPACT OF THE
PROTESTANT REFORMATION ON THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 100-30 (2003)

(discussing the transformation of German legal science in the sixteenth
century); id. at 270-305 (discussing the transformation of English legal science
in the seventeenth century).
274. These remaining stages will be addressed, however, in a subsequent
article.
For present purposes, returning to Woodard's account of the
development of the "science of law" will be helpful. See supra notes 267-69
and accompanying text. In Woodard's account, the second stage of this
development, in which "a critical literature of law" created "a sizable body of
factual and theoretical data about the law itself," was followed by a third stage
(from 1870 until 1930) in which law became an "academic science," and "legal
scientist-scholar(s)" such as Langdell identified "the principles underlying this
data," and "the science of law [was] reconstructed on truly scientific
foundations" using the inductive scientific method. Woodard, supra note 267,
at 338, 342-46. The fourth stage (from 1930 until the time of writing, 1968) is
more "pragmatic," involving an effort, by the American Legal Realists and
their successors, to "make scientific knowledge useful" through the use of a
"modern legal technology." Id. at 346-48. It should be noted that Woodard's
third and fourth stages in the development of a "science of law" coincide with
the second and third phases in the historical development of U.S. legal
education (the phase of Langdellian legal science and the legal realist phase
respectively) as identified in the present article. See supra note 1 and
accompanying text.
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classical common law thought; three related notions representing
some further ways in which the common law was conceptualized
in classical common law thought; the character of associated
natural law thinking; and the emergence of a new, instrumentalist
conception of law, particularly during the second part of the
'
period. 75
Students of the law in all three formal legal education
settings discussed in Section A above - apprenticeship training,
independent law school programs, and college/university law
programs - would have become familiar with these five elements
by reading law reports of cases, 76 as well as various commentaries
and treatises explicating the common law (including, of course, the
works of Blackstone, Kent and Story), 7 ' that expressed or
otherwise manifested these elements. Many students would have
gained additional familiarity with these elements by observing the
practice of their mentors in apprenticeship training, in particular
court proceedings, or by participating in moot court exercises in
the independent law school and college/university law programs.
Familiarity with all five elements was doubtless reinforced

275. See supra notes 197-200 and accompanying text (nature of the common
law tradition); supra notes 205-23 and accompanying text (nature of common
law reason in classical common law thought); supra notes 224-43 and
accompanying text (three related notions in classical common law thought);
supra notes 244-51 and accompanying text (character of associated natural
law thinking); supra notes 252-66 and accompanying text (emergence of a new,
instrumentalist conception of law). The sixth element concerns the nature of
early American legal science. See supra notes 267-74 and accompanying text.
276. Students of the law would have read law reports routinely in
apprenticeship training, and frequently in the independent law school and
college/university law programs. See supra note 77 and accompanying text
(apprenticeship training); supra note 171 and accompanying text (independent
law school and college/university law programs).
277. With respect to the role of such commentaries and treatises in formal
legal education, see supra note 77 and accompanying text (apprenticeship
training); supra note 170 and accompanying text (independent law school and
college/university law programs); supra notes 176-77 and accompanying text
(discussing all three settings). For further discussion of the general character
and content of Blackstone's COMMENTARIES,

Kent's COMMENTARIES

and

Story's series of treatises, see supra notes 178-86 and accompanying text
(Blackstone); supra notes 187-90 and accompanying text (Kent); supra notes
191-93 and accompanying text (Blackstone and Kent); supra notes 194-96 and
accompanying text (Story).
With respect to the third element - the three related notions in
classical common law thought - see supra notes 228, 237, 243 for citations to
passages, in Blackstone's COMMENTARIES and Kent's COMMENTARIES as well
as other sources, reflecting these three notions of classical common law
thought.
278. See supra note 73 and accompanying text (apprenticeship training);
supra note 173 and accompanying text (independent law school and
college/university law programs).
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through interaction with a mentor in the former setting and
through classroom teaching in the latter setting.279
Although the law curriculum in apprenticeship training and
in some of the college/university law programs may have placed
greater additional emphasis upon formal instruction in the
refinements of natural law thinking (i.e., the fourth element) than
did the curriculum in the independent law school programs,' ° it
must be remembered that many students of the law in all these
settings would have received a college education (or its equivalent)
before beginning their professional legal education, 1 and a college
279. See supra note 73 and accompanying text (interaction with a mentor in
apprenticeship training); supra notes 169-72, 174 and accompanying text
(classroom teaching methods in the independent law school and
college/university law programs). Of relevance, too, is the influence of the
prevailing professional ideal, the ideal of the lawyer-statesman, upon the legal
education of the period. See infra notes 394-435 and accompanying text. The
lawyer-statesman ideal emphasized in particular the twin character-virtues of
practical wisdom and civic-mindedness. See generally infra notes 293-361 and
accompanying text. Insofar as mentors in apprenticeship training and law
teachers in the independent law school and college/university law programs
sought to familiarize their students with the lawyer-statesman ideal and to
cultivate in them its component character-virtues, presumably they would
have placed additional emphasis upon those elements of the prevailing
jurisprudence, such as the nature of common law reason and natural law
theory, that were of particular relevance to the cultivation of those qualities.
See infra notes 406-07, 411, 422 and accompanying text (college/university law
programs); infra notes 413, 418-20 and accompanying text (apprenticeship
training); infra notes 430-35 and accompanying text (independent law school
programs).
280. For emphasis upon natural law thinking in apprenticeship training, see
supra note 77 and accompanying text (William Smith curriculum). See also
infra notes 418-20 and accompanying text.
For emphasis upon natural law thinking in the early college/university
law programs, see supra notes 112, 116 and accompanying text (Currie
assessment Hoffman Syllabus respectively). Regarding such emphasis in the
later university law programs, see supra notes 149, 153-55 and accompanying
text (Harvard curriculum model); supra notes 162-65 and accompanying text
(Virginia curriculum model). In these later university programs, both the
Harvard curriculum model and the Virginia curriculum model included
coverage of Blackstone's COMMENTARIES. Assuming that classroom teachers
addressed the relevant portions of the COMMENTARIES in their lectures, see
supra notes 181-84 and accompanying text, their coverage of Blackstone would
have included at least some coverage of natural law thinking as well.
Relevant coverage may also have been incorporated into lectures on other
topics in the curriculum. See also infra notes 411, 422 and accompanying text.
For the apparent lack of emphasis upon natural law thinking in the
independent law school programs, see supra notes 91, 94 and accompanying
text (Litchfield curriculum and Sheppard assessment respectively). Again,
however, the introductory component of the curriculum may have included
some coverage of natural law theory, and relevant coverage may also have
been incorporated into lectures on other topics in the curriculum. See also
infra notes 431, 434 and accompanying text.
281. See supra note 79 and accompanying text (apprenticeship training);
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education would have included the study of moral philosophy and
natural law thinking.282
With respect to the sixth and final element in the prevailing
jurisprudence - early American legal science - students of the
law in all three settings would have become familiar with the legal
science of Blackstone and (later on) the legal science of scholars
such as Kent and Story through reading their written works."
supra note 96 and accompanying text (independent law school programs);
supra note 128 and accompanying text (early college/law school programs);
supra note 168 and accompanying text (later university law programs). See
also supra notes 129, 165-166 and accompanying text (regarding the ability, in
some of the college/university law programs, to take parallel courses in other
departments of the college/university).
282. See, for example, Bailey, supra note 59, at 322-23, where the author
explains that:
In the antebellum colleges, the keystone of the curriculum was the
course in moral philosophy taught during the senior year ....
Generations of college students listened to lectures reconciling
Protestant theology and the new sciences and demonstrating the
unbreakable connections between individual character and happiness,
the moral and material progress of civilization, and social stability and
traditional and supposedly immutable moral values and ideas. At the
core of this system of belief lay the fundamental assumption that there
was a deity whose existence and attributes could be logically
demonstrated; man was a created being ruled by divine and natural
laws rather than a product of natural forces. Moral philosophers agreed
that the faculty of reason bestowed upon man by the creator enabled
man to know moral truth, the content of divine and natural law, either
from direct, scriptural revelation or from the study of natural and moral
philosophies conducted according to the scientific method .... Moral

philosophy described the moral nature and necessities of man and was
regarded both as an important support for Christian belief and as the
foundation upon which civil society rested.
Id. Of relevance, too, is Bailey's observation that:
The parallels between the natural law commentators chosen by legal
educators and the texts of the academic moral philosophers are less
remarkable when one notes that the Scottish moral philosophers and
their academic disciples in America drew extensively from the natural
law theories of Grotius and Pufendorf. Pufendorfs works, in particular,
were frequently used as course texts.
Id. at 325. For a general description of the standard college curriculum, see
supra note 72 and accompanying text.
283. See supra notes 267-74 and accompanying text.
284. See supra notes 268-69 and accompanying text; references supra note
277. Legal science included works not only on the "science of principles" but
also on the practical "'science' of pleading." See LAPIANA, supra note 2, at 4042 (discussing works on pleading by Story, Chitty, and Gould, as well as the
laudatory references by various legal scientists to the "science" of pleading).
Indeed, James Gould, who based his treatise on pleading (first published in
1832) on his lectures at the Litchfield School, claimed that he was presenting
the doctrines of pleading "not as a compilation of positive rules; but as a
system of consistent and rational principles, adapted, with the utmost
precision, to the administration of justice." FELDMAN, supra note 4, at 57
(quoting and discussing Gould); accord LAPIANA, supra note 2, at 30, 42. For
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Moreover, through their reading of law reports, students of the law
would also have seen the results of early American legal science
reflected in a more methodical method of law reporting as the
period progressed.28 Moreover, once again, students of the law
may have acquired additional familiarity with this element of the
prevailing jurisprudence by observing the practice of their
mentors, in particular court proceedings, or by participating in
moot court exercises."' Their familiarity with legal science may
also have been reinforced through interaction with a mentor or, to
a greater extent, through classroom teaching.287
One legal educator, writing in the mid-1830s, provides a
succinct description of what was involved in the scientific study of
law. Such study, he explained:
[U]sually commence[s] with the law of nature, as the foundation of
all legal science ... [followed by] the law of nations, and ... the
Political or Constitutional Law ... [and only then] the subject of

Municipal Law which comprises the great body of... civil and
criminal jurisprudence .... [T]reat[ment] of the Municipal Law...
commonly begin[s] with the rights of persons and the relations of
domestic life, which branches, as well as the whole law of property,
real and personal, are all expounded, before the modes of applying
the rules of law and of administering justice in pursuance of them,
are taken up.
It seems that in general teachers in the college/university law
programs aimed centrally and consistently at providing organized
and systematic instruction in law as the science of principles,288
and frequently the same was true of teachers in the independent
further discussion of the scientific conception of law in early American legal
thought as a rational system of principles low-level legal rules, reflecting the
common law forms of action, see supra note 273 and accompanying text. For
further discussion of James Gould and the Litchfield School, see supra notes
82-96 and accompanying text.
285. See supra note 269 and accompanying text.
286. See references supra note 278.
287. See references supra note 279.
288. Butler, supra note 139, at 171. See also LAPIANA, supra note 2, at 52

(discussing Butler's views regarding the study of law); supra note 273 and
accompanying text (discussing Feldman's view that the common law was
understood by premodern jurisprudents as a science, a rational system of
natural law principles and low-level legal rules reflecting the common law
forms of action).
289. See LAPIANA, supra note 2, at 29-32, 37-38, 44, 48 (discussing the views

of several college/university law teachers who characterized law as a Baconian
science of principles, including James Wilson at Philadelphia, Daniel Mayes at
Transylvania, William Kent at the University of the City of New York, Joseph
Story, Simon Greenleaf and Joel Parker at Harvard, and Theodore Dwight at
Columbia; and explaining that antebellum legal educators provided
"instruction in legal principles" and "tried to inculcate the science of law as
best they could using the standard educational techniques of their day"). See
also references to Hoeflich, Schweber, and Woodard cited supra note 273.
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law school programs as well."29 While students of the law in
apprenticeship training may not have been "exposed to systematic
instruction in the science of principles" in the same way,"
nevertheless it seems that many mentors advertently
exposed
their students to legal science through directed reading. 9 2
2.

PrevailingProfessionalIdeal

It appears also that a particular professional ideal - the
ideal of the lawyer-statesman - may have prevailed for much or
most of the period. Although various accounts of lawyers' original
self-understanding during this period have been advanced in the
scholarly literature, it will be apparent from the discussion in this
subsection that there exists very strong support for the position
that lawyers' original self-understanding indeed was that of the
lawyer-statesman.293 The lawyer-statesman ideal was closely
290. See, e.g., REED I, supra note 2, at 131-33 (explaining that the Litchfield
School, which was a model for other proprietary law schools, was "[cloncerned
with law as a science" and that it "offered a good narrow course in which the
common law was taught as a system of connected rational principles rather
than as a code of arbitrary, but authoritative, rules and dogmas") (internal
quotation marks omitted); Klafter, supra note 59, at 324-27 (explaining that in
their effort to "present an organized system of American law where none had
previously existed" and to teach law "as a science emphasizing the diverse
reasons for its development" instead of promoting "mere memorization of rules
and procedures," teachers in the proprietary law schools relied upon
Blackstone's COMMENTARIES, in particular for their categorizations and much
of their methodology).
291. See LAPIANA, supra note 2, at 38 ("The vast majority [of American
lawyers] studied law only through apprenticeship and were never exposed to
systematic instruction in the science of principles.").
292. For a good discussion of students' directed reading in apprenticeship
training, see Bailey, supra note 59, at 315-16, 319-22, 323, noting the perhaps
telling references to "legal science," at 316 and 318, and to the "intellectual
system" of "legal science," at 319. The directed reading discussed by Bailey
includes works not only on the "science of principles" but also works on the
"science" of pleading. See also supra note 284. Study of the practical "science"
of pleading was, of course, central to apprenticeship training. See LAPIANA,
supra note 2, at 38-41.
With respect to students in all three formal legal education settings, it
should be noted that the prevailing professional ideal of the period - the ideal
of the lawyer-statesman - was also partly shaped by the conceptions of legal
science. For discussion of the lawyer-statesman ideal in general, see infra
Part II.B.2. For discussion of the influence of the conceptions of legal science
upon the content of the lawyer-statesman ideal, see infra notes 335-339 and
accompanying text. As in the case of various other elements of the prevailing
jurisprudence, mentors in apprenticeship training, and law teachers in the
independent law school and college/university law programs, may have tried
advertently to expose their students to this element of the prevailing
jurisprudence also as part of their effort to familiarize their students with the
lawyer-statesman ideal. See supra note 279; see also infra note 395.
293. For a brief but useful survey of various positions that have been
advanced in the scholarly literature regarding American lawyers' original self-
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associated with certain of the jurisprudential elements explored in
Subsection 1 above, in particular with the artificial reason of the
common law, natural law theory, and early American legal
science.
As the term itself suggests, however, the lawyerstatesman ideal applied to politics as well as to law and thus was
also partly rooted in considerations of fundamental political
theory.
In his book The Lost Lawyer: Failing Ideals of the Legal
Profession, Anthony Kronman provides a highly sophisticated
account of the nature of the lawyer-statesman ideal and of its
development from the founding of the Republic until the present
day.294 Subsection a will consider Kronman's general account of
the lawyer-statesman ideal and of its influence during this first
phase in the history of U.S. legal education, and Subsection b will
discuss the ways in which, in his analysis, Kronman associates the
lawyer-statesman ideal with the Aristotelian political tradition.
Because Kronman's account of the historical role of the lawyerstatesman is rather abstract and general, it will be supplemented
in Subsection c by an examination of Robert Gordon's more
concrete and detailed account of this historical role, focusing on
particular types of activities and achievements of the lawyerstatesman. Subsection d will then seek to put Kronman's account
and Gordon's account into a broader perspective by considering
various claims made by other scholars who have written about the
prevailing political philosophy of the period.
Subsection e
concludes this examination of the lawyer-statesman ideal by
considering its role in the formal legal education of the period.
a.

The Ideal of the Lawyer-Statesman

As far as this first phase in the history of U.S. legal education
is concerned, Kronman explains that "for the early-nineteenthcentury bar, whose leaders still viewed their work and social
understanding of their role, see Russell Pearce, Lawyers As America's
Governing Class: The Formation and Dissolution of the Original
Understandingof the American Lawyer's Role, 8 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE
381, 382 n.5 (2001). Pearce explains that scholars have described lawyers'
original self-understanding variously as that of the advocate (Monroe
Freedman, David Luban), the gentleman (Thomas Shaffer), the guild member
(Elliott Krause), the individual lawyer-statesman (Anthony Kronman, William
Rehnquist), and a member of Tocqueville's lawyer aristocracy (Mary Ann
Glendon). Id. For a discussion of Pearce's own position, see infra notes 388-91
and accompanying text.
The discussion here in Part II.B.2 examines the work of those scholars
who claim that lawyers' original self-understanding of their role was that of
the lawyer-statesman.
The views of other scholars writing about the
prevailing political philosophy and legal education of the period appear to
provide strong support for this position as well. See infra Subsection d
(political philosophy) and Subsection e (legal education).
294. See KRONMAN, supra note 218.
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function in classically republican terms, the idealized figure of the
lawyer-statesman was the embodiment of professional excellence." 95 The lawyer-statesman is "not just an accomplished
technician" with "specialized professional knowledge," but "a
distinctive and estimable type of human being - a person of
practical wisdom." 96 Kronman describes the lawyer-statesman in
general terms as being "possessed of great practical wisdom and
exceptional persuasive powers, devoted to the public good but
keenly aware of the limitations of human beings and their political
arrangements." 7 Thus understood, the lawyer-statesman is "a
stock figure in the hortatory literature of the early-nineteenthcentury bar," and that literature indicates how lawyers of the time
Kronman broadens his claims
wished to see themselves.298
regarding the influence of the ideal beyond the early nineteenthcentury, asserting that the ideal was widely accepted within the
profession throughout the entire nineteenth-century.2 9
According to Kronman, the lawyer-statesman ideal continued
to operate as an ideal of professional excellence even for those
many lawyers who had only limited opportunities to instantiate, or
who otherwise fell short of, the ideal in their own work, thereby
"affirm[ing] the self-worth of lawyers as a group."0 0 The lawyer295. Id. at 12

(citing THE

LEGAL MIND IN AMERICA FROM INDEPENDENCE TO

THE CIVIL WAR (Perry Miller ed., 1962); FERGUSON, supra note 78; Robert W.
Gordon, Lawyers as the 'American Aristocracy': A Nineteenth-Century Ideal
That May Still Be Relevant, 20 STAN. LAWYER, Fall 1985, at 2-7, 79-82).
296. Id. at 15-16.
297. Id. at 12.
298. Id. (citing ADDRESSES AND ORATIONS OF RUFUS CHOATE 222-40 (6th ed.
1891); JEAN V. MATTHEWS, RUFUS CHOATE, THE LAW AND CIVIC VIRTUE

(1980)). The Rufus Choate speech cited by Kronman was given upon the death
of Daniel Webster in 1852, and is described by Kronman as "a good example of
the genre" of such hortatory literature. Id. at 12 n.3.
299. Id. at 16.
300. Id. at 12, 16-17. With regard to the role of the lawyer-statesman ideal
in "affirm[ing] the self-worth of lawyers as a group," Kronman situates the
lawyer-statesman ideal in the broader context of the "culture of
professionalism," which became very influential during the latter part of the
nineteenth century, explaining that the "ideal of professionalism" was "a
secular successor to the concept of salvation as a calling that appeared... in
the writings of the great seventeenth-century divines." Id. at 370-72. The
"ideal of professionalism" sought to "confer[ ] meaning on the whole of a
person's life" through "some intrinsic feature of the work" in which the
professional was engaged. Id. at 371. More particularly, the ideal stressed
that a professional career offers meaningful "personal fulfillment" because,
unlike non-professional work, professional work "engages a sufficiently broad
range of human capabilities" to have a "transformative" and identity-shaping
effect on the personality "by promoting the development of a distinctive
professional character." Id. For further discussion of the meaning of
"professionalism" and the historical development of that concept and of the
professions, see generally WILLIAM SULLIVAN, WORK AND INTEGRITY: THE
CRISIS AND PROMISE OF PROFESSIONALISM IN AMERICA (2d. ed., 2005). For
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statesman ideal was, of course, instantiated (and indeed,
presumably, largely constituted) by various "hero figures" who
were its "living representatives."'
In giving examples from our
period, Kronman seems to endorse the identification and portrayal
of "eight representative figures" by Chief Justice Rehnquist in a
1986

article entitled

The Lawyer-Statesman in American

History."2 These representative figures include Thomas Jefferson,
Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Marshall, from
what the Chief Justice calls the "Founding Period," and Abraham
Lincoln, Stephen Douglas, Salmon Chase, and William Seward,
from the "Civil War Period.""' To this list Kronman adds the
names of other advocates and judges of the period, including
Webster, Choate, Ames, Pinkney, and Kent."°
We have already noted Kronman's very general description of
the lawyer-statesman.3 "' He also provides a more detailed, albeit
still fairly general, "provisional" description of the main elements
of the ideal "in its classical nineteenth-century form," emphasizing
that "[tihe ideal of the lawyer-statesman was an ideal of
character," and explicating in particular the "character-virtues" of
practical wisdom (i.e., prudence) and devotion to the public good

Sullivan's discussion of our period, see id. at 67-82.
301. See KRONMAN, supra note 218, at 12, 16.
302. See id. at 11-12.
303. William H. Rehnquist, The Lawyer-Statesman in American History, 9
HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 537, 537-53; see also KRONMAN, supra note 218, at 3
(discussing Lincoln).
304. KRONMAN, supra note 218, at 12. Kronman illustrates his concept of
the lawyer-statesman further by giving additional examples from the
twentieth-century, including Henry Stimson, Dean Acheson, John McCloy,
Robert Jackson, and Earl Warren, as well as (more recently) Cyrus Vance,
Paul Warnke, and Carla Hills. Id. at 3, 11-12. Other twentieth-century
examples given by Kronman include Archibald Cox, Lloyd Garrison, William
Rogers, Orville Schell, and Adlai Stevenson. Id. at 273, 283.
For a critique challenging Kronman's reliance upon Rehnquist's article
and Rufus Choate's 1852 speech, supra note 298, to support his claims
regarding the content and influence of the lawyer-statesman ideal in the
nineteenth century, see James Altman, Modern Litigators and LawyerStatesmen, 103 YALE L.J. 1031, 1047-51 (1994) (reviewing Kronman's Lost
Lawyer, supra note 218, and questioning the probative value of Choate's
speech in supporting Kronman's claims as far as the area of law as opposed to
politics is concerned, as well as the probative value of Rehnquist's article in
supporting those claims as far as both areas are concerned). Despite these
reservations, Altman finds that other evidence, specifically various writings on
lawyer ethics, suggests that antebellum litigators indeed may have sought to
practice law in accordance with the nineteenth-century republican ideal of the
lawyer-statesman, or at least may have sought to do so more than modern
litigators. See id.at 1051-55; see also infra note 365 (for Altman's articulation
of the intellectual premises of the nineteenth-century republican lawyerstatesman ideal).
305. See supra notes 296-97 and accompanying text.
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(i.e., civic-mindedness or public-spiritedness)." 6 As far as the
virtue of civic-mindedness is concerned, Kronman emphasizes that
the lawyer-statesman is a "devoted citizen [who] cares about the
public good and is prepared to sacrifice his own well-being for it." 3 '
This "spirit of citizenship" sets him apart from "those who use the
law merely to advance their private ends," and from the "purely
self-interested practitioner of law."0"
Moreover, the lawyerstatesman is a "better citizen than most" not just because of his
motives but also because of his "special talent for discovering
where the public good lies, and for fashioning those arrangements
"
needed to secure it.
0
This last observation implicates the character-virtue of
practical wisdom. Here, Kronman explains that "[w]hether acting
as the representative of private interests or as a counselor in
matters of state," the lawyer-statesman does not just provide
"instrumental" assistance but also displays "exceptional wisdom"
in "offer[ing] advice about ends," an "essential aspect of his work"
being "to help those on whose behalf he is deliberating come to a
better understanding of their own ambitions, interests, and ideals
and to guide their choice among alternative goals." 10 Thus, in
addition to his intellectual abilities, the lawyer-statesman is a
"leader," a person of "extraordinary deliberative power," a
"paragon of judgment" who "excels at the art of deliberation," in
particular because he possesses "certain temperamental qualities,"
such as being "more calm and cautious than most people and
better able to sympathize with a wide range of conflicting points of
view," thereby "show[ing] ... a balanced sympathy toward the
various concerns of which his situation (or the situation of his
client) requires that he take account."311

306. KRONMAN, supra note 218, at 14-17, 109, 154. Kronman understands
"character" to mean "broadly speaking, an ensemble of settled dispositions of habitual feelings and desires." Id. at 15. Kronman does not appear to
regard the virtue of practical wisdom and the virtue of civic-mindedness as
"character-virtues" in the same sense. On the one hand, he refers to "the
character-virtues of prudence and public-spiritedness." Id. at 154. On the
other hand, he states that "[dieliberative wisdom is a virtue that people
possess to different degrees, making the distinction between excellence and
mediocrity unavoidably relevant to it. Devotion to the public good, by
contrast, requires only an act of will that every citizen is in principle able to
perform." Id. at 367. For further discussion of Kronman's understanding of
practical wisdom as a virtue of "character," see infra notes 310-11, 324-28, 330,
333 and accompanying text.
307. Id. at 14.
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Id. at 15.
311. Id. at 15-16. Kronman claims that those nineteenth-century lawyers
who held up the lawyer-statesman as a model for the profession portrayed him

in just this way; they meant to praise his "character" and not just his "learned
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In addition to such general description, Kronman undertakes
an explicit, in-depth "philosophical" analysis of the lawyerstatesman ideal in the political and legal contexts. Although he
recognizes that earlier defenders of the lawyer-statesman ideal did
not consciously think in such terms because, "[bleing confident
about its worth, they were never moved to scrutinize their
convictions in a philosophical light," nevertheless he appears to
claim that his analysis accurately depicts the content of the ideal
in the past.312 Thus, subsequent chapters of his book seek to
demonstrate how the twin virtues of practical wisdom and civicmindedness are displayed,313 in varying modes, in the political
understanding," to praise "his virtue and not just his expertise." Id. (citing
Maxwell Bloomfield, Law and Lawyers in American Popular Culture in LAW
AND AMERICAN LITERATURE: A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS 132-43 (Carl S. Smith
et al. eds., 1983)).
312. The claim is explicit with regard to statesmanship in politics. See id. at
53-54 (asserting that the "essential meaning [of statesmanship] has remained
the same from one political epoch to the next"). Moreover, the similarity
between Kronman's "provisional" description of the main elements of the
lawyer-statesman ideal "in its classical nineteenth-century form," see supra
notes 306-11 and accompanying text, and his in-depth philosophical analysis
strongly implies such a claim in the context of law as well. See also id. at 5-6
("[W]hat is permanently valuable in [the ideal] must be identified more
explicitly than before"); id. at 13-14 ("[W~e must ... articulat[e] [the ideal's]
intellectual premises more deliberately" than did its earlier defenders).
313. Although Kronman does not explicitly make the link himself, his
analysis of the twin virtues of practical wisdom and civic-mindedness in
various contexts, see infra notes 314-16 and accompanying text, arguably can
be seen as an analysis of what Alasdair MacIntyre describes as "internal
goods" of a "practice," as opposed to "external goods" such as money, status,
and power. See MACINTYRE, supra note 198, at 187-96. Here, of course, we
are concerned with the practice of politics and the practice (or perhaps more
accurately various "practices") of law. MacIntyre defines a "practice" in a
special sense, as being:
[Any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative
human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are
realized in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence
which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of
activity, with the result that human powers to achieve excellence and
human conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are systematically
extended.
Id. at 187. In MacIntyre's account, "practices" are "transmitted and reshaped"
through "traditions." Id. at 221-23; see also id. at 193-94. For MacIntyre's
definition of a "living tradition," see supra note 198 MacIntyre's account of a
"practice," and his distinction between "internal goods" and "external goods" of
a practice, is essentially Aristotelian. See id., at 197-99, 203. For further
discussion, see infra note 392.
In Kronman's analysis of the twin virtues of practical wisdom and civicmindedness in various contexts, these two virtues appear to be linked. Thus,
deliberating in a particular way (with practical wisdom), procedurally,
produces a particular good appropriate to the context in question
substantively, and the disposition to deliberate in that way arises out of a
civic-minded concern to achieve that substantive good.
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context" 4 and in the legal context- in judging3 5 and in legal
practice 1 ' - as is recognized also in law teaching."1
During the course of his "philosophical" analysis, Kronman
also explores another character trait of the lawyer-statesman,
namely a particular kind of political and legal conservatism.
Specifically, in confronting the question of change, the lawyerstatesman prefers a strategy of "pragmatic gradualism" because,
being "skeptic[al] about the power of abstract ideas," he is
"temperamentally inclined to see a value in the irregularities of
the existing order and to proceed with caution in leveling them

314. See KRONMAN, supra note 198, at 53-62, 87-108 (analyzing the modes of
practical wisdom (in particular, the capacity for "sympathetic detachment")
and civic-mindedness (in particular, the desire for, and the creation and
preservation of, "the good of political fraternity" while advocating a particular
course of action) in good political deliberation, and describing also a resulting
conservatism of a particular kind); see also infra note 318 (discussing the
conservatism of the lawyer-statesman). In his analysis, Kronman draws
parallels between good political deliberation and good personal deliberation,
which also requires practical wisdom (in particular, the capacity for
sympathetic detachment) and results in the personal equivalent of the good of
political fraternity, namely "the good of integrity [of the soul]." See KRONMAN,
supra note 198, at 57-59, 62-87.
315. See KRONMAN, supra note 198, at 116-21, 122 (emphasizing that the
capacity for sympathetic detachment and a civic-minded devotion to the "good
of the community represented by the laws" are crucial for good deliberation
when performing the "law job" of adjudication). In addition to a concern for
"doctrinal coherence" and "the responsiveness of doctrine to social and
economic circumstances," a devotion to the good of the law also includes a
concern for the preservation of political fraternity. Id. at 118, 138-39, 141-43,
158, 319; see also id. at 326-27 (discussing sympathetic detachment in
adjudicative deliberation); id. at 339-45 (discussing the judge's concern for
political fraternity in the exercise of judicial statesmanship); id. at 210-25
(discussing Karl Lewellyn's account of appellate judging).
316. See id. at 121-62 (building on the accounts of excellence in personal and
political deliberation and on the account of judging, to analyze the various
modes of practical wisdom (in particular, the capacity for sympathetic
detachment) and civic-mindedness (in particular, devotion to the good of the
law) in deliberation by the "good lawyer" when performing the "law jobs" of
counseling and advocacy, and describing a particular kind of legal and political
conservatism among lawyers). See also infra note 318 and accompanying text
(on the conservatism of lawyers).
317. With respect to this recognition in law teaching, Kronman focuses on
the cultivation of practical wisdom and civic-mindedness by the modern case
method of teaching. See KRONMAN, supra note 198, at 109-35; see also id. at
266-67, 269 (discussing the traditional aims of law teachers using the case
method). As far as our period is concerned, however, Kronman observes that
in the early nineteenth century the lawyer-statesman ideal "drew its vitality
from other sources." Id. at 154. Addressing "the formal legal education of the
early nineteenth-century bar," Kronman states that "prudence and publicspiritedness were extolled as virtues for lawyers and instilled by a blend of
apprenticeship and broad humanistic learning." Id. In this regard Kronman
refers to the disciplines of history and literature in particular. Id.
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out;" he "sees more in these arrangements than others do and
tends to be less optimistic about reform."3 8
b.

The Lawyer-Statesman Ideal and the Aristotelian Political
Tradition

In Kronman's analysis the lawyer-statesman ideal is closely
associated with the "Aristotelian political tradition." The type of
association differs, however, as between politics and law. In
politics the association appears to be one of direct inspiration,
whereas in law it appears to be more an association by
comparison. In the area of politics, Kronman explains that the
lawyer-statesman ideal was "closely entwined" with the tradition
and literature of "classical republicanism" or "civic humanism"
that began with Aristotle and other ancient writers. 319 Kronman
appears to see at least two important links between the lawyerstatesman ideal and this tradition. °
First, Kronman seems to suggest that the lawyer-statesman
ideal placed an Aristotelian stress on the autonomy of politics.2
For Aristotle, Kronman explains, politics is autonomous "in its
independence from the prepolitical domain of private needs," and
it is autonomous also "in the freedom of its own deliberative
processes, participation in which...
[is] essential to the
318. Id. at 154-55, 161-62. Kronman explains that, according to Tocqueville,
American lawyers are conservatives because of their close connection to the
propertied class (leading them to oppose "the destabilization of property
rights"), and because the ceremony of the law and "the discipline of legal
reasoning" encourage not only "a love of intellectual regularity," but also "a
contempt... for the unruly proceedings of democratic assemblies" and "a
generalized hostility to popular political reform." Id. at 155. While conceding
"the validity of Tocqueville's observations," Kronman prefers to "explain the
conservatism of modern-day American lawyers" as resulting from "a certain
skepticism regarding the power of abstract ideas" and a "moral
cosmopolitanism" regarding "the irreconcilable diversity of human goods," and
he maintains that these traits are shared by "the idealized figure of the
lawyer-statesman," and are encouraged today by the case method of teaching.
Id. at 155-61. See also id. at 106-08 (discussing the conservatism of the
statesman in politics and explaining that because of the emphasis on the value
of political fraternity, there is "a commitment to order and the status quo").
For further discussion of Tocqueville's views regarding lawyers in the early
American Republic, see infra note 348 and accompanying text.
319. KRONMAN, supra note 198, at 27, 35-36. Regarding the development of
the classical republican tradition and its reception in America, see infra note
362 and accompanying text.
320. In Kronman's analysis, these links between the lawyer-statesman ideal
and the Aristotelian political tradition emerge somewhat indirectly as part of
a comparison between the lawyer-statesman ideal and the recent movement in
American public law scholarship, known as the "new republicanism," that is
his main focus in the relevant discussion. See KRONMAN, supra note 198, at
26-50. Kronman describes the new republicans as "the most outspoken
defenders of civic virtue within the legal profession today." Id. at 51.
321. See id. at 36, 49.
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achievement of the self-rule that our fulfillment as human beings
requires. " "' For those in the Aristotelian tradition, then, the
autonomy of politics means that the goal of political action is not
always to "satisfy a prepolitical desire," an antecedent "social"
interest, but sometimes to form or cultivate new preferences, new
"political" interests, through deliberation; that at least some
political contests are concerned with "determin[ing] the collective
interest of everyone involved," with the content and requirements
of the "public good," and not with the satisfaction of "private"
political interests focused on the separate interests of each
participant; and that political contests should be resolved through
322. Id. at 37. In short, for Aristotle "politics is an independent activity with
a special aim or object of its own," namely the "self-government of a
community of equals by deliberative means." Id. at 36. Stephen Feldman
provides the following useful summary of some of the central elements in
Aristotle's moral and political thought relevant in the present context:
To Aristotle, the universal nature and ends of human life determine the
best form of political society. Most important, then, one must recognize
that "man is by nature a political animal" and that the telos or natural
end of human life is eudaimonia, or happiness. One achieves happiness
by living in accordance with virtue, and one cannot live virtuously
except by acting prudently and sagaciously within a polis or political
community. The good of the individual and the good of the political
community are intertwined and inseparable. In "the best regime,"
Aristotle declared, "[the citizen] is one who is capable of and
intentionally chooses being ruled and ruling with a view to the life in
accordance with virtue." The government, regardless of its form or
type - whether a government of the one, the few, or the many - should
pursue the satisfaction of the common good and not mere private
interests. For the individual, in short, virtuous participation in the
political community was deemed the highest good.
FELDMAN, supra note 4, at 12 (citing ARISTOTLE, THE NICHOMACHEAN
ETHICS, bk. IV, ch. 1-3, in 2 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1729

(Jonathan Barnes ed., 1984)); ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS bk. I, ch. 2; id. at bk.
III, ch. 7, 9, 13, in 2 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 2121 (Jonathan
Barnes ed., 1984)). As far as emphasis upon the common or public good is
concerned, and as the above passage suggests, Aristotle famously divides
constitutions (or forms of government) into two basic categories: those aiming
at the common interest (good or right forms) and those aiming at the personal
interest of the rulers (bad or wrong forms). See id. at bk. III, ch. 7, 127925 1 2 7 9b4.

thought,

For a more detailed discussion of Aristotle's moral and political
see, for example, 1 FREDERICK COPLESTON, A HISTORY OF

PHILOSOPHY 332-58 (Image ed., 1993) (1946).
The Aristotelian moral and political tradition, with its emphasis upon
virtue and the common good, was incorporated as a central element in the
Judaeo-Christian natural law tradition, in particular as a result of the
medieval synthesis achieved by St. Thomas Aquinas in the mid-thirteenth
century. See 2 COPLESTON, supra, at 398-434 (1948); J.M. KELLY, A SHORT
HISTORY OF WESTERN LEGAL THEORY 123-31, 134-37, 141-46 (1992). As
discussed above in Subsections c and d of Part II.B.1, the Judaeo-Christian
natural law tradition was a central element in the prevailing jurisprudence of
the period. See supra notes 244-45, 248, 250, 258-61, 273 and accompanying
text; see also supra note 282 and accompanying text.
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persuasion, through free "deliberative debate" and agreement,
32 3 and
not through "the manipulative techniques of power politics."
Second, Kronman claims that the emphasis of the lawyerstatesman ideal on character and judgment has its source in
Aristotle's account of political excellence, in his "character-based
elitism." 4 As Kronman explains, "[aiccording to Aristotle, politics
is a deliberative activity calling for judgments about particular
matters 'in which an indeterminate element is involved.' 32 5 The
appropriate excellence when deliberating about political matters
and participating in political self-rule (as also when deliberating
about personal matters and engaging in personal self-rule) is the
excellence of practical wisdom. 326 This is "a virtue of character, a
dispositional habit shaped by training or education;"3 7 and
"because of their greater natural abilities and superior education,"
some have more practical wisdom - and hence a greater capacity
for self-rule - than others, although practical wisdom, and
therefore the capacity for self-rule, may increase as a person
develops the requisite "character traits," which include2 8traits such
as "sobriety," "fair-mindedness," and "incorruptibility. 1

323. KRONMAN, supra note 218, at 31-34. Here, Kronman is actually
discussing the tenets of the "new republicans." See supra note 320. As
Kronman explains, however, the new republicans rely on the tradition of
classical political thought, drawing heavily from the literature of classical
republicanism. See KRONMAN, supra note 218, at 26-27, 35-36. It is a fair
inference, therefore, that Kronman regards these three tenets as being
representative of the Aristotelian political tradition generally.
As far as the lawyer-statesman ideal itself is concerned, it is a fair
inference that these tenets are descriptive of that ideal as well because, as
noted above, supra note 319 and accompanying text, the lawyer-statesman
ideal was "closely entwined" with the tradition and literature of classical
republicanism, and also because Kronman considers that the new republicans
and the lawyer-statesman ideal are similar with respect to their emphasis
upon the autonomy of politics. On this latter point, see KRONMAN, supra note
218, at 26-27, 35, 49.
When discussing the three tenets of the new republicans regarding the
autonomy of politics, Kronman contrasts them with adherents of "the interestgroup theory of politics," who hold opposing views on all these points. Id. at
28-31. In short, the interest-group theory implies that politics is not
"autonomous," but "instrumental," being "in its essence an adjectival process
with no internal ends or values of its own." Id. at 34.
324. Id. at 40, 42.
325. Id. at 40 (quoting ARISTOTLE, NICOMECHEAN ETHICS, at 1112b)).
326. Id. at 41, 42-44.
327. Id. at 41.
328. Id. at 41, 42-44. Kronman concedes that, in addition to this "characterbased elitism," Aristotle notoriously espoused a "biological elitism" that
excluded groups such as the young, women, and "natural slaves" from political
participation in the first place, on the grounds that they are naturally
incapable of the necessary self-rule. Id. at 37, 42. This effectively restricted
political participation to the adult male heads of households, who alone
possessed the requisite capacity, and meant that the disenfranchised groups
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The Aristotelian political tradition's emphasis upon the
importance of judgment and character in politics was also
addressed earlier when discussing Kronman's comparison of the
Aristotelian political tradition with the artificial reason of the
common law tradition. 29 As was noted there, Kronman considers
that the two traditions resemble each other in three main respects.
Thus, they both emphasize the necessity of long experience (to
"complex and
acquire the necessary knowledge, which is
disorderly"), the difficulty of attaining mathematical precision
(with the result that there is always room for "reasonable
disagreement"), and the importance of sound character (in
particular, the virtue of "prudence or practical wisdom") as well as
intellectual acuity, in achieving true understanding.3 0
In the area of law, then, for Kronman the association of the
lawyer-statesman ideal with the Aristotelian political tradition
"had to be ruled despotically, outside the realm of politics, by others." Id.
Although Kronman does not explicitly address the point, it is likely that at
least some adherents of the lawyer-statesman ideal during our period may
have shared Aristotle's views in this regard as well. See infra note 386 and
accompanying text.
The "new republicans," see supra notes 320 and 323, reject both
biological elitism and character-based elitism. KRONMAN, supra note 218, at
37 (biological elitism); id. at 27, 35, 51, 367 (character-based elitism). This is
because they combine their Aristotelian belief in the autonomy of politics, see
supra notes 320-23 accompanying text, with a commitment to "the prevailing
neo-Kantian consensus," justifying the principle of universal enfranchisement
on the Kantian non-empirical grounds that, with certain very limited
exceptions (such as "the very young" or "the severely handicapped"), every
person has an equal capacity for self-rule (or "self-determination"), conceived
as "the exercise of will" by "beings capable of action in accordance with the
conception of a rule," and is therefore "equally qualified to participate in
political deliberation." KRONMAN, supra note 218, at 37-39, 46-48. The
particular form of egalitarianism entailed in this Kantian justification for the
principle of universal enfranchisement also puts into question the whole
notion of practical wisdom and "a differential order of excellence in politics."
Id. at 44-46, 47-49, 51; see also id. at 27-28, 36, 367 (discussing further the
new republicans' neglect of the virtue of practical wisdom due to their
commitment to a Kantian will-based conception of equality). Consequently,
the "new republicans" are in fact hostile to the lawyer-statesman ideal,
omitting virtually any mention of three important components or features of
that ideal, namely: "the claim that some citizens have a superior ability to
discern the public good; the belief that this superiority is due to their
excellence of judgment; and the assumption that good judgment is a trait of
character and not simply an intellectual skill." Id. at 35, 49-50.
As Kronman makes clear, however, one can reject Aristotle's "biological
elitism," yet still accept his "character-based elitism." Not only is it perhaps
logically possible to combine a Kantian justification for the principle of
universal enfranchisement with Aristotle's account of political excellence, it is
also possible to justify that principle on non-Kantian, empirical grounds that
clearly can be combined with Aristotle's account. Id. at 40, 48.
329. See supra notes 218-23 and accompanying text.
330. See supra notes 218-23 and accompanying text.
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appears to be an association by comparison rather than an
association by direct inspiration."
As Kronman explains, "the
lawyer-statesman ideal was "deeply rooted in the common law
tradition," with its emphasis upon the "prudent resolution of
individual cases. " " The ideal incorporated "this ancient commonlaw reverence for the virtue of practical wisdom," for the notion
that disputes in hard cases required "a subtle and discriminating
sense of how the (often conflicting) generalities of legal doctrine
should be applied" in those disputes, and indeed amplified it by
claiming more explicitly that "prudence is a trait of character and
not just a cognitive skill. "n
Moreover, although the lawyerstatesman ideal stressed the value for lawyers of a familiarity with
various non-legal disciplines, those disciplines were "humane"
disciplines such as history, literature, and rhetoric, which were
case-centered, involving the "accidental and unique" (history and
rhetoric), and/or which had a "character-shaping function" (history
and literature).
However, the lawyer-statesman ideal was also "partly shaped
by an Enlightenment enthusiasm for system and order. " " There
was, therefore, a "tension" in the lawyer-statesman ideal's
incorporation of the "ancient common-law reverence for the virtue
of practical wisdom" alongside "an Enlightenment rationalism of
more recent origin."" 8 On the one hand, "many of the great
lawyers and judges of the classical period [were] systematizers...
who believed in the value of organization and clarity, both in
established fields (where the historically evolved elements of
doctrine were often exceedingly tangled) and in the newer sphere

331. Of course, many lawyers also participated in politics. Insofar as the
Aristotelian political tradition and the lawyer-statesman ideal influenced
lawyers in the practice of politics (for example, by encouraging civic-

mindedness and practical wisdom), and insofar as characteristics lawyers
developed in politics "spilled over" into their legal practice, then to that extent
the Aristotelian political tradition may have indirectly influenced the practice
of law as well. Similarly, the Aristotelian political tradition may also have
indirectly influenced the practice of law insofar as the legal education lawyers

received was intended to prepare future leaders of the Republic and was itself
conducted within that tradition. Moreover, as discussed earlier, the
Aristotelian tradition in fact may have directly influenced the practice of law
as well. See supra note 223 (Aristotelian modes of thought in premodern legal
reasoning). See also supra note 331 and infra note 392 (understanding of legal

practice within an Aristotelian account of "practices").
332. See KRONMAN, supra note 218, at 20-21.
333. Id. at 21.

334. Id. at 20-22. Thus, "throughout the legal literature of the period, one

encounters... the widely shared belief that lawyers must know something
about history, literature, and rhetoric as well as law if they are to do their jobs
in a properly broad-minded way." Id. at 20.

335. Id. at 20-21.
336. Id. at 21.
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of constitutional law as well."337 Here Kronman mentions Joseph
Story and John Marshall as examples,33 and presumably has in
mind the efforts made by various early American legal scientists
discussed above.339 On the other hand:
[Tihe common-law tradition... historically had taken a more
skeptical view of systematic legal reform and stressed the wisdom of
proceeding on a case-by-case basis instead. The common lawyer
instinctively mistrusts abstract speculation.
He believes that
general principles have a role to play in the law but doubts that
most serious disputes can be decided by reference to them alone. In
addition, he insists, hard cases require the exercise of practical
wisdom ....340

In addition to this emphasis upon the character-virtue of
practical wisdom, in the area of law the lawyer-statesman ideal
also shared the Aristotelian political tradition's emphasis upon
devotion to the public good. 4' Here Kronman appears to suggest
that the lawyer's role was "to 'mediate' between the public order
and its requirements, on the one hand, and the self-regarding
desires of private individuals on the other" by tempering the
"excesses of private ambition" and by seeking to improve the law
when arguing great public cases and dealing with other concrete
disputes. 34 2 This mediating role, then, is also central to Mary Ann
337. Id. at 20.
338. Id.
339. See supra notes 267-74 and accompanying text. It is significant, in this
regard, that at this point in the discussion Kronman is comparing and
contrasting the lawyer-statesman ideal with a successor ideal, the ideal of
scientific law reform, that gradually emerged from the lawyer-statesman ideal
toward the end of the nineteenth century. See KRONMAN, supra note 218, at
17-23. For further discussion of the ideal of scientific law reform, see infra
note 342 and accompanying text.
340. KRONMAN, supra note 218, at 21.

341. With respect to the Aristotelian political tradition's emphasis upon
devotion to the public good, see supra notes 322-23 and accompanying text;
infra notes 362-66 and accompanying text.
342. See KRONMAN, supra note 218, at 18-19 (citing Robert W. Gordon, The
Ideal and the Actual in the Law: Fantasies and Practices of New York City
Lawyers 1870-1900, in THE NEW HIGH PRIESTS: LAWYERS IN POST-CIVIL WAR

AMERICA 53-74 (Gerald W. Gawalt ed., 1984)). These particular points about
the lawyer-statesman ideal emerge, somewhat elliptically perhaps, during the
same discussion comparing and contrasting the lawyer-statesman ideal with
the ideal of scientific law reform referred to above. See supra note 339.
In his comparison of the two ideals, Kronman explains that they both:
shared a commitment to the public good and improvement of the legal order;
valued a systematic approach to legal problems; and stressed the value of
nonlegal disciplines for their solution. However, they also diverged with
respect to these three points. Thus, adherents of the ideal of scientific law
reform: (a) focused on "the structural arrangement of the legal order as a
whole" as opposed to "the resolution of particular disputes;" (b) considered that
the "special wisdom" needed for its "scientific reform" through the
"application ...of certain methodical and rigorous techniques" was "reducible
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Glendon's "good of the legal order and the polity it serves."343
c.

Activities and Achievements

Robert Gordon's work on the legal profession during the early
nineteenth century provides further and very useful insights into
the mediating role of lawyers.3
Like Kronman, Gordon
emphasizes and explores the civic-mindedness or publicspiritedness of the elite lawyers of the period. Also, like Kronman,
Gordon considers that these elite lawyers served as role models for
the profession3 45 and that the ideal they represented continued to
be influential during the nineteenth-century.3 46 However, whereas
Kronman describes the historical mediating role of lawyers only in
the most abstract and general terms,"7 Gordon does so in much

to rules and hence teachable in an academic setting," and gave "little weight"
to the common law conception of prudence or practical wisdom; and (c)
emphasized the value of the "social scientific disciplines" (including
criminology, economics, and statistics), as opposed to "the older humane
studies" (such as history, rhetoric and literature). KRONMAN, supra note 218,
at 17-23.
343. GLENDON, supra note 197, at 181; see also supra note 200 and
accompanying text (quoting this language from Glendon's book); supra notes
315-16 and accompanying text (discussing Kronman's account of the lawyerstatesman's civic-minded devotion to the "good of the law" in judging and in
lawyering respectively, and identifying the different elements involved).
344. See Robert W. Gordon, Lawyers as the 'American Aristocracy': A
Nineteenth-Century Ideal That May Still Be Relevant, 20 STAN. LAWYER, Fall
1985, at 2-7, 79-82 [hereinafter Gordon, American Aristorcracy]; see also
Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1, 14-16
(1988) [hereinafter Gordon, Independence] (summarizing, and to some extent
reformulating and extending, various points in his earlier article, supra). As
we have already seen, Kronman invokes Gordon's work in support of his own
historical claims regarding the lawyer-statesman ideal. See supra note 295;
see also supra note 342.
345. In Gordon's words:
Lawyers... seemed to have exceptional opportunities to lead exemplary
lives, to illustrate by their example the calling of the independent
citizen, the uncorrupted just man of learning combined with practical
wisdom. Lives of eminent lawyers were written up and circulated for
schoolchildren and popular readers. As an inspiration to the younger
bar, lawyers endlessly eulogized their dead brethren's disinterestedness
and devotion to professional craft and public service, often at
considerable sacrifice to income.
Gordon, Independence, supra note 344, at 15-16 (Emphasis in original).
346. See infra note 361 and accompanying text.
347. See the references to Kronman's discussion of the lawyer-statesman
ideal and the virtue of civic-mindedness in politics, supra note 314
(emphasizing the statesman's civic-minded devotion to the good of political
fraternity); in judging, supra note 315 (emphasizing the judge's civic-minded
devotion to the good of the law); and, in legal practice, supra note 316
(emphasizing the importance of a civic-minded devotion to the good of the law
in counseling and advocacy). Regarding legal practice in particular, see also
supra note 342 and accompanying text (discussing the role of lawyers in
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more concrete and detailed terms, focusing on particular types of
activities and achievements.
Taking as his point of departure Alexis de Tocqueville's
famous mid-1830's characterization of lawyers as the "American
aristocracy,""8 Gordon explains that the elite lawyers, who were
"metropolitan, college-trained, mostly Federalist-Whig in politics,"
saw themselves as republican lawyer-statesmen with the
"mediating" role of "harmoniz[ing] the pursuit of private interest
with the universal interest of the whole." 9 In explicating the selfimage or "professional ideology" of these elite lawyers, Gordon
explains further that although they were "increasingly inclined to
emphasize their passive role as a restraint on the excesses of
Jacksonian democracy" in the mid-1830's when de Tocqueville was
writing, they were more self-confident and activist during previous
decades - from about 1790 until 1830.350
Then they saw
themselves as "uniquely situated and qualified to diffuse
throughout society the culture of civic virtue upon which the
success of capitalist democracy would essentially depend... [and
as] a means for mediating the conflict between virtue and
commerce,... a way of reconciling the particular with the
universal, class and regional factionalism with the common good,
utilitarian calculation with social morality." 5 ' In the following
passage Gordon describes how the influence of lawyers imbued
with this vision and professional ideology extended throughout
society:
[Cionstitutional review by high court judges was only the tip of the
iceberg, the institutional apex of a vast interlinked network of
lawyers deployed throughout society: the collegium of appellate

mediating between the public order and individual interests). As noted above,
Kronman appears to claim that his analysis of the lawyer-statesman ideal
accurately depicts the content of the ideal in the past. See supra note 312 and
accompanying text.
348. See Gordon, American Aristocracy, supra note 344, at 2 (quoting
Tocqueville's observation that "[iln America there are neither nobles nor men
of letters and the people distrust the wealthy. Therefore the lawyers form the
political upper class and the most intellectual section of society .... It is at
the bar or the bench that the American aristocracy is found." Id (quoting
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 268 (J.P. Mayer ed., 1969)).

See also Gordon, Independence, supra note 344, at 14 (explaining that "[the]
leading... lawyers, nourished on Montesquieu..., in turn, influenced
Tocqueville's view of American lawyers as a substitute for the
Montesquieuvian aristocracy"). The notion, of course, is that lawyers play the
classical aristocratic role of a political balance wheel. See Gordon, American
Aristocracy, supra note 344, at 3; Gordon, Independence, supra note 344, at 14.
For further discussion of Tocqueville's views regarding lawyers in the early
American Republic, see supra note 318.
349. Gordon, American Aristocracy, supranote 344, at 2-5.

350. Id. at 4.
351. Id. at 4-5.
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lawyers who advise the judges, the scholars and treatise writers; the
lawyers elected to the legislatures and the legal policy intellectuals
who suggest legislative initiatives; the lawyers in their professional
practice roles, advising clients, addressing juries; and above all as
shapers of both elite and popular opinion, as corporate directors,
local notables, speakers before mercantile societies, Fourth of July
orators, political stump speakers, using any and all occasions for
public argument - appellate argument, jury speeches, judicial
charges to grand juries, legislative debate - as a means of
educating general audiences in the principles and duties of
republican citizenship.5 2
Gordon identifies three main sets of reasons why the elite
lawyers held the vision of themselves as having such a "special
stewardship."3
First, because
of social and historical
circumstances, lawyers enjoyed political dominance (indeed,
"almost all lawyers of that time sought elective office at one time
or another") as well as cultural dominance ("law was a branch of
public letters ... [and, i]n an age whose ideal of the man of letters
was the classical-Ciceronian active citizen law could still be the
literary man's vocation"), and it would be "irresponsible" to waste
such a position of leadership."M Second, "the ordinary practice of
law was filled with virtue-developing experiences," cultivating the
fundamental skill of public oratory and the "fiduciary muscles" as
well as an "insider's knowledge" of many different activities and
positions in society together with the ability to assess that
5
knowledge independently."
Third, for reasons associated with the
content of the law, and with the techniques, methods and
education of lawyers, "the substance of Law itself... was capable

352. Id. at 4; see also Gordon, Independence, supra note 344, at 14, where
Gordon articulates the "negative and positive roles" of lawyers as follows:
The negative role is that of resolutely obstructing, out of their
instinctive conservatism, any attempted domination of the legal
apparatus by executive tyrants, populist mobs, or powerful private
factions. Lawyers were to be the guardians, in the face of threats posed
by transitory political and economic powers, of the long-term values of
legalism. Performing their positive functions entails the assumption of
a special responsibility beyond that of ordinary citizens. They are to
repair defects in the framework of legality, to serve as a policy
intelligentsia, recommending improvements in the law to adapt it to
changing conditions, and to use the authority and influence deriving
from their public prominence and professional skill to create and
disseminate, both within and without the context of advising clients, a
culture of respect for and compliance with the purposes of the laws.
Id.
353. See Gordon, American Aristocracy, supra note 344, at 5 (for the
expressions "special stewardship" and "legal stewardship").
354. Id. at 5-6.
355. Id. at 6.
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of forming the integrative paste.., for binding the separate and
particular activities of a business society into a political unity.""'
Gordon provides the following useful "short list" of what those
lawyers who believed in this "Republican Vision" actually
achieved, despite the inevitable gap between the vision and its
realization:
(1) the triumph of the idea of the Constitution as law and acceptance
of the institution of judicial review; (2) the whole nationalizing and
vested-rights defining corpus of the Marshall Court, clearly the joint
work-product of the justices and the small group of regulars at the
Supreme Court Bar; (3) Webster's amazing success in promoting
Law and the Constitution as culturally unifying symbols of
nationhood; (4) the legal profession's continued domination, without
serious rivals, of political officeholding; (5) by default, the
assumption by state courts and their coteries of leading advocates of
the major share of responsibility in defining and enforcing the
ground-rules of property rights and exchange rules, and in
supervising corporations; (6) a large body of law reports and
treatises interpreting them; (7) a respectable start on modem legal
education, with the revival of Harvard under Story and Greenleaf;
and (8) retention of control - despite Jacksonian attacks on
professional privilege and demolition of formal entry barriers - of
access to the upper echelons of law practice and judicial office.3 "
Nevertheless, Gordon concedes that the continued implementation
of the elite lawyers' vision appeared to have "run into deep

356. Id. at 6-7. With respect to the reasons associated with the content of
the law, and with the techniques, methods, and education of lawyers, Gordon
explains that: (1) the common law contained "the basic principles of English
liberty" at issue in the Revolution together with "a vast reservoir of
experience" in dealing with conflicts arising in commercial societies; (2) skilled
lawyers possessed various interpretive "conventional techniques" for resolving
linguistic uncertainty as well as a method for inducing principles from cases
and using them to deal with novel economic and social circumstances;" and (3)
"the ideal (if rarely realized) law curriculum of the period was a whole liberal
education in itself," a course of reading exposing lawyers to the "universal
laws of history," the "cosmopolitan practices of commercial nations," and the
'great civilian writers on the law of nature and of nations," thereby equipping
lawyers with a "trained sensibility" that enabled them to realize universal
legal, historical and moral principles in "ordinary social practice." Id.
With respect to all three sets of reasons discussed notes 354-56 and
accompanying text; see also Gordon, Independence, supra note 344, at 15:

[Lawyers] furnished a disproportionate share of Revolutionary
statesmen, dominated high offices in the new governments and the
organs of elite literary culture, had more occasions even than ministers
for public oratory, and were the most facile and authoritative
interpreters of the laws and constitutions, rapidly becoming the primary
medium of America's public discourse and indeed its "civic religion."
Id. As noted above, supra note 345, "they [also] seemed to have exceptional
opportunities to lead exemplary lives." Id. at 15.
357. Gordon, American Aristocracy, supra note 295, at 79.
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trouble" by the mid-1830s.358 Moreover, "[tihe project continued to
founder for a number of good historical reasons," all of which
"culminat[ed] in a virtual revolt by a large part of the bar against
the Federalist-Whig vision of the lawyer's role," 9 emphasizing
instead the lawyer's role in representing private interests rather
than performing public duties. 6 ° Gordon maintains, however, that
358. Id.
359. Id. Among the "good historical reasons" for the continued foundering of
the project are "the less than lofty actualities of the conditions of law study
and practice, a major split in the profession over the slavery issue, a decline in
respect for oratory per se, the increasing profitability of private practice over
public service, [and] growing ties between lawyers and the corporations." Id.
360. Id. For an analysis focusing on factors other than those identified by
Gordon that put pressure on the lawyer-statesman ideal before the Civil War,
see Altman, supra note 304, at 1055-56:
Even before the Civil War, changes in intellectual life and American
society were undermining the intellectual premises of the lawyerstatesman ideal. During the antebellum period, economic development
aggravated regional and class differences and made it much more
difficult to maintain a republican view of politics based upon a
conception of the public good.
As the result of that economic
development, by the 1830s and 1840s the law had come to be thought of
more instrumentally, as "facilitative of individual desires and as simply
reflective of the existing organization of economical and political power."
The classical tradition in intellectual life collapsed around 1830 and an
Enlightenment morality based upon rules replaced the Aristotelian
moral tradition.
Id. (quoting HORWITZ, supra note 224, at 253). For Altman's articulation of
the intellectual premises of the nineteenth-century republican lawyerstatesman ideal, see infra note 365.
For discussion of the waning of the classical republican tradition, with
its emphasis upon virtue and the public good, in favor of Lockean liberal
individualism in American political thought, see infra notes 366-93 and
accompanying text. For discussion of the emergence of an instrumentalist
conception of law, see supra notes 252-66 and accompanying text. On the
collapse of the classical tradition in intellectual life, see also FERGUSON, supra
note 78, at 200-06 (emphasizing factors, including the collapse of the classical
tradition in intellectual life, that diminished the value for lawyers of general
learning and literary accomplishment, leading to the demise of "the ideal of
the gentleman lawyer-writer" around 1840 or 1850, but recognizing "the
strange and notable exception" of the South where that ideal continued to
flourish throughout the nineteenth century). For discussion of the emphasis
upon virtue and the common good in the Aristotelian moral and political
tradition, see supra note 322. It should perhaps also be noted that Aristotle's
moral and political thought recognized the importance of rules as well as
virtues. See, e.g., I COPLESTON, supra note 322, at 341-42 (discussing
Aristotle's understanding of "Justice"). So does the Judaeo-Christian natural
law tradition, which, as discussed supra note 322, incorporated the
Aristotelian moral and political tradition as a central element. See, e.g., JOHN
FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 164-65, 281-90 (1965).
Altman also observes that during the second half of the nineteenth
century, and with the rise of corporate capitalism, "the corporate counselor
supplanted the litigator" among elite lawyers, most of whom "hitched their
star to corporate interests and defined loyalty to their clients as their sole
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"[tihe vision had not in fact collapsed at all, but was on its way to
becoming institutionalized in the professional culture of the late
nineteenth century."3
d.

Broader Perspective: Civic Republicanism and the Virtuous
Elite

The claims made by Kronman and Gordon regarding the
historical influence of the lawyer-statesman ideal, with its
emphasis upon the public good and civic virtue, appear to be
broadly consistent with the views of contemporary historians and
political theorists who emphasize the extent to which American
political thought during the eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries derived from and continued the tradition of classical
republicanism 2 (which was associated with the natural law
moral obligation." See Altman, supra note 304, at 1056.
361. Gordon, American Aristocracy, supra note 295, at 79. More specifically,
the vision was "resurrect[ed] in the vocations of the bureaucratic statesman
and the counselor to corporate managements" as the "'Progressive' vision of
public interest lawyering." Id. For a useful explanation of how this
"Progressive" vision modified the lawyer-statesman ideal, focusing on the
views of Louis Brandeis, see Altman, supra note 304, at 1056-59. Altman also
concludes that "by the turn of the century, the republican version of the
lawyer-statesman ideal based upon an Aristotelian view of politics and moral
virtues was no longer credible," and that although "the lawyer-statesman ideal
was still alive ... in a transmuted form for corporate counselors" (but not for
litigators), nevertheless "[elven this progressive version of the ideal was not
prevalent." Id. at 1059. In apparent contrast to Gordon and Altman,
Kronman seems to consider that the republican version of the lawyerstatesman ideal was widely influential throughout the nineteenth century.
KRONMAN, supra note 218, at 16. Moreover, according to Kronman, it
remained highly influential for most of the twentieth century, only
succumbing to various institutional pressures, and the associated emergence
of competing professional ideals within academia, law firms, and courts,
during the latter part of the twentieth century. See KRONMAN, supra note 218,
at 1-7, 11-13 (general); id. at 17-51, 165-70 (academia); id. at 270-314 (law
firms); id. at 315-52 (courts).
362. See, e.g., THOMAS L. PANGLE, THE SPIRIT OF MODERN REPUBLICANISM:
THE MORAL VISION OF THE AMERICAN FOUNDERS AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF

LOCKE 28-29 (1988) (identifying J. Pocock, Gordon Wood, and Joyce Appleby
as scholars holding such views); Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the
Feminine Voice in ConstitutionalAdjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 543, 550-51 &
n.22, n.23 (1986) (identifying B. Bailyn, L. Banning, D. Howe, R. Ketcham,
and Ross, in addition to Pocock and Wood, as scholars holding such views); id.
at 574-75 & n.149 (identifying David Epstein, Jonathan Macey, and Cass
Sunstein as scholars holding such views). Sherry identifies this last group
with "the new republicans." Id. at 575. As Anthony Kronman explains, the
new republicans "trace their intellectual roots ... to the federalist-republican
culture of the early nineteenth century and its historical successors
(progressivism in particular)." See KRONMAN, supra note 218, at 364. For
further, specific discussion of these intellectual roots in the present article, see
supra Subsection c of Part II.B.2 above. For further discussion of the new
republicans in the present article, see supra notes 320, 323, 328 and
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As Suzanna Sherry explains, according to these

scholars, there were "three themes... derived from classical
republicanism" that "dominated the thought of the neoclassical
American republicans: the good of the commonwealth as a whole,
the subordination of individual interests through the promotion of
civic virtue, and citizen participation in a deliberative, valueselective form of government. "
Moreover, these three themes
were "integrally and necessarily related to one another":
The good of the commonwealth requires that citizens subordinate
their private interests, and the fostering of civic virtue is the
mechanism by which they may be expected to do so. Neither private
virtue nor public good, however, can be defined in a vacuum: in the
republican vision, a primary function of government is to order
values and to define virtue, and thereby educate its citizenry to be
virtuous.36 5

accompanying text; infra note 368 and accompanying text.
Regarding the development of the classical republican tradition and its
reception in America, Pangle explains that, according to its contemporary
proponents, "classical republicanism" was taken over into eighteenth-century
American thought from the "Country" opposition in England and is "traceable
in a pretty straight line, back through Cato's Letters, Bolingbroke, Sidney, and
Harrington to Machiavelli and thence... to Savonarola, Aristotle, and the
Spartan as well as the Roman and Venetian ideals of citizenship." PANGLE,
supra note 362, at 28 (emphasis in original). For other links in the chain of
development, see, for example, Carrington, FrancisLieber, supra note 106, at
348-52 (identifying, in particular, Pericles and Montesquieu, in addition to
Machiavelli).
Feldman emphasizes within this tradition the links to Aristotle and
Machiavelli:
Civic republicanism could be traced back at least to Aristotelian political
theory, which emphasized that individuals fulfill their natures only by
living and participating in a political community.
Thus, civic
republicans generally stressed that virtuous citizens and leaders must
deliberate about and pursue the public or common good so that, as
Machiavelli had underscored, they might preserve their political
community or republic as long as possible.
FELDMAN, supra note 4, at 58. For Feldman's summary of some of the central
elements in Aristotle's political thought, see supra note 322. For Feldman's
discussion of Machiavelli's political thought, see FELDMAN, supra note 4, at
14-15.
363. See supra notes 322, 362 and accompanying text; see also supra note
328 and accompanying text (discussing Aristotle's "character-based elitism"
and "biological elitism"); infra note 386 and accompanying text (discussing the
inluence of Aristotle's biological elitism in Southern defenses of slavery).
364. Sherry, supra note 362, at 552.
365. Id.; see also id. at 552-57 (elaborating on the three themes and their
relationship). Similarly, Pangle continues his discussion of the development of
the classical republican tradition and its reception in America, as portrayed by
the contemporary proponents of that tradition, see supra note 362, as follows:
The lynchpin of this "essentially anti-capitalist" grand "republican
synthesis" of eighteenth-century American political thought is said to be
the concept of virtue, understood as the notion that "furthering the
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Although there appears to be considerable consensus among
contemporary historians that classical republican thought was
predominant in eighteenth-century America, there is considerable
divergence of opinion regarding the time when, and the extent to
which, Americans began departing from the framework of classical
republicanism in favor of a Lockean liberalism embracing
individualism and capitalism,3" (which was associated with the
public good - the exclusive purpose of republican government required the constant sacrifice of individual interests to the greater
needs of the whole, the people conceived as a homogenous body."
PANGLE, supra note 362, at 28 (quoting Robert E. Shalhope, Republicanism
and Early American Historiography,39 WM. & MARY Q. 335 (1982) (emphasis
by Pangle)). Similarly, too, in reviewing Kronman's Lost Lawyer, supra note
218, Altman states:
Kronman's ideal of the lawyer-statesman bears great resemblance to the
nineteenth-century republican ideal of the lawyer-statesman.
That
republican ideal grew out of a set of three interconnected intellectual
premises closely tied to the Aristotelian tradition: (1) the republican
view of politics as deliberation about the public good; (2) the republican
view of law as an expression of the moral sense of the community, with a
substantive content concerning the proper goals of human conduct; and
(3) a morality based upon virtues, specifically including practical
wisdom and public spiritedness (often called "civic virtue").
Altman, supra note 304, at 1048-49.
See also supra note 322 (reproducing Feldman's summary of some of the
central elements in Aristotle's moral and political thought).
366. See PANGLE, supra note 362, at 28-29. For a good sense of the range of
divergent views, see id.; Sherry, supra note 362, at 551. Sherry explains that
the transformation involved "three essential disputes: (1) whether society was
an organic whole or a collection of individuals; (2) whether man was
irretrievably self-interested or potentially virtuous and community-minded;
and (3) whether the function of government was to define and safeguard the
common good or protect individual liberties." Id. at 551 note 25. Stated thus,
of course, the formulation of the third dispute may be somewhat misleading
because Locke too embraced the long-standing notion that government should
promote the common good, albeit understanding the common good as involving
essentially the protection of natural rights. See, e.g., KELLY, supra note 322,
at 217 (explaining that, for Locke, the sole function of government is to protect
the subjects' "property" in the broad sense of "'their lives, liberties and
estates'" and that this function is "conferred on the ruler or rulers ... not
absolutely and irrevocably, but by way of a trust for the public good." Id.
(quoting JOHN LOcKE, Two TREATISES ON GOVERNMENT (1690)); see also 5
COPLESTON, supra note 322, at 139-40 (1959) (recognizing "Locke's principle
that the government.., has a trust to fulfil and that it exists to promote the
common good," but criticizing "Locke's failure to give any thorough analysis of
the concept of the common good" and his "tend[ency] to assume without more
ado that the preservation of private property and the promotion of the
common good are to all intents and purposes synonymous terms").
Presumably, therefore, perhaps the third dispute is more accurately
understood as a dispute over two competing visions of the common good: a
Lockean liberal vision, focusing on the protection of natural rights; and an
alternative, neo-classical republican vision that either conceives of the
common good in terms that do not include the protection of individual rights
as such or, possibly, that conceives of the common good as including their
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Surveying various views, Sherry

Once thought to be thoroughly individualist in its outlook, the
Revolution has been reinterpreted by contemporary historians "not
as a Lockean effort to protect property from taxation and regulation
but as a Machiavellian effort to preserve the young republic's 'virtue'
from the corrupt and corrupting forces of English politics." These
historians thus find American revolutionary ideology in classical
republicanism, primarily as envisioned by Machiavelli. Within a
short time, however, that ideology began to undergo a major
transformation.
Perhaps as early as 1787, or as late as the
aftermath of the Civil War, classical republicanism faded from the
American political consciousness, to be replaced by the liberalism of
Locke and Madison.3

protection as such but limits their exercise in favor of other components of the
common good. With respect to the latter type of alternative vision, compare
FINNIS, supra note 360, at 210-18 (explicating how "the maintenance of
human rights is a fundamental component of the common good," but that
"most human rights are subject to or limited by each other and by other
aspects of the common good.., which are fittingly indicated... by expressions
such as 'public morality,' 'public health,' 'public order.'" Id. at 218 (emphasis
in original).
For further discussion of how the neoclassical American
republicans in fact may have conceived of the common good, see infra notes
399-400 and accompanying text.
367. See supra note 366 and accompanying test; see also, e.g., FELDMAN,
supra note 4, at 67 (observing that a Lockean emphasis, by the constitutional
framers themselves, upon "the protection of an individual right to accumulate
property and wealth" had "set the stage" for the transition of the United
States "from a largely agricultural to a commercial and eventually industrial
economy").
368. Sherry, supra note 362, at 550-51 (quoting J. DIGGINS, THE LOST SOUL
OF AMERICAN POLITICS: VIRTUE, SELF-INTEREST, AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF

LIBERALISM 9-10 (1984)). Sherry canvasses the range of views regarding the
timing of the "major transformation" whereby "classical republicanism" was
replaced by "the liberalism of Locke and Madison," and lists the following
views: (1) "1787 and the adoption of the Constitution signaled 'the end of
classical politics,'" (quoting G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC 1776-1787 606 (1969)); (2) "liberalism triumphed no earlier than the
end of the War of 1812" (citing L. BANNING, THE JEFFERSONIAN PERSUASION:

EVOLUTION OF A PARTY IDEOLOGY (1978)); (3) "classical politics ended with
rise of Jacksonian democracy" (citing R. KETCHAM, PRESIDENTS ABOVE PARTY:

THE FIRST AMERICAN PRESIDENCY, 1789-1829 (1984)); (4) "republican or Whig
values lasted until after Civil War" (citing D. HOWE, THE POLITICAL CULTURE
OF THE AMERICAN WHIGS 301-05 (1979)); (5) "republicanism lingered through

1880's" (citing Ross, The Liberal Tradition Revisited and the Republican
Tradition Addressed in

NEW DIRECTIONS

IN AMERICAN

INTELLECTUAL

HISTORY 116, 122-29 (J. Higham and P. Conkin eds., 1979)); (6) "classical
influence and awareness of the 'Machiavellian moment' continues to present
day" (quoting J. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE
POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION 526-45
(1975)). Id. at 551 n.23.

As indicated in the above listing, Gordon Wood considers that 1787 was
"the decisive turning point;" he also "described the Anti-Federalists as the last
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The situation is even more controversial because, as the above
passage suggests, the scholars who make these various claims
regarding the influence of the classical republican tradition upon
early American political thought are themselves presenting a
revisionist view of history.369 This revisionist view has been
increasingly criticized by other scholars who are more aligned with
the earlier, pre-revisionist view and who emphasize, therefore, the
great extent to which even Revolutionary political thought was
influenced by Lockean liberalism.37 °

great exponents of the 'classical republican' vision." PANGLE, supra note 362,
at 28. See also Sherry, supra note 362, at 555 (discussing "[t]he anti-federalist
insistence that only a small, homogeneous republic could succeed"). For
further exploration of the thesis that the Constitution is the pivotal event in
the transformation replacing classical republicanism with modern liberalism,
see id. at 557-62. Sherry concludes that:
Based on the "psychology of temptation and the politics of suspicion,"
the Constitution of 1787, and especially the Bill of Rights of 1789,
represent a triumph of modern liberalism over classical republicanism.
Individualism had become the foundation of the Republic, whereas in
1776 it was anathema to it. Because the ancient republics had died and
because it appeared that this new republic might also succumb to
corruption, Americans adopted the individualism of Locke over the
Republic of Machiavelli and Harrington.
Id. at 561-62 (quoting J. DIGGINS, supra, at 74 (1984)). With respect to the
indigenous risk of "corruption," Sherry explains that "[riepublicanism was
totally dependent on civic virtue to obligate citizens to the public good. In the
years of the Articles of Confederation, the founders began to reject the ideals
of republicanism because of a perceived licentiousness and lack of virtue
among the people." Id. at 557. The approach of the framers, therefore, was to
ensure "a balance of powers to check the tendency toward tyranny and
corruption," and to "shift[ ] the purpose of government from perfecting human
virtue to promoting individual desires." Id. at 559; see also infra note 376 and
accompanying text.
For further discussion of Banning's view that "Jeffersonian republicanism represented in large measure a resurgence of the classical ideal," see
PANGLE, supra note 362, at 28-29. For a discussion of the view that the
Constitution itself (also) embodies the classical republican heritage, see
Sherry, supra note 362, at 574-75 (discussing the views of "new republicans"
such as Sunstein, Epstein and Macey).
369. See also PANGLE, supra note 362, at 28 (explaining that post-sixties
historical and political theorists "have become captivated by a romantic
longing to discover, somewhere in the past, the roots of a prebourgeois and
non-Lockean American 'soul'"); Sherry, supra note 362, at 550 n.22 (referring
to "the republican 'revisionists").
370. See, e.g., Sherry, supra note 362, at 550 n.22 (discussing the views of
John Diggins and Isaac Kramnick); see also PANGLE, supra note 362, at 36
(identifying Dworetz, Lerner, and Storing in addition to Diggins and
Kramnick as scholars who are part of the "increasing criticism" of the
revisionist view). While emphasizing the importance of Locke, Pangle is
critical of both the revisionist scholars and their critics for their insufficient
and/or insufficiently careful attention to the original sources within the
classical republican tradition and the "atypical works" of some of the most
important founders. Id. at 29, 35, 37.
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These various disagreements regarding the character of
American political thought during the eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries have important implications, potentially at
least, for any evaluation of the claims made by Kronman and
Gordon. Clearly, if the influence of classical republicanism upon
American political thought during this period is relatively weak in
intensity and/or duration or, indeed, if it is virtually non-existent,
this might tend to suggest that the claims made by Kronman and
Gordon regarding the historical influence of the lawyer-statesman
ideal, with its emphasis upon the public good and civic virtue, also
become correspondingly weak. It might also tend to suggest, just
as with respect to the disagreements regarding the continuing
influence of classical common law notions and associated natural
law thinking following the emergence of a pragmatic instrumentalist conception of law, that any continued expression or espousal
of classical republican notions by lawyers or others are likely to
represent no more than lip service paid to ideas that were no
longer taken seriously.371
Once again, however, just as the emergence of an instrumentalist conception of law is not necessarily incompatible with a

According to Sherry, "The older Lockean tradition is admirably
represented by L. Hartz... [who] confidently describes 'the national
acceptance of the Lockean creed, ultimately enshrined in the Constitution."
Id. at 550 n. 22 (quoting L. HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA 9

(1955)). While crediting his "basic instinct," Pangle is critical also of Hartz for
the "errors that result from Hartz's impressionistic, careening sweep through
the complex materials of historical interpretation." PANGLE, supra note 362,
at 27.
Feldman provides a more recent statement of what appears to be a
moderate and balanced view. See FELDMAN, supra note 4, at 58-72. Feldman
considers that American revolutionary ideology, as reflected in the Declaration
of Independence and in the first state constitutions modeled on that of
Virginia, was rooted both in Lockean liberalism, with its emphasis on natural
rights, and in civic republicanism, with its emphasis upon civic virtue and the
common good. Id. at 58-59. Feldman also considers that important elements
of civic republicanism continued to persist after adoption of the Constitution
and during the early nineteenth century. See id. at 59-72. For further
discussion of Feldman's position, see infra notes 375-87 and accompanying
text.
371. Regarding this suggestion with respect to the classical common law
notions and associated natural law thinking, see supra note 257 and
accompanying text. Regarding this suggestion with respect to classical
republican notions, see, for example, Sherry, supra note 362, at 550 n. 22
(discussing Diggins' general lack of "faith in political rhetoric as illuminating
ideology or reasons for action," and his apparent specific denial "that classical
republicanism had any influence on the American revolutionaries," even
though "the rhetoric of the Revolution was republican and ...the question of
virtue as a foundation of the state was at least debated"). Cf id. at 562 n. 87
(explaining that "[oln both sides of the Atlantic, the classical paradigm
survived underground - in literature - for a time after its political demise"
(citing FERGUSON, supra note 78, at 96-195)).
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continuing real influence of classical common law notions and
associated natural law thinking in early American legal thought,37
so the presence of Lockean liberal conceptions within early
American political and legal thought is not necessarily
incompatible with the continuing real influence of classical
republican notions within that thought as well. To begin with,
just as early American legal thinkers may have been able to
reconcile pragmatic instrumentalism with classical common law
notions and associated natural law thinking at the level of theory,
subscribing to both types of thought at the same time,373 so legal
and political thinkers may have been able to achieve, at least
partially, a similar theoretical reconciliation between classical
republicanism and Lockean liberalism. Arguably, the achievement of such a theoretical reconciliation within the minds of legal
and political thinkers increases the likelihood that classical
republican notions continued to be influential well into our period.
Moreover, the existence of substantial scholarly disagreement
(both between the revisionists and their critics, and among the
revisionists themselves) regarding the relative influence of
classical republicanism and Lockean liberalism during the
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries 74 suggests complexity
in the historical situation, and such complexity also increases the
likelihood that classical republican notions continued to be
influential well into our period.
Once again, too, we can derive assistance, on both these
points, from Stephen Feldman's recent account of premodern
American legal thought. As far as a possible reconciliation of
classical republicanism with Lockean liberalism at the level of
theory is concerned, Feldman explains that democratic excesses in
state governments during the years of the Articles of Confederation had shown that in general the ordinary people were too
self-interested to produce and elect virtuous leaders committed to
In light
pursuit of the public good from within their own ranks.
of this experience, the framers of the U.S. Constitution shifted
away from the revolutionaries' emphasis upon "a civic republican
form of liberty that stressed citizen participation in government"
372. See supra notes 258-66 and accompanying text.
373. See supra notes 258-66 and accompanying text.
374. See supra notes 366-70 and accompanying text.
375. See FELDMAN, supra note 4, at 59-60, 63. Thus:
Americans had sought their governmental officials from among the
ordinary people, with the hope that a cadre of virtuous elites would be
electively chosen. Yet, from the perspective of the framers, the 1780s
had unhappily revealed that too often self-interested citizens elected
officials who themselves lacked a sufficiently virtuous commitment to

the common good.
Id. at 60; see also Sherry, supra note 362, at 557 (referring to "a perceived
licentiousness and lack of virtue among the people"(quoted supra note 368)).
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and towards "a more Lockean vision [that] sought to protect
preexisting individual rights from governmental infringement by
limiting governmental power."" 6
However, the framers combined this Lockean vision with the
retention of certain civic republican hopes and ideals. Thus, the
framers considered that "governmental officials should virtuously
deliberate about and pursue the common good" and they hoped
that "the ordinary people would display sufficient judgment to
elect those few elite individuals who possessed the requisite virtue
to attain these republican ideals." 77 Subsequently, moreover,

376. FELDMAN, supra note 4, at 61. Feldman explains that, compared to the
revolutionaries, "the framers were more wary of potential democratic excesses
and governmental corruptions ....
Whereas the American revolutionaries
had stressed individual liberty within the context of governmental
participation, the constitutional framers tended to understand individual
liberty as freedom from governmental interference." Id. Therefore, in order to
secure this freedom and protect against governmental infringement of
individual rights:
[T]he new Constitution shifted power away from the democratic
republican state governments to the new national government, but
then.., attempted to limit the ability of the national government to
exercise its potential power. Many of the structural provisions of the
Constitution - separation of powers, checks and balances, bicameralism, federalism - tended to encumber the exercise of power by
the national government.
Id. See also supra note 368 and accompanying text.
377. FELDMAN, supra note 4, at 60-61 (emphasis in original). Feldman
considers that "it was perhaps the elitism of the framers and their Federalist
colleagues that most sharply divided them from the Constitution's antiFederalist opponents." Id. at 60. This "elitist vision of republicanism," id. at
64, is a dimension that Suzanna Sherry, for example, fails to address in her
apparent endorsement of the view that the Constitution and the Bill of Rights
"represent a triumph of modern liberalism over classical republicanism," and
that "[ilndividualism had become the foundation of the Republic." See Sherry,
supra note 362, at 561-62; see also supra note 368 (quoting Sherry). Sherry
does recognize the existence of other interpretations of the Constitution,
however, and concedes that "[tihe framers, whether liberal or republican, were
neither as monolithic nor as fundamentally antithetical as this description
supposes." Id. at 551 n.25; see also id. at 561 n. 85, 575 n. 149 (referencing the
views of the "new republicans").
Feldman expresses the combined Lockean-civic republican vision of the
framers as follows:
Following in the Machiavellian republican tradition, then, the framers
sought to construct a constitutional government that would strain
toward the civic republican ideals of virtue and the common good but
simultaneously would protect against the self-interested political
machinations of ordinary people and factional groups. The framers
hoped that, under the Constitution, the virtuous elite would be elected
as often as possible to governmental offices. But in the likely event that
lesser individuals were elected instead, the structures of the
constitutional government would nonetheless thwart their selfinterested partisanship. The purpose of the Constitution, in other
words, became the structuring of a stable government that would act for
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there were similar "expressions of republican elitism" by leading
legal thinkers who "reasoned that the best means for securing
virtuous governmental officials who would pursue the common
good was to choose from a cadre of elite individuals."37 Underlying
the elitist attitude of the framers and leading legal thinkers was a
premodern concern, rooted in a cyclical view of history, that
without such an adherence to republican principles by a virtuous
elite the Republic would inevitably degenerate and decay.379
At the level of theoretical reconciliation, then, it seems that in
accordance with principles of Lockean liberalism, the ordinary
people would be expected primarily to pursue their own selfinterest and in doing so would be protected under the Constitution
from inappropriate governmental interference. On the other hand,
in accordance with principles of civic republicanism, the virtuous
elite, whom hopefully the people would elect as their governmental
leaders, would be expected primarily to pursue the public good and
thereby help preserve the Republic." °
Feldman's account is also helpful in assessing the complexity
of the historical situation and the likelihood that, for this reason

the public good despite the (supposed) ignobleness of human nature and
the resultant fragility of the republic.
FELDMAN, supra note 4, at 60-61. Considering that the language "captured
the framers' strained conjunction of hope and cynicism," Feldman then quotes
Madison in The FederalistNo. 57: "The aim of every political constitution is, or
ought to be, first to obtain for rulers men who possess most wisdom to discern,
and most virtue to pursue, the common good of the society; and in the next
place, to take the most effectual precautions for keeping them virtuous while
they continue to hold their public trust." Id. at 61 (quoting THE FEDERALIST
No. 57, at 350 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). Feldman also
cites a number of other Federalist papers evidencing "Publius's emphasis on
the public or common good." Id. at 61 n.40 (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 1, at
33-35 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); THE FEDERALIST No.
10 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
378. Id. at 64. In this context, Feldman discusses Nathaniel Chipman,
Zephaniah Swift, and St. George Tucker as examples of "leading jurisprudents" holding such views. See id. at 63-64 (citing NATHANIEL CHIPMAN,
SKETCHES OF THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT (1793); ZEPHANIAH SWIFT, A
SYSTEM OF THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT (1795); TUCKER,

BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES, supra note 103). Chipman, Swift and Tucker
were also leading legal educators. As discussed earlier, Tucker taught at the
College of William and Mary from 1789 until 1804. See supra notes 100, 118,
123 and accompanying text. Chipman taught at Middlebury College from
1816 until 1843. Carrington, supra note 100, at 559. Swift conducted a
proprietary school at Windham, Connecticut, from 1805 until 1823. Klafter,
supra note 59, at 323 n.83; see also REED I, supra note 2, at 431. The element
of republican elitism within legal education during the period is discussed
further in Subsection e of Part II.B.2 below.
379. See FELDMAN, supra note 4, at 61-63, 64-65.
380. As to how the common good may have been conceived in American neoclassical republican thought, see supra note 366; infra notes 399-400 and
accompanying text.
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too, classical republican notions continued to be influential well
into our period. Thus, Feldman seeks to show how, despite the
existence of various modernizing forces in the political, economic
and religious spheres, forces that manifested a developing ethos of
egalitarian individualism, a number of opposing forces within
those same spheres resulted in the
persistence of certain
premodern notions during the period.381 In the present context,
and focusing on forces in the political sphere, Feldman explains
that although "the Federalists stressed a premodern civic
republican elitism, while the Jeffersonian Republicans advocated a
more democratic popular sovereignty," even the Jeffersonians "still
believed, to a great extent, in rule by a meritocratic elite - so long
as the supposedly corrupt and aristocratic Federalists no longer
held office. " " Moreover, although the political controversies
between the Federalists and the Jeffersonian Republicans during
the 1790s "introduc[ed]
certain modernist notions into
government," they also "simultaneously reinforced Machiavellian
republican concerns about the health of the nation." "
Even
though these concerns "faded over the first decades of the
nineteenth century and self-interested political partisanship,
replete with political parties, became increasingly acceptable,"
nevertheless "remnants of premodern elitism always persisted
within the American governmental system." 8
In addition to this general persistence of premodern elitist
elements, civic republican elitist thinking may have been
particularly persistent in the South. Thus, Feldman explains that
various factors produced strong Southern defenses of slavery

381. For Feldman's discussion of modernizing forces in the political,
economic, and religious spheres that manifested a developing ethos of
egalitarian individualism and that contributed to the decay of "the vestiges of
premodern social roles and structures," see id. at 65-71. See also supra note
41 and accompanying text (discussing the general historical situation).
For Feldman's discussion of social and economic forces, such as
plantation slavery, anti-immigrant prejudices, and various economic
developments, that "seem[ed] to delay the advance of modernism" by giving
rise to "new political and economic hierarchies. . ., starting particularly in the
1830s," and of political and religious factors that "seemed to nurture
persistent premodern views" (including especially natural law thinking) and
that paradoxically resulted from some of the modernizing forces in the
political and religious spheres, see FELDMAN, supra note 4, 71-74. See also
supra note 261 and accompanying text (discussing the effect of opposing forces
on natural law thinking).
382. FELDMAN, supra note 4, at 68, 72.
383. Id. at 72.
384. Id. The fading of these Machiavellian republican concerns was
associated with the development of the eschatological idea of progress that
was characteristic of second-stage premodern American jurisprudential
thought. See id. at 58, 64-65, 74-75; see also supra notes 41, 261 and
accompanying text.
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during the decades leading up to the Civil War;385 and these
defenses were rooted in an Aristotelian civic republicanism that
represented a rejection of Lockean liberalism, of popular
sovereignty and the developing modern ethos of egalitarian
individualism, viewing society instead "as being naturally ordered
with distinct elite and laboring classes."3 8
Although Feldman does not address the role of the legal
profession specifically in any detail, his account of civic republican
elitism and its persistence as an element within American political
thought is certainly supportive of the claims made by Kronman
and Gordon regarding the lawyer-statesman ideal and its
influence in the area of politics during our period. Moreover, of
special interest for their claims regarding the lawyer-statesman
ideal and its influence in the area of law is Feldman's point that,
within the American governmental system, the "remnants" of civic
republican elitism continued to persist in particular within the
judiciary: "Judges seemed to assume the mantle of the virtuous
'umpire, standing above the marketplace of competing interests
The
and rendering impartial and disinterested decisions.'
imposition of judicially interpreted law became, in a sense, a
means for controlling the partisan maneuvering of politicians."387
The work of another scholar, Russell Pearce, is also generally
supportive of the claims made by Kronman and Gordon regarding
the lawyer-statesman ideal and its influence both in the area of

385. See FELDMAN, supra note 4, at 86-87. These factors included: the
increasing dependence of the Southern economy on cotton cultivation; the
continuing geographical expansion of the nation, which produced conflict
between slave states and free states regarding the status of new states and
territories (the status of new states in particular being crucial for determining
the balance of power in Congress); and the renewal during the 1830s of an
abolitionist movement in the North, which led to conservative reactions in the
North and the South. Id.
As the quoted language suggests, the elitism of
386. Id. at 88-89.
Aristotelian civic republicanism is based on a particular type of natural law
thinking. Thus, "Southern proponents of slavery tended to argue that natural
law imposed a natural order on society, with slaves supposedly entrenched in
their proper role (at the bottom); the government, according to this view,
therefore justifiably enforced through legal sanctions this natural or inherent
social order." Id. at 87. While Southerners employed the rhetoric of natural
law to defend the institution of slavery, Northerners employed a competing
rhetoric of natural rights to attack it. See id. at 87-88. In any evaluation of
civic republican elitism in general, however, one should remember Kronman's
distinction between Aristotle's "biological elitism" and his "character-based"
elitism, and his admonition that rejection of the former does not necessitate
rejection of the latter. See supra note 328 and accompanying text. The
distinction was doubtless made by those who may have opposed slavery, yet
stressed the importance of cultivating a virtuous elite to lead the nation.
387. FELDMAN, supra note 4, at 72 (quoting GORDON WOOD, THE
RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 325 (1991)).

Regarding the

reference to "remnants," see supra note 384 and accompanying text.
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Pearce describes a "modified
politics and in the area of law.'
Republicanism" of the period in terms resonant with Feldman's
He goes beyond Feldman,
account of civic republican elitism."
however, in advancing the claim, explicitly and in some detail,
that lawyers considered themselves to be the virtuous elite and
"America's governing class":
The legal elite's original and uniquely American understanding of
the lawyer's role was that lawyers were America's governing class.
Leading lawyers, judges and scholars, including the first American
legal ethicists, sought to explain how the common good, minority
rights and the rule of law could coexist with majority rule by an
electorate largely composed of self-interested voters. They decided
that the answer was a governing class of lawyers. With their
dedication to the common good and their placement in the center of
commerce and governance, lawyers were ideally suited for political
leadership... This perspective did not exclude the lawyer's role as
388. See, e.g., Pearce, supra note 293, at 381-95. As discussed supra note
293, Pearce surveys the various positions advanced in the scholarly literature
regarding American lawyers' original self-understanding of their role,
explaining that scholars have described lawyers' original self-understanding
as that of the advocate (Monroe Freedman, David Luban), the gentleman
(Thomas Shaffer), the guild member (Elliott Krause), the individual lawyerstatesman (Anthony Kronman, William Rehnquist), and a member of
Tocqueville's lawyer aristocracy (Mary Ann Glendon). Id. at 382 n.5. Stating
his own position, Pearce writes that his article "argues that the historically
dominant ideology of the legal elite was neither the hired gun, gentleman,
guild, nor even the individual lawyer-statesman. The article identifies the
dominant ideology as a governing class perspective grounded not in
Tocqueville but in the political understandings of American lawyers." Id.
Apparently, then, Pearce disavows a description of American lawyers'
original self-understanding of their role as being that of the individual lawyerstatesman, and thereby seeks to distinguish his position from that of Kronman
and Rehnquist. However, his own description of the "original conception of the
lawyer's role" appears to be quite compatible with an original selfunderstanding of a lawyer's role as lawyer-statesman, although Pearce does
appear to explore in greater depth than Kronman or Rehnquist the
philosophical foundation for the legal elite's collective understanding of the
lawyer's role in American political thought. See id. at 382 n.5, 384-92.
389. See Pearce, supra note 293, at 384-87. In Pearce's account this
.modified Republicanism" was embodied in particular in the Constitution,
whose framers "sought a virtuous political elite" in the landed gentry and the
learned professions, and in Hamilton's FederalistNo. 35, which "went so far as
to identify professionals as the most virtuous members of this emerging
governing class" because, certainly unlike other businesses and unlike even
the landed gentry, members of the learned professions were truly
disinterested, neutral, and impartial, being ready to make decisions in the
general interest. Id. at 386 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 35, at 257
(Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin Wright ed., 1961)). In giving his account of
"modified Republicanism" Pearce draws especially upon the work of Gordon
Wood. See GORDON WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 17761787 (1969) [hereinafter WOOD, AMERICAN REPUBLIC]; GORDON WOOD, THE
RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1991) [hereinafter WOOD,
AMERICAN REVOLUTION].
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representative of clients. It included and bounded it.

3 90

Regarding "the lawyer's role as representative of clients," Pearce
explains further in the continuation of this passage:
One of the major components of the legal elite's conception of
lawyering was that lawyers exert influence on their clients, in
addition to the influence lawyers wielded through their political
leadership and their function of interpreting the law for the public.
When representing clients, advocacy and governance duties could
often coexist but when they conflicted the legal elite believed that
the governing class duty was paramount.391
In sum, even though it may be possible to take issue with
specific aspects of their arguments, in general the claims made by
Kronman and Gordon regarding the content and influence of the
lawyer-statesman ideal during the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries appear to be not only plausible but also likely
well-founded. 32
As Kronman and Gordon suggest, to a large

390. Pearce, supra note 293, at 383; see also id. at 387-95 (elaborating upon
the claim that lawyers considered themselves to be the virtuous elite and
"America's governing class"). The "minority rights" to which reference is made
in the quoted passage concerned property rights in particular. See id. at 385,
402.
391. Id. at 383. Elaborating upon his reference to "the first American legal
ethicists," Pearce demonstrates how the self-understanding of the legal elite
as "America's governing class" was reflected in the pioneering works on legal
ethics published by David Hoffman in 1836 and George Sharswood in 1854.
See id. at 388-91 (citing David Hoffman, Resolutions in Regard to Professional
Deportment in 2 HOFFMAN (1836), supra note 105, at 752-75; GEORGE
SHARSWOOD, AN ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (5th ed., 1884)).

Both

Hoffman and Sharswood sought to explain how impartial and disinterested
lawyers should pursue the public good and perform their mediating role when
exerting influence on their clients in the attorney-client relationship and not
just when holding public office, although in striking the balance between the
public good and client interests "Sharswood blended the public good with
client advocacy in a way that afforded more deference to client interests than
Hoffman's Resolutions." Id.
As discussed earlier, David Hoffman taught at the University of
Maryland from 1823 until 1832. See supra notes 100, 114-17, 122, 126 and
accompanying text. Although Hoffman published his Resolutions in Regard to
Professional Deportment in the second edition of his A COURSE OF LEGAL
STUDY in 1836, he had already included the topic of Professional Deportment
in Title XI of the Syllabus for his course of lectures at Maryland, published in
1821. See supra notes 114-16 and accompanying text. As also discussed
earlier, George Sharswood taught at the University of Pennsylvania, which
reopened its law program under his leadership in 1850. See supra note 119.
With respect to the reflection of the lawyer-statesman ideal in various
writings on legal ethics during this period, see also supra note 304 (discussing
the views of James Altman).
392. For an example of a scholar whose account of the historical lawyerstatesman ideal differs in detail from the accounts given by Kronman and
Gordon, but whose analysis generally supports their central claims regarding
the content and influence of the ideal during our period, see Altman, supra
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extent lawyers were the virtuous elite upon whom the future of the
new nation depended; and America at this time indeed can be
characterized as a "nomiocracy.
e.

The Lawyer-Statesman Ideal in Legal Education

On the assumption, then, that in large part lawyers were the
virtuous elite and that the claims made by Kronman and Gordon
regarding the content and influence of the lawyer-statesman ideal
during our period are likely well-founded, how far did the formal
legal education discussed in Section A above seek to familiarize
students of the law with the lawyer-statesman ideal and to
cultivate in them its component character virtues of practical
wisdom and civic-mindedness?394 Although it is perhaps difficult to

note 304, at 1047-60. See also supra notes 360, 365.
It is submitted (especially to those who may question whether it is the
case) that the claims made by Kronman and Gordon with respect to legal
practice as well as politics are consistent, in the final analysis, with an
Aristotelian account of "practices" such as that developed by Alasdair
Maclntyre. This point will be explored further in a future article. See supra
note 313 (MacIntyre's definition of a "practice"); MacIntyre, supra note 198, at
197-99, 203 (MacIntyre's characterization of his account of a "practice" as
Aristotelian); see also supra note 198 (MacIntyre's definition of a "living
tradition").
393. For use of the term "nomiocracy," see PAUL JOHNSON, A HISTORY OF
THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 186-87 (1997) (discussing the Constitutional
Convention in Philadelphia in 1787 and Hamilton's view that lawyers were
"disinterested" and "therefore formed a natural ruling elite," and concluding
that "though America's ruling elite, insofar as it still existed in the 1780s,
intended for the new Constitution to provide rule by gentlemen, what it did in
fact produce was rule by lawyers - a nomiocracy"). Id. at 187 (citing WOOD,
AMERICAN REVOLUTION, supra note 389, at 254-56 (1992)).
Compare
Carrington, Transylvania University, supra note 106, at 676 (asserting that
during the period 1779-1860 "[als Thomas Paine had foretold, law had indeed
become the American king, and the elite of the legal profession its nobility"
(citing THOMAS PAINE, COMMON SENSE 41 (Dolphin ed., 1960))).
394. The extent to which students actually acquired these character virtues
is, of course, a separate issue. It is one thing to attempt to inculcate a
character ideal and its component character virtues, but another thing to
succeed in that attempt. A definitive evaluation of this issue would require a
determination of, first, the extent to which students of the law came to
instantiate the ideal in their professional lives and, second, the extent to
which any such instantiation may have been due to their formal legal
education as opposed to other factors operating outside of their formal legal
education. Although it is beyond the scope of the present article to attempt
such an evaluation, certain aspects of the discussion earlier are suggestive on
the first point. See supra notes 300-04, 345-46, 348-52, 357-61 and 387-91 and
accompanying text. Carrington's speculations regarding the effectiveness of
college/university law teaching in inculcating a morality of public conduct are
suggestive on the second point, both for the college/university programs
themselves and perhaps, to some extent, for formal legal education generally.
See infra note 401.
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answer this question with certainty, this subsection will consider
various indications that would appear to be highly suggestive.
Of course, the very process of interacting with a mentor (in
apprenticeship training) or a law teacher (in an independent law
school or a college/university law program) who instantiated the
lawyer-statesman ideal in his own life and work would have had
some "modeling" effect. However, exposure to the ideal and
cultivation of its component character virtues would have been
more advertent to the extent a mentor or a law teacher regarded it
as a purpose of the legal education he provided, and thus as his
special responsibility, to help develop these qualities in his
students .9
With respect to the college/university law programs, we saw
earlier that Paul Carrington considers that most of the law
teachers in these programs were particularly concerned to
inculcate public virtue in future political leaders of the Republic. 96
As Carrington explains, "[U]niversity law teaching was in
antebellum times often done by judges .... The public morality
that these teachers espoused was closely related to classical
notions of civic virtue."37 These law teachers "were consciously
engaged in moral education: they sought to prepare young men...
for public life in a democracy. They taught law as an act of
patriotism. What they sought was to inculcate standards of public

395. See also supra note 279 (noting that, insofar as mentors in
apprenticeship training, and law teachers in the independent law school and
college/university law programs, sought to familiarize their students with the
lawyer-statesman ideal and to cultivate in them its component charactervirtues of practical wisdom and civic-mindedness, presumably they would
have placed additional emphasis upon those elements of the prevailing
jurisprudence of the period, such as the nature of common law reason and
natural law theory, that were of particular relevance to the cultivation of those
qualities).
As discussed earlier, supra notes 335-40 and accompanying text,
Kronman maintains that the lawyer-statesman ideal was also "partly shaped
by an Enlightenment enthusiasm for system and order." KRONMAN, supra
note 218, at 20-21. As noted there, in this regard Kronman appears to have in
mind the legal science of the period. As also discussed earlier, supra note 292,
legal educators in the various formal legal education settings may have tried
advertently to expose their students to this element of the prevailing
jurisprudence also as part of their effort to familiarize them with the lawyerstatesman ideal.
For discussion of these various elements in the prevailing jurisprudence
of the period, see supra notes 205-23 and accompanying text (nature of
common law reason); supra notes 244-51 and 258-64 and accompanying text
(natural law theory); supra notes 267-74 and accompanying text (early
American legal science). For further discussion of these (and other elements)
of the prevailing jurisprudence in the formal legal education of the period, see
supra notes 275-92 and accompanying text.
396. See supra notes 108-09, 111, 142 and accompanying text.
397. Carrington, Hail!Langdell, supra note 108, at 697.

1154

The John MarshallLaw Review

[39:1041

conduct appropriate to popular self-government subject to
Equating the concept of public
constitutional constraints."398
virtue with "disinterest," Carrington considers that "[t]hose
standards of conduct, if they could be made to exist, were
admittedly but dimly understood, and there were perhaps quite
disparate views as to what they might be; for almost half a century
there was no attempt at a full and coherent statement of them."3 "
However, Carrington regards Francis Lieber's articulation of those
standards in three works published in 1838 and 1839 "as an
expression of the pedagogical aims of most of those who taught law
in American colleges from the time of George Wythe's appointment
at William and Mary in 1779 at least until the Civil War." °0
398. Carrington, FrancisLieber, supra note 106, at 340.
399. Id. at 340, 349.
400. Id. at 340 (citing FRANCIS LIEBER, MANUAL OF POLITICAL ETHics (2
vols., 1838-39); FRANCIS LIEBER, LEGAL AND POLITICAL HERMENEUTICS, enl.

ed. (1839)); see also id. at 356-68 (discussing Lieber's life and works). A
Prussian immigrant, Lieber taught first at the University of South Carolina
(from 1835 until 1856) and then at Columbia University (from 1857 until
1872). Id. at 356-60, 367. When he died in 1872, Lieber was "the most
renowned American law teacher." Id. at 356. He was also "the only person in
antebellum times to devote a full career to law teaching." Carrington, Hail!
Langdell!, supra note 108, at 697.
With respect to the general character of the standards of public conduct
articulated by Lieber, Carrington explains that "[flor Lieber, as perhaps for
other Americans of his generation, public virtue was better termed
'patriotism,"' and that "Lieber's patriot... makes public decisions in the
public interest as measured by public values and the public good," and also
"presumes to make only those public decisions properly entrusted to him or
her." Carrington, FrancisLieber, supra note 106, at 368, 383. In Carrington's
view, Lieber's work represented "[his] effort to coordinate individual rights
with the duties of citizens and public officers in a constitutional democracy.
He sought rationally to harmonize liberalism with republicanism, while
recognizing the tension between them." Id. at 368. In this effort Lieber "was
preoccupied chiefly with process, with the manner in which political and legal
power is exercised and with the spirit in which public decisions are made.
What he sought to provide was an intellectual process or a discipline for the
consideration of public issues." Id. at 370.
Carrington provides a detailed explication of Lieber's "process values,"
explaining that Lieber advocated the exercise of wise and independent
judgment by decision-makers who are familiar with their country's history,
culture, and sources of public values found in that culture and its literary
tradition as well as in properly interpreted and applied public instruments,
and who are honest, realistic, intellectually courageous, self-aware, calm, selfrestrained, and anti-dogmatic, being able and willing to understand others'
viewpoint and to compromise in order to conserve the whole, as well as to
accept responsibility for adverse consequences resulting from their decisionmaking. See id. at 372-86. For Carrington's identification of some of Lieber's
expressed or implied "substantive" values, see id. at 371, 384 (identifying, for
example, Lieber's opposition to slavery and a concern to improve the situation
of disadvantaged groups, such as the urban poor, and to reduce excessive
concentrations of wealth through limited redistribution); id. at 385-86, 388
(identifying a certain type of "intergenerational relativism" that recognized the
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Moreover, Carrington rejects any suggestion that a project, such
as Lieber's, aiming to inculcate public virtue in young
college/university students, is infeasible or indeed even quixotic. °'
Reinforced by the social background of their students, almost
all of whom "were drawn from families who could support leisure
for lessons," these college/university law teachers "would not have
denied the existence of an elitist touch to their teaching of law" in
that "le]arly American law teachers were calling their students to
an elevated sense of place. Without apology, the quality these
teachers sought to nurture was what Tocqueville described as the
'aristocratic' aspect of American law. " '
Consistent with
moral need to reform the law and legal institutions and thus to adapt
precedent to contemporary circumstances).
Significantly for an assessment of the claims made by Kronman
regarding the content and historical influence of the lawyer-statesman ideal
during the period, Carrington considers that Kronman's account of republican
statesmanship in the political sphere "strikingly resembles" Lieber's account.
See Carrington, Hail!Langdell, supra note 108, at 697 n.35 (citing KRONMAN,
supra note 218, at 53-108). See also id. at 695-96 (discussing the view shared
by Jefferson and Hamilton, two political rivals, that "popular self-government
could be sustained only if its leaders were morally constrained to respect
opposing interests and seek common ground or political fraternity," and noting
Kronman's use of that term); see also supra note 314 and accompanying text
(discussing Kronman's equation of civic-mindedness in the political sphere
with the desire for, and the creation and maintenance of, political fraternity
while advocating a particular course of action).
401. Thus, in responding (at least provisionally) to the argument that
Lieber's project was in fact a quixotic enterprise, Carrington emphasizes that
Lieber's standards are in fact realistic, although they may be aspirational to
some degree for those who may not be able to meet them in all respects. See
Carrington, Francis Lieber, supra note 106, at 391-92. Cf KRONMAN, supra
note 218, at 12, 16-17 (discussing the positive value of the nineteenth-century
lawyer-statesman ideal even for those who fell short of the ideal in their
work); see also supra note 300 and accompanying text (discussing Kronman's
views). Moreover, Carrington concludes that "a morality of public conduct
such as Lieber sought to nurture" can indeed be "transmitted and acquired" in
a university environment, at least with some degree of success, and that such
moral education is, in fact, more likely to occur at a university than in a
family. Id. at 393-95. Carrington gives several reasons for reaching this
conclusion, namely: most people acquire professional moral standards that
"are not necessarily connected to the private morality we acquire from family,"
and indeed do so after achieving adulthood and independence from parents; a
"shared training" can create and enhance mutual expectations; there exists
"some empirical evidence ....that young adults can be trained to a higher
willingness to sacrifice their individual interests to community needs;" and, "a
university environment.. . provides suitable reinforcement for the selfdiscipline that the art of patriotism entails." Id. This part of Carrington's
response, of course, can be seen as addressing the second aspect of the issue
identified supra note 394 (the extent to which instantiation of the lawyerstatesman ideal may have been due to formal legal education as opposed to
other, outside factors).
402. Carrington, Francis Lieber, supra note 106, at 387.
Although
Carrington actually refers to "Lieber and his contemporaries" as being those
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Kronman's emphasis on the virtue of practical wisdom in his
particular account of the lawyer-statesman ideal,4" Carrington
seems to suggest that the college/university law teachers were
concerned to cultivate this virtue in future leaders of the Republic
in addition to a civic-minded devotion to the public good.4' The

"who would not have denied the existence of an elitist touch to their teaching
of law," the subsequent language referring to "early American law teachers",
and indeed the whole context of Carrington's discussion at this point, strongly
suggest that this characterization is intended to be equally applicable to
college/university law teachers throughout the period. See id. at 386-88; see
also supra note 378 and accompanying text (discussing the expressions of
republican elitism by Henry St. George Tucker, who taught at the College of
William and Mary from 1789 until 1804, and by Nathaniel Chipman, who
taught at Middlebury College from 1816 until 1843). For discussion of
Tocqueville's characterization of lawyers as the "American aristocracy," see
supra note 348 and accompanying text.
As discussed earlier, the effort by American law teachers to inculcate
public virtue in future leaders of the Republic has been linked by Carrington
and others (although perhaps to differing degrees) with Thomas Jefferson's
vision of legal education. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
Carrington addresses the elitist element in Jefferson's vision in the following
terms:
Although conceding to his fellow elite revolutionaries that most of their
fellow citizens were not fit to govern one another, [Jefferson]
believed.., that the number of citizens sufficiently virtuous to
participate in republican government might be enhanced adequately to
sustain a large and effective federation of republican states. Thus, for
Jefferson, university legal education was to be part of "the nursery" in
which the political leadership of the republic could be nurtured, forming
"the statesmen, legislators, and judges, on whom public prosperity and
individual happiness" so much depended. To provide the political
support for the leadership so propagated, Jefferson planned for
universities to provide some legal training for all the intellectual elite in
attendance.
Carrington, supra note 100, at 529 (citing for the first quote in the passage
David P. Peeler, Thomas Jefferson's Nursery of Republican Patriots: The
University of Virginia, 285 J. CHURCH & ST. 79 (1986)). Carrington is unclear
regarding the citation for the second quotation in the passage. It appears to
be from Jefferson himself, when addressing the purpose of higher education in
connection with his plans for establishing the University of Virginia. See
Currie, supra note 106, at 355 (citing HERBERT B. ADAMS, THOMAS JEFFERSON
AND THE UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA 135 (1888)).

According to Carrington, Jefferson envisioned, for the American colleges
in his day, that they would have the function of "creat[ing] ... a secular clergy
that would maintain the faith in republican institutions" as being "but a slight
deflection.., from their accustomed function of graduating a class of persons
from whom the American Protestant clergy might be selected." Carrington,
supra note 100, at 532; see also Carrington, Transylvania University, supra
note 106, at 674 (to similar effect); see also supra note 382 and accompanying
text (discussing Stephen Feldman's view that even the Jeffersonians "still
believed, to a great extent, in rule by a meritocratic elite").
403. See supra notes 295-343 and accompanying text.
404. Thus, as discussed supra note 400, Carrington considers that Francis
Lieber's articulation of the standards of public conduct expressed the
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cultivation of practical wisdom and civic-mindedness with respect
to politics in those attending the college/university law programs
may have indirectly influenced them in their legal practice as
well.4 5
However, to the extent that law teachers in the
college/university law programs sought to prepare their students
for legal practice as well as for political leadership,4" doubtless
they would have sought to cultivate in their students the
particular modes of practical wisdom and civic-mindedness
appropriate to good judging and good lawyering (in particular as
manifested in good legal reasoning).0 7
pedagogical aims of most law teachers during our period; and according to
Carrington, Lieber expressed a concern for "sound judgment" or "wisdom," as
well as "benign motive," in public officers. See Carrington, Francis Lieber,
supra note 106, at 377-78. In Carrington's words:
Lieber would have agreed with the recent dictum of Frank Michelman
that public virtue is not satisfied by benign motive and fortitude alone,
but requires sound judgment in the application of public values to
advance the public good. He affirmed that patriotism in public office
requires wisdom in the exercise of independence, and imposes on officers
a duty of dissent from ignorance.
Id. (citing 2 FRANCIS LIEBER, MANUAL OF POLITICAL ETHIcS 274 (1838-39);

Frank Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term - Foreword:Traces of SelfGovernment, 100 HARV. L. REV. 58 (1987)); see also id. at 381 ("[Plublic action
can seldom be accommodated to theoretical or ideological purities;"
consequently, "[ilt is not practical, and it is therefore neither virtuous nor
patriotic in Lieber's sense, to effect a decision that does not take appropriate
account of the uncertainty of those unforeseen, perhaps remote, consequences
of a handsome idea, especially if the idea is an abstraction of broad sweep").
405. See also supra note 331.
406. See supra notes 107, 110 and accompanying text; supra notes 141, 143
and accompanying text.
407. Cf Bailey, supra note 59, at 317. In discussing the early college law
programs during the first part of the period, Bailey explains that "[platterning
their efforts on Blackstone's lectures as Vinerian professor of law at Oxford,
American lecturers adopted the organization and style of his COMMENTARIES
ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND.
Lectures primarily examined the history,
development, and ideology of the common law." Id.
It seems, however, that at least some of these early American law
teachers may not have displayed the same reverence towards the existing
English common law as did Blackstone. For example, Klafter explains that
George Wythe's teaching at the College of William and Mary sought to adapt
Blackstone's COMMENTARIES to American circumstances. See Klafter, supra
note 59, at 315-18. Thus "[Wythe's] technique of legal inquiry was designed to
impart to his students an understanding of how the common law developed
and how and why it had been revised in the United States." Id. at 317. In
addition to this adaptation of Blackstone's COMMENTARIES to American
circumstances, Wythe also conducted a mock legislature, through which his
students could learn how to reform the common law (as well as be prepared for
their participation in politics). Id. at 315, 317-18. Wythe's successor at
William and Mary, Henry St. George Tucker, went even further than Wythe,
advocating reform of the law through judicial activism as well as through
legislation. Id. at 318-21. Interestingly, however, whereas Wythe conducted a
moot court as well as a mock legislature, Tucker, it seems, had no time for
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We have noted earlier the breadth of the curriculum followed
in the early college/university law programs and in many of the
later university law school programs (and equivalent law
programs).4 "8 It seems that at least one of the purposes of a broad
curriculum was precisely to expose students to ideas that would
help cultivate the liberal frame of mind necessary in the virtuous
elite.4" 9 Carrington, for example, states that in pursuit of the
general aim of preparing the future leaders of the Republic, "the
law curriculum... often emphasized public law, frequently as a
companion study to political economy and political ethics, and
generally included the law of nations as well as American
constitutional law. '10 For reasons similar to those discussed below
either. Carrington, supra note 100, at 535, 539. As discussed earlier, in 1803
Tucker published an important American edition of Blackstone's
COMMENTARIES. See supra notes 53, 103, 185-86 and accompanying text. In
his edition of Blackstone, Tucker adapted the COMMENTARIES to American
circumstances. In the words of Davison Douglas, Tucker's five-volume edition
contained "hundreds of pages of annotations and explanations to account for
American departures from the English common law," together with "analysis
of the constitution and laws of both the United States and Virginia." Douglas,
supra note 59, at 204.
See also Carrington, FrancisLieber, supra note 106, at 362 (explaining
generally that Francis Lieber's work on legal and political hermeneutics
"explored the ethical responsibilities of judges and lawyers when dealing with
legal texts, breaking new ground as the first substantial American work on
legislation and on the doctrine of precedent"); id. at 383-85 (discussing Lieber's
"interpretive morality" with regard to the interpretation and construction of
legal texts in greater detail). As discussed earlier, Francis Lieber taught at
the University of South Carolina from 1835 until 1856, and then at Columbia
University from 1857 until 1872, and he wrote three works, published in 1838
and 1839, including his work on hermeneutics, which articulated standards of
public conduct that Carrington regards as expressing the pedagogical aims of
most American law teachers during our period. See supra note 400 and
accompanying text.
408. See supra notes 112-22, 129 and accompanying text (discussing early
college/university law programs, with special consideration of David Hoffman's
"ideal curriculum" developed for the law program at the University of
Maryland); supra notes 144-67 and accompanying text (later university law
school programs and equivalent programs, with special consideration of the
narrower curriculum model developed at Harvard Law School and the broader
curriculum model developed at the University of Virginia).
409. There may have been other purposes, connected with the prevalence of
natural law thinking and legal science as central elements in the prevailing
jurisprudence of the period. See infra notes 546, 548-55 and accompanying
text.
410. Carrington, FrancisLieber, supra note 106, at 341 (contending that the
law curriculum of American colleges during our period often had the general
aim of "train[ing] young men for a secular clergy, or (in Tocqueville's
terminology) an 'aristocracy,' who would be morally and intellectually
prepared for the political roles to which (their mentors hoped) they would be
called by the people," and that "[iun pursuit of that general aim, the law
curriculum... often emphasized public law, frequently as a companion study
to political economy and political ethics, and generally included the law of
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in connection with apprenticeship training, natural law, ancient
law, and contemporary civil law also may have served the purpose
of cultivating the necessary liberal frame of mind when included in
the college/university law programs.41' Despite the subsequent
narrowing of the Harvard Law School curriculum, Joseph Story's
inaugural address412is an eloquent and powerful expression of this
liberalizing spirit.
Many mentors in apprenticeship training also may have tried
consciously to help prepare their students to become part of the
virtuous elite and may have sought, therefore, to help them
develop the lawyer-statesman's character-virtues of practical
wisdom and civic-mindedness, both for the practice of law and
perhaps also for political leadership. The law curriculum in the
apprenticeship setting included reports of cases, commentaries,
and treatises, which presumably helped the student become
familiar with the modes of practical wisdom and civic-mindedness
manifested in good legal reasoning.1 Moreover, as we also noted
earlier, the apprenticeship curriculum, like the curriculum in
many of the college/university law programs, appears often to have
been a broad curriculum."" Like those curricula, then, a broad

nations as well as American constitutional law").
411. See infra notes 416, 418-20 and accompanying text. It must be
remembered, too, that many students in these programs would already be
familiar with natural law thinking because they had received a general college
education that exposed them to such thinking before beginning their
professional legal education. See supra notes 281-82 and accompanying text.
412. See Story, supra note 139, at 306-13. As discussed supra notes 153-54
and accompanying text, Story stated in his inaugural address that he proposed
to give lectures on the Law of Nature, including political philosophy, and the
Law of Nations, in addition to Maritime and Commercial Law, Equity Law,
and U.S. Constitutional Law. He also emphasized the value for lawyers of
becoming liberalized through the study of philosophy, history, and literature,
as well as the value of studying the art of rhetoric. As also discussed there,
however, the regular Harvard curriculum in fact did not reflect the breadth of
coverage suggested by these remarks.
For a discussion of the liberalizing purpose of specific legal educators in
advocating a broad curriculum, see Douglas, supra note 59, at 185-87, 199, 211
(Jefferson's purpose); id. at 200-02 (Wythe's purpose); id. at 203-06 (Tucker's
purpose); id. at 207 (Wilson's purpose); id. at 207-08 (Kent's purpose); see also
Hoffman, IntroductoryLecture, supra note 106, at 282-84 (Hoffman's purpose).
413. See, e.g., Bailey, supra note 59, at 315-16, 320 (discussing the inclusion
of these materials on students' reading lists).
414. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text (discussing the
curriculum of studies in apprenticeship training, with special consideration of
William Smith's "model" curriculum); supra notes 112-13 and accompanying
text (comparing the breadth of the Smith curriculum with that of the
curriculum followed in the early college/university law programs); see also
supra notes 162-66 and accompanying text (discussing the broader Virginia
curriculum model among the later university law programs); supra note 95
and accompanying text (contrasting the broad Smith curriculum with the
narrower Litchfield type of curriculum).
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apprenticeship curriculum also may have had the purpose of
cultivating the liberal frame of mind necessary in the virtuous
elite. 15 Indeed, for Mark Warren Bailey an examination of several
such broad apprenticeship curricula suggests that:
[LIegal educators frequently went beyond merely utilitarian
considerations in framing their students' curricula. The leading
members of the American bar aspired to educational ideals similar
to those of the antebellum colleges and therefore placed considerable
emphasis on reading that would make their students ornaments of
civilization and would anchor their legal knowledge in an
appropriate religious and moral context. They aimed, then, at the
inculcation of correct habits of thought and expression in a person of
virtue, culture, and social worth. 416
In addition to noting that texts on political theory, such as
Montesquieu's Spirit of the Laws, continued to be included on
students' reading lists, 17 Bailey emphasizes in particular the
importance that was attached to the study of natural law theory in
cultivating public virtue. Noting that "[t]he embodiment of the
ideas of sociability and public virtue in natural law theory was
recognized by moral philosophers and legal educators as an
important support for society and government in a democratic
republic," Bailey explains:
Natural law texts remained prominent and important parts both of
a well-rounded legal education and of intellectual discourse for
precisely the same reason that Thomas Jefferson and George Wythe
believed in the necessity of university law courses. They were
necessary tools in providing moral education and traits of
republican virtue.4 8
Bailey also considers that the study of ancient law and
contemporary civil law served much the same purpose through
their illumination of natural law principles. 49 The "well-read

415. Once again, as in the case of the broad curricula in the college/
university law programs, there may also have been other purposes, connected
with the prevalence of natural law thinking and legal science as central
elements in the prevailing jurisprudence of the period. See supra note 409 and
accompanying text; infra notes 546 and 548-55 and accompanying text.
416. Bailey, supra note 59, at 322. Indeed, Bailey suggests that, for the
purpose of "reveal[ing] the most about the intellectual aspect of legal
education," the interesting texts in law students' reading lists were not "the
reports and form books of technical law," but rather "those expressing the
belief that the lawyer should be a cultured person possessed of a classical
liberal education." Id. at 316.
417. See id. at 323 (citing the 1748 English translation of Montesquieu's
work).
418. Bailey, supra note 59, at 327-28.
419. Id. at 324-25; see also id. at 323, 328 (discussing further the

illumination of natural law by "the civil law of antiquity and continental
Europe").
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practitioner" was believed to be "uniquely qualified to uncover,
publicize, and apply those fundamental laws in a nation where
political institutions depended heavily on public virtue.""' As
suggested above,"' presumably natural law, ancient law, and civil
law had a similar relevance when studied in the college/university
law programs as well."2
With regard to the breadth of the curriculum in
apprenticeship training, it should be noted additionally that the
apprenticeship curriculum frequently included study of the law of
nations. 3 As in the case of many of the college/university law
programs, inclusion of the law of nations in the apprenticeship
curriculum also may have served the purpose of helping to
cultivate the liberal frame of mind necessary for the virtuous
elite.2 4 Of relevance too are Kronman's claims that for the early
nineteenth-century bar the lawyer-statesman's virtues of prudence
and civic-mindedness were "instilled by a blend of apprenticeship
and broad humanistic learning," in particular in the areas of
history and literature, and that the legal literature of the period
stressed the importance of lawyers becoming familiar with the
disciplines of history and literature, as well as rhetoric, "if they
[were] to do their jobs in a properly broad-minded way."'4 Although
they are perhaps not usually considered in the present context,
some (perhaps many) of the law teachers at the independent, or
proprietary, law schools also may have sought to prepare their
students to become part of the virtuous elite and thus to help them
develop the lawyer-statesman's virtues of practical wisdom and
civic-mindedness. 6 As in the case of the college/university law
420. Id. at 324-25 (listing Dane, Kent, and Story as examples of legal
educators and writers holding this belief). Here again, it must also be
remembered that many apprentices would already be familiar with natural
thinking because they had received a general college education that exposed
them to such thinking before beginning their professional legal education. See
supra notes 281-82 and accompanying text.
421. See supra note 411 and accompanying text.
422. Indeed, Bailey seems to imply as much through his preceding references
to the views of Dane, Kent, and Story. See supra note 420.
423. See supra note 77 and accompanying text (noting inclusion of the law of
nations in the William Smith "model" curriculum in the apprenticeship
setting).
424. See supra notes 409-10 and accompanying text.
425. KRONMAN, supra note 218, at 154; id. at 20; see also supra note 317, 334
and accompanying text.
426. Expressing the contrary view, at least with respect to politics, Douglas
states:
These schools emphasized private law, as opposed to public law, and
mastery of English and American common law. They paid far less
attention to public law topics such as constitutional law that received
greater emphasis in the colleges and universities. Their focus was more

explicitly to equip students to practice law as opposed to training them
both to practice law and to exercise political leadership.
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programs, the background of many of the proprietors of these
Thus, in
schools is certainly suggestive in this regard.4
considering seventeen proprietors of schools founded before 1830,
Craig Evan Klafter observes that "eight were judges of their
respective state's highest courts, one was a United States Senator,
one a United States Congressman, one the chief judge of a state's
trial court and one was one of the nation's most noted patent
attorneys."428 Suggestive, too, is the fact that many of the students
at the proprietary law schools came from the wealthy social elite
and went on to become leaders of the American bar and hold

Douglas, supra note 59, at 209. Douglas also notes that Jefferson criticized
the proprietary law schools because they focused on the narrow practical
aspects of legal practice. See id. at 209 n.134. See also Carrington, Francis
Lieber, supra note 106, at 346 ("Reeve's program [at Litchfield] emphasized
the study of private law and had little in common with the initiative of
Jefferson, whom Reeve reviled").
427. As discussed above, according to Carrington, the teachers in the
college/university law programs were often judges who espoused a public
morality that was "closely related to classical notions of civic virtue."
Carrington, Hail! Langdell, supra note 108, at 697; supra note 397 and
accompanying text.
428. Klafter, supra note 59, at 324. Interestingly, one of these proprietors
was Zephaniah Swift, who was Chief Justice of the Connecticut Supreme
Court of Errors from 1806 until 1819. Id. at 324 n.86. As noted earlier, Swift
conducted a proprietary law school at Windham, Connecticut, from 1805 until
1823 and is given by Feldman as an example of a leading legal thinker
expressing sentiments of republican elitism. See supra note 378 and
accompanying text.
Also interesting in the present context is the education received by the
proprietors of three proprietary law schools founded after 1830 in North
Carolina. Richard Pearson, who was first a judge on the superior court and
then a judge (and later Chief Justice) on the state supreme court, conducted a
proprietary law school for over forty years, first as Macksville (from about
1836 until 1846), and then at Richmond Hill (from 1846 until his death in
1878). See Hunter, Institutionalization, supra note 2, at 432-38. Hunter
hazards the statement that Pearson's proprietary school "was the most
important institution for legal education within North Carolina over the entire
course of the nineteenth century." Id. at 432. John Bailey, who served on the
superior court for twenty-six years, conducted a proprietary law school, first in
Hillsborough (from 1845 until 1858), then at Black Mountain (from 1859 until
some time before 1863), and finally at Asheville (for a decade after the end of
the Civil War until the mid-1870s). Id. at 438-40. Superior court judge
William Battle conducted a proprietary law school at Chapel Hill for two years
(from 1843 until 1845), until the school became affiliated with the University
of North Carolina. Id. at 423-25. Battle then remained on the faculty at the
University's law school until 1879, during which time he became a judge on
the state supreme court. Id. at 425-27. Regarding the education received by
Pearson, Bailey, and Battle, Carrington states that they all attended the
University of North Carolina where their university training was "cast in
Jefferson's mold," and subsequently "distinguished themselves during the mid1800s as law teachers influenced in the tradition initiated by George Wythe."
Carrington, supra note 100, at 557.

20061

A History of U.S. Legal EducationPhase I

1163

prominent positions in politics.429 With respect to legal practice
specifically, Klafter contends that "[piroprietary law school
teachers imparted to their students the belief that as lawyers it
would be their job to constantly encourage the improvement of the
law," O and that this was done in particular through the vehicle of
the schools' moot courts.43'
As noted earlier, although the independent law school
curriculum itself may have been narrow in comparison to many of
the curricula followed in apprenticeships and college/university
law programs, 2 it must be remembered that most students were
apparently college graduates, and that, at least at some schools,
429. See supra notes 83, 87 and accompanying text.
430. Klafter, supra note 59, at 328.
431. Id. at 328-29. Klafter gives the following account of the moot courts
held at the Winchester Law School in Winchester, Virginia:
A review of the records of the Winchester moot court reveals clear
patterns of how students were to shape their legal arguments.
Hypothetical cases were constructed to emphasize how unjust results
could come from the application of legal principles to everyday disputes.
Students were taught to approach a case by first determining, based on
their own sense of right and wrong, what the proper result should be.
Then they were to search through the law noting legal authorities which
both supported and countered the result they sought. There were no
limitations placed on what authorities could be used. The briefs indicate
a wide breath [sic] of sources from law reports throughout the region to
the works of European natural law writers including works by
Blackstone, Montesquieu, Beccaria, Vattel, Burlamaqui and Matthew
Bacon. Finally, the relevant authorities were compared and contrasted
emphasizing the faults in those against the position being taken. The
theme underlying all of the arguments was that it was the advocate's
responsibility to seek modification of legal principles as new situations
required.
Id. The Winchester Law School operated from 1824 until 1831. Id. at 323
n.83. Klafter's account of the moot courts at the Law School is based on the
Charles James Faulkner Papers, which "contain the most extensive record of a
proprietary law school's moot court proceedings," Faulkner having become
Moot Court Club president in 1829. Id. at 328.
Presumably, a Winchester law student may well have become familiar
with such sources as the works of the European natural law writers during the
student's prior college education. See supra notes 280-82 and accompanying
text. Conceivably, too, there may have been some coverage of such material in
any Introductory lectures and/or incorporation of some relevant coverage into
lectures on other topics in the curriculum.
Cf supra note 91 and
accompanying text (noting the topics covered in the Litchfield curriculum).
See also supra notes 276-79 and accompanying text; infra notes 506-07, 511-13
and accompanying text (also discussing some additional ways in which
students may have been exposed to natural law thinking).
432. See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text and notes 112-13 and
accompanying text (contrasting the Litchfield curriculum with the broader
William Smith apprenticeship curriculum, and with the broader curricula in
the early college/university law programs, respectively); see also supra notes
162-66 and accompanying text (discussing the broader Virginia curriculum
among the later university law programs).
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those who had not attended college were given some general
instruction before beginning their legal education. 3 Consequently, students at the proprietary law schools also may have
been exposed to a course of studies that helped cultivate the
liberal frame of mind necessary in a virtuous elite. 4 Indeed,
Klafter claims that the reason for the proprietary schools'
emphasis on the value of a prior liberal arts education was that
"legal instruction, as presented in proprietary law schools, would
no longer be based on mere memorization of rules and procedures.
Instead, the law would be taught as a science emphasizing the
diverse reasons for its development which could be best
understood by inquiry from a liberally educated mind." 5
C. CurricularAnalysis and Evaluation
Section A examined the various settings (apprenticeship
training, independent law school programs, and college/university
law programs) in which a student of the law could receive some
type of formal legal education during this first phase in the history
of U.S. legal education, and Section B examined the
jurisprudential ideas and professional ideal that prevailed for
most of this period. Subsection 2 of the present section undertakes
a more detailed, and comparative, analysis and evaluation of the
breadth of coverage provided by the curricula of studies followed in
the various formal legal education settings, and also evaluates the
role played by certain of the prevailing jurisprudential ideas and
by the prevailing professional ideal in contributing to the existence
of a remarkable emphasis upon a broad education for lawyers.
Before doing so, however, it is first necessary to explain the
methodology used in undertaking this curricular analysis and
evaluation. Subsection 1 provides this explanation.
1.

Methodology Used: Basic Conceptual Framework and
EmpiricalBases

Drawing on accounts given in an earlier article, Fundamental
Dimensions of Law and Legal Education: A Theoretical
Framework," Subsection a describes a basic conceptual frame433. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
434. This appears to be evidenced, for example, by the breadth of sources,
including the works of European natural law writers, that were included in
the moot court briefs at the Winchester law School. See supra note 431 and
accompanying text; see also supra note 282 and accompanying text (discussing
student exposure to natural law thinking as part of a prior general college
education).
435. Klafter, supra note 59, at 325; see also id. at 326-29 (discussing the
proprietary law schools' development of a methodology for teaching law as a
science, and for demonstrating the reasons for the law's development as well

as how it could be improved).
436. Mark L. Jones, Fundamental Dimensions of Law and Legal Education:
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work (and associated terminology) that can be used to categorize
the courses addressing different types of subject matter within a
curriculum, and Subsection b analyzes the possible empirical
bases for reaching conclusions, within that basic framework,
regarding the curricular treatment of this subject matter. The
discussion also addresses the extent to which the basic framework
and empirical bases are applicable with respect to this first phase
in the history of U.S. legal education.
a.

Basic Conceptual Framework

Adopting a contemporary perspective to begin with, presentday substantive law is traditionally divided into, and distributed
among, many commonly accepted separate categories based upon
perceived differences in the nature of the relevant subject matter.
For example, the subject matter of contracts is seen as inherently
different from the subject matter of torts or of property law. These
categories are all regarded, however, as falling within a broader
category of private law, and as inherently different from the
subject matter of areas such as criminal law and administrative
law that fall within a broader category of public law, or from the
subject matter of areas such as civil or criminal procedure and
evidence that fall within a broader category of procedure. 7 The
titles and content of courses in present-day law school curricula
generally reflect these same categories. Something analogous can
be said, of course, regarding the subject matter of fields of activity
and inquiry that are associated with substantive law in various
ways, for example because they concern certain practicalities of
lawyering, or the relationship of law to various social realities, or
the search for fundamental understandings about law."8
The basic conceptual framework takes such categories and
courses as given."
What the framework does is to group and
A Theoretical Framework,26 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 547 (2001).
437. For one example of a conventional taxonomy classifying different areas
of substantive law on such a basis, see FARNSWORTH, supra note 47, at 99-170.
See also Jones, supra note 436, at 595 n.68 (summarizing Farnsworth's
taxonomy).
438. Although the titles and content of courses in present-day law school
curricula generally reflect these commonly accepted categories, it should be
remembered that the main reason they are commonly accepted categories in
the first place is due to the systematizing work of legal scholars in the past,
both during this first phase and during subsequent phases in the history of

U.S. legal education.

For discussion of the efforts of legal scholars to

systematize and rationalize the common law through the development of an
appropriate "legal science," see supra notes 267-74 and accompanying text.

439. Conventional taxonomies of areas of substantive law, and of courses
addressing those areas, are not necessarily uncontroversial.
See, e.g.,
Daniel A. Farber and Philip P. Frickey, In the Shadow of the Legislature: The
Common Law in the Age of the New Public Law, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 875, 885-87
(1991), reprinted in ROBERT HAYMAN, NANCY LEVIT & RIcHARD DELGADO,
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organize the various categories of subject matter, and the various
courses that address them, into six broader categories (and various
subcategories). It also uses a particular terminology. Thus, the
various categories of subject matter concern "dimensions of law"
and the six broader categories (and their subcategories) concern
six broader sets (and subsets) of "fundamentaldimensions of law,"
based on perceived similarities and differences in sources of law.' 0°
JURISPRUDENCE CLASSICAL AND CONTEMPORARY: FROM NATURAL LAW TO
POSTMODERNISM 807, 808-09 (2d. ed., 2002) (discussing realist and postrealist

challenges to the private law/public law distinction); see also RoderickA.
Macdonald, CurricularDevelopments in the 1980s: A Perspective, 32 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 569, 575-78 (1982) (discussing the question whether the law school
curriculum should be structured on the basis of "factual subject-matter
coherence," e.g., the Law of Beaches or the Law of Subdivisions, or on the basis
of "legal-concept coherence," e.g., the law of property, torts, contracts,
commercial law, etc.).
440. Use of the term "dimensions" of law is intended to evoke a broad
concept of law that includes much more than 'substantive law." Such a broad
concept of law is entirely appropriate for some purposes, including our
purposes here, but may not be appropriate for certain other purposes, such as
for the purpose of legal reasoning. For further discussion, see Jones, supra
note 436, at 564-68 & n.28. Use of the term "fundamental" connotes the idea
that at least some dimensions within each set (and indeed within each subset)
of dimensions, and various aspects of those dimensions, are fundamental for
law and legal education.
It also connotes the idea that the boundaries
separating the sets and the subsets can serve as the basis for a classificatory
system of law and legal education. For further discussion, see id. at 563-64.
As indicated in the article text, the taxonomic schema that results from
the grouping and organization of "dimensions of law" into six broader sets (and
subsets) of "fundamental dimensions of law" is based on perceived similarities
and differences in sources of law. Here the term "sources" is understood
broadly to include many different kinds of human influences that operate as
actual or potential causal factors in producing legal outcomes, as well as on
perceived similarities and differences in law-related sources that operate as
causal factors in producing nonlegal outcomes. For further discussion, see id.
at 594-601. The schema is intended to capture, and to help us in thinking
about, the complex "multicontextual" or "multidimensional" reality of law in a
modern legal system. The fundamental dimensions of law, indeed, are the
fundamental dimensions of a modern legal system. For further discussion, see
id. at 571-73. The schema thereby also captures, and helps us in thinking
about, the complex "multicontextual" or "multidimensional" reality of
lawyering in a modern legal system. The fundamental dimensions of law,
indeed, are also fundamental dimensions of lawyering. For further discussion,
see id. at 610; see also id. at 594-601 (discussing "sources" of law). Similarly,
the schema is intended to help us in thinking about legal education, because it
provides a corresponding framework for grouping and organizing courses in
the curriculum into six similar broad categories (and subcategories) that
concern the six broad sets (and subsets) of fundamental dimensions of law.
The fundamental dimensions of law, indeed, are fundamental dimensions of
legal education as well, although the curriculum does not always make the
complex "multicontextual" or "multidimensional" reality of law and lawyering
as clear as it could. This is, of course, how the schema is being used in the
present article. Moreover, arguably such an approach towards categorizing
courses in the curriculum as is suggested here makes explicit a latent
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Turning to specific details, the framework identifies the following
six sets of fundamental dimensions of law: the substantive
dimensions of law; the structural dimensions of law; the practical
dimensions of law; the social dimensions of law; the cultural
dimensions of law; and the transnational dimensions of law."'
These six sets will now be briefly described. For illustrative
purposes, the discussion of each set will be followed by a note
listing a few courses whose primary emphasis is upon dimensions
within that particular set."
These notes will also indicate
possible subsets of that set of fundamental dimensions.
The substantive dimensions of law concern, in particular, the
substantive legal norms, laid down by the state, governing the
relationship of individuals (and associations of individuals) with
each other and with the state itself.' The structural dimensions
of law concern, in particular, the legal norms governing the
various components of the "law machine" (legal institutions, legal
actors, and legal processes), within which legal norms develop, and
within which they are applied and enforced."5
The practical
taxonomic order that already exists within the curriculum. For further
discussion, see id. at 608-09, 611-12.
441. The six sets of fundamental dimensions of law are systemically
pervasive (so that the fundamental dimensions are also dimensions of each
other), and mutually interactive (so that changes in one or more dimensions
can frequently produce changes in other dimensions). For further discussion,
see id. at 571-73. Arguably, it is also possible to identify (perhaps somewhat
playfully) the postmodern dimensions of law. For further discussion, see id. at
601-08.
442. Use of the expression "primary emphasis" implies, of course, that a
course may also incorporate some emphasis on other dimensions, either within
that particular set of fundamental dimensions or within another set of
fundamental dimensions.
443. For a more complete description of the six sets of fundamental
dimensions of law, and for a fuller listing of illustrative courses, see id. at
573-94.
444. Possible subsets of the substantive dimensions of law might be: private
law dimensions, and public law dimensions. Illustrative courses include:
Contracts, Torts, Property Law, Criminal Law, and various courses in the area
of administrative law. For further discussion, see id. at 574-76.
445. Possible subsets of the structural dimensions of law might be: the legal
institutions dimensions, the legal actors dimensions, and the legal processes
dimensions; or, alternatively, the legislative dimensions, the adjudicative
dimensions, the administrative dimensions, the legal profession dimensions,
and the legal education dimensions.
Illustrative courses include:
Constitutional Law, Legislative Process, Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure,
Evidence, and Legal Professions (structure and roles aspect). For further
discussion, see id. at 577-79.
Together, the substantive dimensions of law and the structural
dimensions of law also comprise the doctrinal (or normative) dimensions of
law, which are concerned with "substantive law." See supra notes 437, 439
and accompanying text. To recognize the doctrinal dimensions as a separate
set of dimensions within the taxonomic schema, however, would obscure the
important distinction between the substantive dimensions and the structural
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dimensions of law concern, in particular, the professional skills
that lawyers need, and the professional values that should guide
them, when performing their various roles and tasks within the
legal system (especially as legal practitioners, but also as judges,
law professors, legislators, etc.).'
The social dimensions of law
concern, in particular, larger social realities, and those disciplines,
such as political science and various other social sciences
(economics, psychology, sociology, anthropology, etc.), through
which those larger social realities are intellectualized."
The
cultural dimensions of law (the historical, jurisprudential, and
comparative dimensions of law) concern, in particular, the very
roots/foundations of law in the past, in profound speculation, and
in the legal experience of other peoples."
The transnational
dimensions of law, which are a different order of dimensions from
the dimensions in the preceding five sets, concern, in particular, a
vast body of transnational law as well as the processes of

dimensions. For further discussion, see Jones, supra note 436, at 578 n.43.
446. Possible subsets of the practical dimensions of law might be: the skills
dimensions, and the professionalism dimensions. Illustrative courses include:
Legal Analysis, Legal Writing, Legal Research, Counseling, Negotiations,
Trial Practice, Moot Court Competition, Legal Ethics, and Legal Professions
(values aspect). For further discussion, see id. at 580-81.
447. Possible subsets of the social dimensions of law might be: the political
dimensions, the economic dimensions, various other social science dimensions,
the literary dimensions, and the religious dimensions. Illustrative courses
include: Law and Politics, Law and Economics, Law and Society, Law and
Anthropology, Law and Psychiatry/Psychology, Law and Literature, Law and
Religion. For further discussion, see id. at 582-84. Regarding the relationship
between such interdisciplinary courses and the jurisprudential dimensions of
law, see id. at 585 n.49, 587 n.54, 588 n.57. Courses on the social dimensions
of law are commonly regarded as providing valuable "perspectives on law." Id.
at 564, 583 n.48
448. Possible subsets of the cultural dimensions of law might be: the
historical dimensions, the jurisprudential dimensions, and the comparative
dimensions. Illustrative courses include courses in the areas of Legal History,
Jurisprudence and Comparative Law. For further discussion, see id. at
585-88. It seems that the term "cultural dimensions" is often used today to
refer to the relationship between law and the culture of a particular society or
social group within society. In my taxonomy of fundamental dimensions of
law, the "cultural dimensions" of law in this sense would be included within
the social dimensions of law. For further discussion, see id. at 582-84. Use of
the term "cultural dimensions of law" to describe collectively the historical,
jurisprudential, and comparative dimensions of law reflects a different usage
of the term "cultural" derived from Brainerd Currie. See Currie, supra note
106, at 332-33 nn. 2-3 (referring to legal history, jurisprudence, Roman law,
and comparative law as "cultural" courses). Like courses on the social
dimensions, courses on the cultural dimensions of law are also commonly
regarded as providing valuable "perspectives on law." Jones, supra note 436,
at 564. By exploring the very roots/foundations of law, however, such courses
provide fundamental perspectives on law. Id. at 585 n.51
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"transnationalizing" the national economic, social, and legal
environments."9
The above framework (and associated terminology) is equally
serviceable in categorizing the subject matters that were studied
in various curricula during the first phase in the history of U.S.
legal education. However, it should be pointed out of course that
this taxonomic schema, identifying six sets (and various subsets)
of fundamental dimensions of law, is an intellectual interpretive
construct, developed in the historical context of contemporary legal
education," ° that is being superimposed upon the prior experience

449. Possible subsets of the transnational dimensions of law might be:
transnational law dimensions (i.e., public international law dimensions,
private international law dimensions (in a narrow sense, international conflict
of laws, and in a broader sense, international business transactions),
immigration law dimensions, regional integration dimensions, foreign law
dimensions), and the transnationalization dimensions. Illustrative courses
include: International Law, Human Rights Law, International Conflict of
Laws, International Business Transactions, Immigration Law, and European
Union Law. For further discussion, see id. at 589-94. The transnational
dimensions of law are a different order of dimensions because, from a strictly
analytical point of view, in considering the preceding five sets of fundamental
dimensions of law we are concerned with phenomena that occur solely within
the national context. With the transnational dimensions of law, however, we
are now concerned with phenomena that cross national frontiers, with
external influences upon the national economic, social, and legal
environments, and with various formal and informal linkages between the
national legal system and external legal orders. For further discussion, see id.
at 589-94. Regarding the relationship of the transnational dimensions of law
to the comparative dimensions of law and the lines of demarcation between
them, see id. at 589 n.59, 592-94 & n.65. Regarding the distinction between
the foreign dimensions of law and the comparative dimensions of law, see id.
at 590 n.59.
450. The fundamental dimensions taxonomy builds upon, and seeks to
extend, the work of earlier scholars who have analyzed the structure of legal
education. For example, in his study of legal education published in 1921,
Reed suggests that an ideal "professional legal education" would include
"comprehensive training" under three separate heads: "practical training,"
dealing with "skill or discipline"; "theoretical knowledge of the law," dealing
with "systematized legal doctrines" as well as "[certain subjects] of a relatively
non-technical nature, such as jurisprudence and government"; and "general
education," dealing with "all such additional sciences or arts as ...may be
helpful to the prospective lawyer in any way." REED I, supra note 2, at 276-78;
see also id. at 299-300; ALFRED ZANTZINGER REED, PRESENT-DAY LAW
SCHOOLS IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA 224-25 (1928) [hereinafter REED
III (identifying legal history, legal philosophy or jurisprudence, comparative
law, and international law as non-technical subjects included under the head
of theoretical legal knowledge). Reed's "theoretical knowledge of the law"
component concerns the substantive and structural dimensions of law as well
as the cultural and transnational dimensions; the "practical training"
component concerns the practical dimensions of law; and, the "general
education" component concerns the social dimensions of law and a few subjects
relevant to the cultural dimensions, such as general history and philosophy.
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of lawyers and legal educators who did not necessarily think in
such terms (which is not to deny that they may have been
receptive to such a construct).45'
b.

Empirical Bases

Any truly scientific attempt to analyze, evaluate, and
compare the degree to which an individual curriculum or the
mainstream curriculum in a particular setting emphasized the six
sets (and various subsets) of fundamental dimensions of law, and
the degree to which students were exposed to those dimensions
during their legal education, would have to proceed along lines
similar to those described in my earlier article. 2 Although the
additional theoretical framework developed there for this purpose
focuses on inquiries regarding a set (and subsets) of fundamental
dimensions of law, it is equally applicable to inquiries regarding
an individual dimension or any particular subject matter.
Moreover, although that framework focuses on the law school
curriculum, it applies analogously in other formal legal education
settings as well, such as those with which we are concerned during
this first phase in the history of U.S. legal education.
Four general considerations bear on the degree of curriculum
emphasis and student exposure, including most importantly for

The fundamental dimensions taxonomy also builds upon, and seeks to
extend, the work of other scholars who have analyzed the nature of a legal
system, such as Karl Llewellyn, H.L.A. Hart, and John Henry Merryman. For
further discussion, see Jones, supra note 436, at 565 n.28, 596 n.72
(Llewellyn); id. at 549 n.4, 575 n.39, 577 n.41, 596 n.72, 600 n.79 (Hart); id. at
549 n.4, 577 n.41, 578 n.42, 582-83 n.47, 584 n.48 (Merryman).
451. In this regard, two particular caveats should be noted. First, our
present subject matter categories (and the titles and content of courses in
present-day law school curricula) have evolved from, and have frequently
transcended, classifications made during earlier periods in the historical
development of English and American law, including classifications adopted
from Roman Law (see supra note 193 and accompanying text). Consequently,
the various curricula during this first phase were not always divided up into
the separate courses, and did not necessarily use the titles, with which we are
familiar today. However, a process began during this first phase, whereby (at
Harvard, for instance) "teaching compartments," often comprising several
subjects that were dealt with successively, were gradually replaced by
separate "subject courses" devoted to each subject. See REED I, supra note 2,
at 363-68; REED II, supra note 450, at 257-60.
Second, the detailed classification of topics within certain subject areas
in the curriculum reflected the ancient common law forms of action. See, e.g.,
FELDMAN, supra note 4, at 56-57 (discussing inter alia David Hoffman's A
COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY and the organization of the Litchfield curriculum
under Gould and Reeve). These forms of action remained central to American
common law until states adopted codes of civil procedure, beginning with New
York's adoption of the Field Code in 1848. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at
391-98.
452. See Jones, supra note 436, at 622-29.

20061

A History of U.S. Legal EducationPhase I

1171

present purposes the ways in which a course, and the ways in
which a curriculum, can emphasize, and expose students to, a
particular set (or subset) of fundamental dimensions of law."
453. The four general considerations are: (1) the extent to which the
fundamental dimensions of law are studied in the relevant law school courses
abstracted from context, or alternatively in context; (2) the organization of
detailed knowledge within various types of knowledge structures; (3) the ways
in which courses (and course materials) can emphasize, and expose students
to, a particular set (or subset) of fundamental dimensions of law; and (4) the
ways in which the curriculum can place special emphasis upon a particular set
(or subset) of fundamental dimensions. See id. at 611-22.
For present purposes, the third and fourth general considerations, but
only these, require a little more explanation. Regarding the third general
consideration, the most obvious way in which a particular course in the law
school curriculum (and/or the materials for that course) can provide relevant
coverage, and thereby emphasize and expose students to a particular set (or
subset) of fundamental dimensions of law, is for the course to devote most of
the coverage to (and hence to place primary emphasis upon) that particular set
(or subset) of fundamental dimensions. Analytically, this obvious way resolves
into two ways - the first being the provision of the relevant coverage in a
general course, the second being the provision of the relevant coverage in a
specializedcourse.
In addition to these obvious ways, there are two other, perhaps less
obvious ways. Thus, some specific exposure to a set of fundamental dimensions can be incorporated into a course and/or course materials with a
different primary emphasis (for example, when economics materials are
incorporated into a course with a doctrinal emphasis). Also, some generalized
exposure to certain types of dimensions can be incorporated into a course with
a different primary emphasis when such a dimension is inherent in the
materials used in that course, for example when studying cases and other
texts in a doctrinal course also conveys a sense of the historical development of
the law and a sense of the historical context, or when it conveys a sense of the
jurisprudential paradigm within which the cases were decided.
Some
generalized exposure to certain types of dimensions can also be incorporated
into a course with a different primary emphasis when such a dimension
otherwise informs, and is reflected in, the general approach to teaching that
course and/or the course materials, for example when a particular lawyering
skill, say legal reasoning (which may, of course, itself reflect a particular
jurisprudential paradigm), is developed throughout a doctrinal course.
As one proceeds through these different methods of emphasis and
exposure there may be a (very rough) continuum in which the focus shifts from
a more general and abstract treatment of the fundamental dimension(s) in
question (more likely with the first two, more obvious methods), to application
of the dimension(s) in various contexts (more likely with the last two, less
obvious methods). See also id. at 618-19 & n.102 (discussing the third general
consideration further and also discussing why the extent of coverage alone is
not necessarily a completely accurate indication of emphasis and exposure
within a course).
Regarding the fourth general consideration, a law school curriculum
can place special curricular emphasis upon a particular set (or subset) of
fundamental dimensions by including courses with such an emphasis
(especially courses with a primary emphasis) within the "core curriculum,"
which comprises those courses that are required or at least generally
recommended due to their perceived fundamental value and importance (in
contrast to courses that are not so perceived and hence are "mere electives"
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Having regard to these four general considerations, it is possible to
identify seven factor-clusters that together will determine the
degree to which an individual law school curriculum actually and
effectively emphasizes, and actually and effectively exposes
students to, a particular set (or subset) of fundamental dimensions
of law.' In order to estimate with scientific accuracy the degree of
relegated to the periphery of the curriculum). See also id. at 619-22
(discussing the fourth general consideration further).
454. See id. at 623-29. A truly scientific inquiry must seek to determine
actual and effective curricular emphasis and student exposure, not just
apparent emphasis and exposure. Thus, it would be highly misleading, for
example, to base an evaluation of emphasis and exposure solely upon the
number of courses in the curriculum with an emphasis on a particular set (or
subset) of fundamental dimensions. Even if there are several or even many
such courses, they may be "mere electives" that are not within the core
curriculum, and they may have consistently low enrollments. Conversely,
even if there is only one such course, it may be required, or at least generally
recommended, and therefore (being within the core curriculum) it will be
certain (if required) or highly likely (if generally recommended) to have
consistently high enrollments. See id. at 623 n.108. The greater the number
of relevant determining factors that are considered, the less risk there is of
being misled by appearances.
In the following brief summary of determining factor-clusters, factorclusters (1) to (3) concern actual emphasis and exposure, and factor-clusters
(4) to (7) concern effective emphasis and exposure: (1) regarding courses with a
primary emphasis on a particular set (or subset) of fundamental dimensions
(i.e., the two obvious methods of emphasis and exposure discussed supra note
453), the number and status of, and enrollment in, such courses, see also infra
notes 455-57 and accompanying text; (2) the same factors as cluster (1), but
with regard to courses which incorporate some emphasis, but not a primary
emphasis, on those dimensions (i.e., the two less obvious methods of emphasis
and exposure discussed supra note 453); (3) the extent to which relevant
exposure is assigned, addressed by professors in class, tested in examinations,
etc., and addressed by students in preparation, review, and examinations;
(4) consideration of the same matters as cluster (3), but with regard to the
quality (not the quantity) of relevant exposure assigned and tested, and of
time spent by professors and students in addressing it; (5) the extent to which
the emphasis and exposure under (1), (2), and (3) is comprehensive, having
regard to the range and diversity of specific dimensions (and/or aspects of
those dimensions), and the range and diversity of their applications in various
contexts, included in the exposure; (6) the extent to which the emphasis and
exposure under (1), (2), and (3) is systematic and integrative both within and
among the specific dimensions (or aspects of those dimensions), and within
and among their applications in various contexts, included in the exposure; (7)
the extent to which the emphasis and exposure under (1), (2), and (3) results
in the acquisition of knowledge structures that are properly integrated with
existing knowledge structures, and sufficiently forward-looking and flexible.
Factor-cluster (5) requires a little more explanation for present
purposes. Factors relevant to the degree of comprehensiveness in the
emphasis and exposure in question include (quantitatively) the proportionate
relationship of the exposure to the total amount of exposure involved in, and
(qualitatively) its relative importance within, a complete coverage of the full
range of dimensions within the set (or subset) (in the case of specific
dimensions/aspects of dimensions) and at least a representative coverage of
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actual and effective curricular emphasis, and actual and effective
student exposure, with respect to a particular set (or subset) of
fundamental dimensions of law, it will be necessary, having
identified all of the relevant determining factors, to obtain reliable
data regarding those factors, and then to analyze and evaluate
that data. If desired, the evaluated information can then be
characterized more descriptively, using some terminology such as
"extensive," "considerable," "significant," "not significant," where
these terms correspond to different scores on an objective scale.
The information and characterization for that set (or subset) of
fundamental dimensions can be compared, of course, with the
information and characterizations for other sets (and subsets) of
fundamental dimensions, using as criteria of comparison the same
criteria of analysis, evaluation, and characterization.
The
information and characterization regarding the treatment of a set
(or subset) of fundamental dimensions within that particular
curriculum can also be compared with counterpart information
and characterizations generated for other curricula. In order to
estimate accurately the degree of curricular emphasis and student
exposure in the "mainstream" curriculum, it would be necessary to
perform this latter exercise with regard to a sufficiently
representative group of curricula.
Of the seven determining factor-clusters, the first factorcluster appears to be the most readily quantifiable; arguably it is
also the most important. Somewhat unsurprisingly, the first
factor-cluster focuses upon courses with a primary emphasis upon
a particular kind of subject matter (using our terminology, courses
with a primary emphasis upon dimensions within a particular set
(or subset) of the fundamental dimensions of law), and it
comprises the following three factors: (a) the number of such
courses in the curriculum and the number of credit hours devoted
to those courses;45 (b) whether the courses are required, generally
recommended, or are "mere electives";. 6 (c) the total number of
the full range of applications in various contexts (in the case of applications).
Here, one should remember that what would be regarded as, or what would be
included within, a full range of dimensions within a set (or subset), or a full
range of applications in various contexts, may evolve over time in accordance
with changes in knowledge and/or changes in various other features of the
historical context. Thus, for example, law in most, perhaps all, of its
fundamental dimensions was much smaller in scale during the first phase in
the history of U.S. legal education than during subsequent phases, and
especially when compared with the situation today. For further discussion of
the seven factor clusters, see id. at 623-29.
455. For a discussion of the importance of not being misled by an exclusive
focus on this factor, see supra note 454; hence, it is crucial, where possible, to

supplement data regarding this first factor with data regarding the following
two factors.
456. For a discussion of these terms, see supra note 453 (final paragraph and
the reference given therein).
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students enrolled in such courses, as well as the percentage of
students who take such courses, and how many of them they take,
(i.e., the percentage of students who take one such course, two
such courses, three such courses, etc.)."
Doubtless the quantifiability and the importance of this first
factor-cluster help to explain why various curriculum surveys and
studies that have been conducted at various times during the
history of U.S. legal education have tended to focus on this factorcluster. Indeed, there exist some very useful curriculum surveys
and studies for later periods in the history of U.S. legal education
in which the authors provide cumulated data regarding one or
more of the factors in this factor-cluster (and in later surveys and
studies, sometimes regarding all three factors) for all or most,
and/or for certain groupings of U.S. law schools, on the basis of
which they may also reach various general and systemic
conclusions regarding the curricula of these law schools and even
regarding the existence of a "standard" or a "core" curriculum.4"
The cumulated data is compiled, of course, from data regarding
individual law school curricula, typically based on information
provided by the law schools themselves. Unfortunately, these
kinds of curriculum surveys and studies do not appear to exist for
this first phase in the history of U.S. legal education. Instead,
those who have attempted to reach general and systemic
conclusions regarding the curricula of studies in the various
settings with which we are concerned appear to have based those
conclusions on available descriptions (of varying reliability) of a
457. For further discussion of the significance of enrollment data, in
particular data regarding the kinds of percentages specified in the article text,
see Jones, supra note 436, at 624 n.110.
458. These surveys and studies include, in chronological order based on the
period surveyed: REED I, supra note 2, at 273-420, 423-41 app.I, 442-52 app.II,
457-59 app.1V (analyzing U.S. law school curricula from 1865-1921); REED II,
supra note 450, at 199-316, 536-46 app. II (analyzing U.S. law school curricula
in 1925-26); E. GORDON GEE & DONALD W. JACKSON, FOLLOWING THE
LEADER: THE UNEXAMINED CONSENSUS IN LAW SCHOOL CURRICULA (1975)
(analyzing U.S. law school curricula in 1949-50, 1969-70 and 1974-75);
DONALD W. JACKSON AND E. GORDON GEE, BREAD AND BUTTER?: ELECTIVES
IN AMERICAN LEGAL EDUCATION (1975) (analyzing the elective component of

U.S. law school curricula in 1974-75); WILLIAM B. POWERS, A STUDY OF
CONTEMPORARY LAW SCHOOL CURRICULA (1986) (analyzing U.S. law school
curricula in 1984-86); Deborah Jones Merritt & Jennifer Cihon, New Course
Offerings in the Upper-Level Curriculum: Report of an AALS Survey, 47 J.

LEGAL EDUC. 524 (1997) (analyzing new upper-class courses and seminars
added to U.S. law school curricula in 1994-97); ABA SECTION OF LEGAL
EDUCATION & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, A SURVEY OF LAW SCHOOL CURRICULA
1992-2002 (2004) [hereinafter ABA SURVEY, 1992-2002] (analyzing U.S. law
school curricular developments and trends between 1992 and 2002). See also
JOHN KING GAMBLE, TEACHING INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE 1990s (1992)
(inter alia analyzing the status of course offerings in the international law
area in U.S. law school curricula, in particular in 1912, 1962 and 1991).
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limited number of individual curricula in the relevant setting.459
Presumably, this is because it is difficult to find extensive and
reliable curricular information regarding a period so far in the
past. The general and systemic conclusions that have been drawn
could nevertheless be correct, of course, if the available
descriptions are in fact accurate and if the sampling is in fact
representative of all or most curricula.
In these circumstances, my own approach in undertaking the
curricular analysis and evaluation in Subsection 2 also focuses
mainly on the first factor-cluster discussed above,' but is subject
to various limitations. First, my analyses and general and
systemic evaluations of curricular emphasis and student exposure
are based on my review, and best assessment, of the data and
conclusions contained in the pertinent sources cited in Part II.A
for each setting."' In particular, the analyses and evaluations will
draw on the discussions that examine the curricula of studies (and
especially the "ideal" or "model" curriculum) in each setting and
that are based on data contained in various of these sources. 2 In
addition, the analyses and evaluations will refer to certain other
data, and various conclusions regarding curricula reached by
different commentators, that are also contained in these sources.
Second, descriptions of the subject matter content of the various
curricula in these sources have consisted mainly in a description of
course or subject titles. In considering such descriptions, two basic
assumptions are made. It is assumed that such course or subject
titles are a reliable indicator of the nature of the subject matter
studied, thereby enabling one to classify reliably the courses or
subjects as related primarily to a particular set (or subset) of
fundamental dimensions of law. It is also assumed that most, if
not all, students following a particular curriculum of study in fact
would have taken all of the courses or studied all of the subjects
described. Hopefully these two assumptions, particularly the
459. For one example relating to the college/university law programs and the
program at Litchfield, see REED I, supra note 2, at 460-63 app.V.B (identifying
the sources of information regarding law schools relied upon by Reed in

completing his study in 1921).
460. See supra notes 455-57 and accompanying text. However, limited
consideration will also be given to the second factor-cluster identified supra
note 454. See infra notes 473, 478, 504-06, 512-13, 517, 526-28, 533 and
accompanying text; see also infra notes 550-55, 559-60 and accompanying text

(discussing various analogous or related points).
461. See supra notes 73-74 (apprenticeship training); supra notes 80, 82
(independent law school programs); supra note 106 (early college/university
law programs); supra note 139 (later university law school programs).
462. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text (apprenticeship training);
supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text (independent law school programs);
supra notes 114-22, 129 and accompanying text (early college/university law
programs); supra notes 148-67 and accompanying text (later university law
school programs).
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second, are not too heroic.4
Finally, my use of the descriptive
evaluative terms "extensive," "considerable," "significant," "not
significant" etc., is not based on a correspondence to points scored
on some type of objective scale but, as indicated above, on my "best
assessment" of the sources reviewed. Despite the limitations of
this approach, ' it is believed that the evaluations, although
necessarily tentative, are reasonably sound, and that they are in
any event suggestive.4 5
2.

CurricularAnalysis and Evaluation

Using the conceptual framework and various empirical bases
described in Subsection 1 immediately above, we shall now
undertake the actual analysis and evaluation of the curricula
followed in the different formal legal education settings with
which we are concerned: apprenticeship training, independent law
school programs, and college/university law programs. Subsection a undertakes a comparative analysis and evaluation of the
breadth of coverage provided by the curricula of studies in the
different settings, and Subsection b seeks to demonstrate how the
striking breadth of many of these curricula and the remarkable
emphasis upon a broad education for lawyers may have reflected
the influence of certain elements of the prevailing jurisprudence
explored in Part II.B.1, in particular the elements of natural law
and legal science, as well as the influence of the prevailing
professional ideal of the lawyer-statesman and its underlying
political philosophy of civic republicanism, explored in Part II.B.2.
a.

Comparative Analysis and Evaluation of Breadth of Coverage

To facilitate discussion, the analysis and evaluation in this
subsection is divided into four parts: substantive and structural
463. The first assumption appears to be a reasonably safe one to make. The
second assumption may be more questionable, and its verification would
require empirical analysis and evaluation of data regarding factors analogous
to those discussed supra notes 456-57 and accompanying text.
464. In addition to the limitations discussed here, see also supra note 451
(discussing various caveats in using the basic framework of fundamental
dimensions of law to categorize the subject matters that were studied in
various curricula during this first phase in the history of U.S. legal education).
465. Interested readers are, of course, encouraged to review for themselves
all of the sources cited in the relevant notes for each setting, see supra
note 461, both those sources containing a generalized discussion of "the
curriculum," as well as those sources containing more particular discussions of
individual experiences and programs in those settings, in order to make their
own assessment of the pertinent data.
Moreover, perhaps those with greater expertise in, and aptitude for,
such matters will be inclined to undertake additional detailed research into
the curricula of studies followed in these various settings, and to generate and
tabulate, to the extent feasible for this period, the kind of statistical data that
is available for later periods. See supra note 458 and accompanying text.
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dimensions of law; practical dimensions of law; social dimensions
of law; and cultural and transnational dimensions of law.
(1) Substantive and Structural Dimensions of Law466
During this first phase in the history of U.S. legal education,
the curriculum in all of the various settings appears to have placed
extensive emphasis upon the substantive dimensions of law, and
at least considerable emphasis upon the structural dimensions of
law.
These particular evaluations would not appear to be
especially controversial and can be supported by a review of the
"model" curricula in these settings. Here the reader's attention is
directed to the earlier discussion of William Smith's curriculum in
the apprenticeship setting, 7 the Litchfield curriculum in the
independent law school setting,4" David Hoffman's Syllabus in the
early college/university setting,469 and the Harvard and Virginia
curricula in the later university law school setting.47 In all these
curricula the relevant coverage of substance and structural
matters (including procedure) is readily apparent.
Four points should be noted regarding coverage of the
substantive and structural dimensions of law in these various
settings. First, the working classifications of the substantive law
used for purposes of study and instruction were not based on a
comprehensive and logical system of classification but instead
reflected what had become an ad hoc, unsystematic, and even
41
'
chaotic division of judge-made law into various standard titles.
These working classifications appear to have persisted despite the
efforts by various pre-Langdellian "legal scientists" to organize
various branches of the law in a systematic and rational manner.47

466. For a description of these dimensions, see supra note 444 and
accompanying text (substantive dimensions of law); supra note 445 and

accompanying text (structural dimensions of law).
467. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text. See also, e.g., Bailey,
supra note 59, at 312-13 (quoting Paul Hamlin's statement that the apprentice
was "instructed in the principles, practices and procedures of the law"); id. at
319-20 (providing a general description of apprenticeship training); id. at 31516 (discussing legal education in general)
468. See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
469. See supra notes 114-17 and accompanying text. See also supra notes
118-22 and accompanying text (discussing the curricula at William and Mary,
Philadelphia, Columbia, Transylvania, and Harvard).
470. See supra notes 148-51 and accompanying text (Harvard); supra
notes 162-65 and accompanying text (Virginia).
471. See REED I, supra note 2, at 345-46.
472. See supra note 267-74 and accompanying text (discussing these efforts).
Cf Schweber, supra note 2, at 608 (noting a resistance to "legal science" even
at some law schools). Reed seems to suggest that textbook writers, both legal
educators and others, even contributed to the confusion because "[they]
defined each for himself his field of study, and thus crystallized the law into

units which subsequent text writers and subsequent law schools were
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Second, in any given curriculum, matters of procedure, and
possibly evidence as well, may have been addressed in connection
with various substantive topics, such as Real Property, Contracts,
and Criminal Law, quite apart from any specific treatment they
may (or may not) have received as separate topics in their own
right. This point was made explicit in the discussion of David
Hoffman's program at Maryland and can be readily verified by
consulting his Syllabus for that program, 7 ' but it was doubtless
equally true in many other cases as well.
Third, the area of Constitutional Law may have been
virtually ignored in the independent law school setting, which
certainly seems to have been the case at Litchfield.474 Conversely,
the area of Constitutional Law may have received a greater
emphasis than even in Hoffman's Syllabus among those
college/university law programs following the Jeffersonian or
similar model of legal education.475
Fourth, there may have been additional coverage of the
substantive and structural dimensions of law (including
Constitutional Law) beyond that which is apparent from any
listing of specific topics to the extent, for example, that the
relevant parts of general institutional works, such as Blackstone's
Commentaries and, later on, Kent's Commentaries were the
subject of lectures and/or assigned readings. 7 '
(2) Practical Dimensions of Law477
There seems to have been at least a considerable emphasis
upon the practical dimensions of law in all of the formal legal
education settings, with an additional emphasis (probably an
extensive emphasis) upon those dimensions in the apprenticeship

compelled to recognize." REED I, supra note 2, at 348-49.
473. See Hoffman, Syllabus, supra note 106; see also supra note 116 and
accompanying text (discussing Hoffman's Syllabus).
474. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text (discussing the Litchfield
curriculum); see also, e.g., REED I, supra note 2, at 131, 453 app.III (surveying
the Litchfield curriculum); Sheppard, Lecture Hall, supra note 2, at 13
(commenting on the Litchfield curriculum (quoted supra note 94 and
accompanying text)).
475. See supra note 111 and accompanying text (identifying programs

following the Jeffersonian-type model).
476. See, e.g., REED I, supra note 2,
Litchfield in 1794 and 1813, Harvard
and observing that "[s]everal of the
Harvard, for instance, were doubtless

at 453-54 (comparing the curricula at
in 1835-38, and Columbia in 1858-75,
topics not specifically mentioned at
covered in the introductory course on

Blackstone and Kent"). For discussion of the institutional character and
contents of Blackstone's COMMENTARIES and Kent's COMMENTARIES, and of
the central role of these and other works in the legal education of the period,
see supra notes 175-93 and accompanying text.
477. For a description of the practical dimensions of law, see supra note 446

and accompanying text.
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setting. These evaluations are based on three main considerations. First, with respect to professional skills, in all of the
settings presumably the skill of legal reasoning would have been
developed, to some extent at least, as students studied the cases
dealing with particular subject matters.478 Second, with respect to
professional values, we have seen in the previous Section how
mentors in apprenticeship training, and law teachers in the
college/university law programs and possibly even in the
independent law schools, sought to cultivate in their students the
4 79
character virtues and values of the lawyer-statesman ideal.
Third, students in all three settings studied additional practical
dimensions, particularly various types of skills, as separate topics
or activities in their own right. The following analysis focuses on
this third consideration in particular.
With respect to institutionalized legal education, i.e., legal
education in the independent law school and college/university
settings, the reader's attention is directed, once again, to the
earlier discussion of the "model curricula" in these various
settings." In the independent law school setting, the Litchfield
curriculum included coverage of Pleading and Practice as well as
optional moot courts and debating societies."'
In the early
college/university setting, David Hoffman's Syllabus included
coverage of pleading within various titles; Legal Biography and
Bibliography, and Professional Deportment (i.e., Legal Ethics)
were covered in a separate Title of their own; and lectures were
supplemented with moot court exercises, debating exercises, and
writing competitions."' In the later university law school setting,
the Harvard curriculum included coverage of Pleading, and again
lectures were supplemented by moot court exercises. *8
The
Virginia curriculum, too, included coverage of Pleading, and a
comprehensive moot court program included litigation and
drafting exercises that required students to "perform most of the
functions of the practicing lawyer."
Many law teachers in these

478. Regarding the study of cases in apprenticeship training, see supra note
77 and accompanying text (discussing the William Smith "model" curriculum).

Regarding the study of cases in the independent law school and college/
university law programs, see supra note 171 and accompanying text.
479. See Subsection e, Part II.B.2, supra notes 394-435 and accompanying

text.
480. See also references cited supra note 173 (discussing methods of
instruction as including moot court and other types of practical exercises).
481. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.

482. See supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text; see also supra note 118
(noting the practice of holding moot courts and moot legislatures at William
and Mary under Wythe); supra note 121 (noting a similar practice at
Transylvania).
483. See supra notes 149-51 and accompanying text.
484. See supra notes 164-65 and accompanying text.
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various programs, moreover, doubtless considered that their
students should receive additional practical training, but that such
additional practical training should be provided during a
subsequent apprenticeship experience."
With respect to apprenticeship training itself, Bailey's
description of the William Smith curriculum notes generally that
this "ambitious course of study" included "an in-depth study of
both the theory and practice of law," and notes specifically the
study of "precedents" and "entries" (i.e., forms and recordkeeping).4
Moreover, one of the elements of apprenticeship
training was the copying of legal documents.f Bailey conveys a
good sense of the extent to which this particular activity helped to
familiarize the apprentice with forms and record-keeping, as well
as various other types of documents:
In an age prior to the general availability of printed forms, the legal
system's dependence on written records required endless copying of
legal documents. This was a powerful incentive for an attorney to
take in apprentices, who spent their days with pen in hand over the
stream of writs, pleadings, and briefs flowing through the office.
Copying also served a practical purpose for the apprentice,
familiarizing him with the filing of writs, the preparation of pleas,
and the notations in dockets and account books that were the basis
of everyday practice.4
Another element of apprenticeship training was the apprentice's
observation of the practice,"9 and doubtless this would also have
included observing the conduct of cases in court.
(3) Social Dimensions of Law49 °
With respect to the social dimensions of law, it may appear
necessary to make a distinction between apprenticeship training
and institutionalized legal education.
In the apprenticeship
setting, the William Smith curriculum included various subjects in
the arts and sciences that are relevant to the social dimensions of
law, resulting in a level of exposure to these dimensions that is at
least considerable, and perhaps even extensive."'" By contrast, the
485. See, e.g., Hoeflich, Theory and Practice, supra note 2, at 864, 867-68
(discussing various law teachers, such as Joseph Story and Daniel Mayes, who
appear to have expressed this viewpoint).
486. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
487. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
488. Bailey, supra note 59, at 313.
489. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
490. For a description of the social dimensions of law, see supra note 447 and

accompanying text.
491. See Bailey, supra note 59, at 320-21 (describing the Smith curriculum

as including "a broad sampling of the arts and sciences" and listing various
subjects in the general studies area); see also supra note 77 and accompanying

text (quoting Bailey).
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Litchfield curriculum in the independent law school setting does
not appear to have included any emphasis upon the social
dimensions of law.'92 David Hoffman's Syllabus in the early
college/university setting also seems to have lacked such an
emphasis,'93 as do, in the later college/university law school
setting, both the Harvard model curriculum"94 and the Virginia
model curriculum (at least as it developed over time)." 5
It is important, however, to bear in mind two cautionary
points in evaluating the apparent contrast between apprenticeship
training and institutionalized legal education with respect to the
exposure of students to the social dimensions of law. First, many
apprentices had already received a general college education
before beginning their apprenticeship training and presumably
were not required to study again the various subjects in the arts
and sciences they had already studied at college, but were
expected to focus instead on the more specifically legal subjects."
Similarly, many (perhaps most) of those attending the
independent law school and college/university law programs also
had received a prior college education,"97' and those who had not
done so were given a brief course of general instruction in the arts
and sciences before beginning the law program (at least at some of
the independent law schools),"9 or were encouraged to take
parallel courses outside the law program itself (at some of the
colleges/universities)."" For those students with a prior college
education (or some equivalent), then, there may have been little
functional difference between apprenticeship training and
institutionalized legal education as far as exposure to the social
dimensions of law is concerned, because they all would have
received such exposure, one way or another, as part of a general

492. See supra notes 91-95 and accompanying text.
493. See supra notes 114-17 and accompanying text.
494. See supra notes 148-54 and accompanying text.
495. See supra notes 162-65 and accompanying text. With respect to the
narrowing of the Virginia curriculum over time so as to exclude subjects such
as history and political economy, see supra note 163 and accompanying text.
496. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. For a description of the
standard college curriculum, see supra note 72 and accompanying text.
497. See supra note 96 and accompanying text (independent law school
programs); supra note 128 and accompanying text (early college/university law
programs); supra note 168 and accompanying text (later university law school
programs).
498. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
499. See supra note 129 and accompanying text (early college/university law

programs, specifically the law program at William and Mary, at least under
Wythe); supra note 166 and accompanying text (law schools influenced by the
Virginia curriculum model); see also note 167 and accompanying text
(discussing more limited opportunities at Harvard to take parallel courses
outside the law program).
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education. Such exposure, moreover, may have been considerable
or perhaps even extensive. 00
The second cautionary point to bear in mind is that the
economic dimensions of law are an important subset of the social
dimensions of law,5"' and several of the college/university law
programs do seem to have included specific coverage of Political
Economy as part of the law program itself.5"
(4) Cultural and Transnational Dimensions of Law50 '
It seems that students in each formal legal education
setting - apprenticeship training, independent law school
programs and college/university law programs - received some
degree of exposure to the cultural dimensions of law during their
legal education. Simply through their study of substantive law,
students would have acquired a basic familiarity with the
historical development of the common law tradition (including the
historical development of American common law and American
constitutional law), with the six main elements of the prevailing
jurisprudence examined in Part II.B.I.,5 °4 and with comparative
500. There may also be a category of students enrolled in the independent
law school and college/university law programs who lacked a prior general
college education (or some equivalent), but who nevertheless received exposure
to the social dimensions of law in an apprenticeship experience (or, of course,
through their own independent study).
See also supra note 77 and
accompanying text (for exposure to these dimensions in apprenticeship
training).
501. See supra note 447 and accompanying text.
502. See, e.g., Carrington, Francis Lieber, supra note 106, at 341; see also
supra note 410 and accompanying text (quoting Carrington). Some specific
examples among the early college/university law programs include Wythe's
program at William and Mary, see supra note 118, Wilson's program at
Philadelphia, see supra note 119, and the program at Transylvania, see supra
note 124. Interestingly, neither Hoffman's program at Maryland nor Kent's
program at Columbia appears to have included such specific coverage of
Political Economy. See supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text (Maryland);
supra note 120 (Columbia). A specific example of a later university law school
program that included such specific coverage is the original 1825 curriculum
at Virginia. See supra note 162 and accompanying text. It should perhaps
also be noted that even though the Harvard list of recommended texts was
influenced by the breadth and classification of Hoffman's A COURSE OF LEGAL
STUDY, see supra note 155 and accompanying text, and even though Hoffman's
COURSE included Political Economy, see supra note 115 and accompanying
text, the Harvard list seems to have omitted this subject. REED I, supra note
2, at 456 app.III.
503. For a description of these dimensions, see supra note 448 and
accompanying text (cultural dimensions of law); supra note 449 and
accompanying text (transnational dimensions of law).
504. Once again, these six elements are: the nature of the common law
tradition; the nature of common law reason in classical common law thought;
three related notions representing some further ways in which the common
law was conceptualized in classical common law thought; the character of
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law (specifically the civil law)." 5 A primary vehicle of such
exposure would have been their study of substantive law in the
works of Blackstone, Kent, and Story."° Additionally, students
would have been exposed to the general treatments of various
historical, jurisprudential, and comparative topics that were
contained in these works."7
In this regard, one should also
associated natural law thinking; the emergence of a new, instrumentalist
conception of law (particularly during the second part of the period); and early
American legal science.
505. Because this exposure occurs, and hence this familiarity is acquired, in
a sense incidentally, simply through the study of substantive law, it is
analogous to the two less obvious ways (and particularly to the second less
obvious way) in which some exposure to a set of fundamental dimensions of
law can be incorporated into a course and/or course materials with a different
primary emphasis, say a primary emphasis upon the substantive and
structural dimensions of law that focus on substantive law. For discussion of
these two less obvious methods of exposure, see supra note 453 (discussing the
third general consideration). See also supra note 454 (identifying the second
factor-cluster). Regarding the concern of the substantive and structural
dimensions of law with substantive law, see supra note 445 (noting also that
together the substantive and structural dimensions comprise the doctrinal (or
normative) dimensions of law).
506. For explicit reinforcement of this point, see, for example, supra notes
181, 184 and accompanying text (discussing Blackstone's methodology); supra
notes 57, 196 and accompanying text (noting the references to comparative
law illustrations in the titles of several of Story's treatises). There were, of
course, several ways in which students may have been exposed incidentally to
the cultural dimensions of law while focusing on substantive law. These are
the same kinds of ways that were identified in Part II.B.1, subsection f, when
considering how students' legal education would have familiarized them with
the six main elements of the prevailing jurisprudence (which represent, of
course, jurisprudential dimensions of law), but they apply to the other cultural
dimensions as well. In addition to reading various commentaries and treatises
explicating the common law (in particular Blackstone, Kent, and Story), these
ways also include: reading law reports of cases; observing the practice of their
mentors in apprenticeship training, in particular court proceedings, or
participating in moot court exercises in the independent law school and
college/university law programs; and interacting with a mentor in the former
setting, and classroom teaching in the latter settings.
507. For discussion of the general character, structure, and content of
Blackstone's COMMENTARIES, Kent's COMMENTARIES, and Story's series of
treatises, see supra notes 178-86 and accompanying text (Blackstone); supra
notes 187-90 (Kent); supra notes 191-93 and accompanying text (Blackstone
and Kent); supra notes 194-96 and accompanying text (Story). Examples of
such general treatments include: Blackstone's treatments of the history of
legal education in England (historical dimensions), of natural law and divine
law (jurisprudential dimensions), and of civil law (comparative dimensions),
all in the first part of Book I of the COMMENTARIES; Kent's treatment of civil
law (comparative dimensions) in Part III of his COMMENTARIES; and Story's
treatment of colonial and state constitutional history (historical dimensions) in
his COMMENTARIES On the Constitution of the United States. Once again,
these general treatments also may have been addressed (or at least
mentioned) in law reports, court proceedings or moot court exercises, and
interaction with a mentor or classroom teaching.
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remember that political philosophy comprises a further element in
the prevailing jurisprudence (an element that was addressed when
examining the prevailing professional ideal of the lawyerstatesman in Part II.B.2) and that, once again, students would
have acquired a basic familiarity with this element by studying,
for example, the general treatment of political theory in
Blackstone's Commentaries, especially in St. George Tucker's 1803
American edition."8
All of these various exposures to the
historical, jurisprudential, and comparative dimensions of law
may amount cumulatively to a level of exposure to the cultural
dimensions of law that was at least significant, and perhaps even
considerable.
Turning to the transnational dimensions of law, students in
each formal legal education setting would have received a minimal
exposure to the law of nations by studying Blackstone. Studying
Kent's Commentaries later on during the period would have
provided a greater degree of exposure, and perhaps even a
significant exposure."
Next we shall consider the extent to which there was any
additional curricular emphasis upon, and student exposure to, the
cultural and transnational dimensions of law beyond that
described above. In this regard, there is an apparent contrast, not
between apprenticeship training and institutionalized legal
education (as in the case of the social dimensions of law), but
between the independent law school setting on the one hand, and
the apprenticeship training and college/university settings on the
other.
(i) Independent Law Schools
Taking the Litchfield curriculum as our primary focus once
again,510 we have already noted the apparent narrowness of the
Litchfield curriculum and Steve Sheppard's comment that "[tihe

508. Blackstone's general treatment of political theory is contained, once
again, in the first part of Book I of the COMMENTARIES. See supra notes 183184 and accompanying text. Volume One of Tucker's 1803 American edition,
which is devoted to this first part of Book I of the COMMENTARIES, also

contains an extensive Appendix in which Tucker inter alia elaborates at
considerable length upon the matters of political theory briefly addressed by
Blackstone. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
509. Thus, Blackstone provides a very brief general treatment of the law of
nations, again in the first part of Book I of the COMMENTARIES, whereas Kent

devotes the whole of Part I of his COMMENTARIES to this subject. See supra
notes 183-84 and accompanying text (Blackstone); supra note 188 and
accompanying text (Kent). Once again, these treatments of the law of nations

also may have been addressed (or at least mentioned) in law reports, court
proceedings or moot court exercises, and interaction with a mentor or
classroom teaching.
510. See supra notes 91-95 and accompanying text.

20061

A History of U.S. Legal EducationPhase I

1185

course was rooted in the practicalities of the common law
governing private disputes, skipping public law topics of
Constitutional government and politics, Roman civil law, and
'stately lectures on the great principles of the Laws of Nature'." 11
One might perhaps conclude, therefore, that the independent law
schools generally placed little or no additional emphasis upon the
cultural and transnational dimensions of law beyond the basic
level of exposure students received in the ways discussed above.512
In this regard, however, three cautionary points should be noted.
First, with respect to the transnational dimensions of law,
lectures and/or readings on The Law Merchant also may have
included some coverage of international trade. Second, before one
could make a definitive evaluation regarding an independent law
school such as Litchfield, it would be necessary to know more
about the extent to which the cultural and transnational
dimensions of law may have been addressed, perhaps even more
than minimally, in the Introductory segment of the program."'
Third, as discussed earlier with respect to the social dimensions of
law,51 ' many of those attending the independent law school
programs had already received a general college education, and (at
least at some schools) those who had not done so were given a brief
course of instruction in the arts and sciences before beginning the
law program itself."5 As also discussed earlier, a general college
education would have included some exposure to natural law
theory.1 6 Moreover, such exposure also may have included at least
some coverage of the law of nations, which was regarded as being
founded, at least partly, on the law of nature. " ' An exposure to
natural law theory and the law of nations also may have been part
of any substitute course of instruction taken by those without a
college education.1
511. Sheppard, Lecture Hall, supra note 2, at 13; see also supra note 94

(quoting Sheppard).
512. See supra notes 504-09 and accompanying text.
513. For one possible example, although slightly beyond our period, see
Hunter, supra note 2, at 441-42 (discussing Judge Dick's "introductory lecture

on the civil and common law systems" at the Dick and Dillard Law School in
North Carolina in the late 1870s, which, when published, was described as 'an
admirable historical as well as legal document' (quoting literary critic

Archibald Henderson, but providing no citation)). Of course, at many schools
the introductory segment doubtless was based, at least in part, on Blackstone
or (later on during our period) on Blackstone and/or Kent.
514. See supra notes 497-98 and accompanying text.
515. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
516. See supra note 282 and accompanying text.
517. For a contemporary discussion of the "foundations" of the law of
nations, see, for example, 1 KENT, supra note 56, at 1-4 (identifying both
"natural law" and "positive law" foundations).
518. For example, Peter Van Schaak's plan for such a preliminary course of

general instruction also included coverage of Ethics. See supra note 96.
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For many students at the independent law schools, then, their
total cumulative level of exposure to the cultural and
transnational dimensions of law respectively, or at least their
cumulative level of exposure to natural law theory and the law of
nations during their combined general college education and
formal legal education, may have been considerable. 9
(ii) Apprenticeship Training and College/University Law
Programs
In apparent contrast to the curricular treatment in the
independent law school programs, the more specifically "legal"
component of the curriculum in apprenticeship training, as well as
the curricula in many of the college/university law school
programs, appear themselves to have placed considerable
additional emphasis upon the cultural and transnational
dimensions of law. The combination of the resulting additional
student exposure, together with the basic level of exposure
received in the ways discussed earlier,52 ° may have resulted in a
total level of exposure to these dimensions that was extensive.
In the apprenticeship training setting, this considerable
upon the cultural and
emphasis
additional curricular
transnational dimensions of law is apparent in the William Smith
model curriculum. Although there is perhaps some degree of
overlap with the "general education" component of the curriculum,
the apprentice lawyer in the Smith curriculum studied history, as
well as works on natural law and the civil law, and works on the
law of nations.52 ' Although not explicit in the description of the
Smith curriculum, it seems that many apprenticeship experiences
also included a specific consideration of political theory as a
separate subject in its own right."' Moreover, any readings on the
law of merchants may have included some coverage of
international trade as well.

519. As in the case of the social dimensions of law, see supra note 500, there
may also have been a category of students enrolled in the independent law
school programs who lacked a prior general college education (or some
equivalent), but who nevertheless received additional exposure to various
cultural and transnational dimensions of law (including especially natural law
and the law of nations) in an apprenticeship experience (or, of course, through
their own independent study). See also infra notes 521-22 and accompanying
text (discussing exposure to these dimensions in apprenticeship training).
520. See supra notes 504-09 and accompanying text.
521. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. See also Bailey, supra
note 59, at 321, 323, 328 (discussing the texts on political theory, natural law,
civil law, and the law of nations that were included in apprentices' reading
lists during the late eighteenth century and the first half of the nineteenth

century).
522. Bailey, supra note 59, at 323.
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As in the case of apprenticeship training, it is clear from a
review of model curricula in the college/university setting that the
early college/university law programs also placed considerable
additional emphasis upon the cultural and transnational
dimensions of law, and that the same is true of several of the later
university law school programs as well. Turning again, for the
early college/university setting, to David Hoffman's model
curriculum at Maryland, Hoffman's Syllabus included detailed
coverage of government and political theory; legal history,
jurisprudence (in particular, natural law), and civil/Roman law;
3
and the law of nations, international trade, and maritime law."
The early college/university law programs appear to have
approximated this ideal to a greater or lesser extent by including
specific coverage of government and political theory as well as
some combination among legal history, natural law, civil law, and
the law of nations.524
In the later university law school setting, it is necessary to
distinguish between the broader Virginia curriculum model and
the narrower Harvard curriculum model. As far as the Virginia
curriculum is concerned (at least through the early 1850s), the
original Virginia curriculum of 1825 largely reflected the
classification and breadth of coverage in David Hoffman's 1817 A
And even the narrower Virginia
Course of Legal Study. 25
curriculum of 1851 included Civil Law and International Law as
separate subjects in their own right, together with coverage of
ancient and constitutional history and political theory (as aspects
of the study of The Federalist, Madison's Report of 1799, and
perhaps Government, i.e., Constitutional Law) and possibly also
trade and maritime law (as aspects of
coverage of international
526
Mercantile Law).
In contrast to the Virginia curriculum (even in 1851), the
Harvard curriculum as it developed under Story appears to be
quite narrow. As in the case of the Litchfield curriculum, none of
the subjects listed in the regular Harvard curriculum appears to
address specifically the cultural or transnational dimensions of
law.2 7 Once again, however, several cautionary points should be
First, Constitutional Law may have included some
noted.
coverage of political theory as well. Second, international trade
523. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
524. See supra notes 118-22 and accompanying text (discussing the curricula
in the early law programs at William and Mary, Philadelphia, Columbia,
Transylvania, and Harvard respectively)
525. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
526. See supra notes 163-64 and accompanying text.
527. See supra notes 148-54 and accompanying text. For discussion of the
apparent failure of the Litchfield curriculum to address specifically the
cultural and transnational dimensions of law, see supra notes 510-12 and
accompanying text.
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presumably was included in the coverage of Commercial and
Maritime Law, a heading that seems to have comprised several
specific subjects. 2 ' Third, the inclusion in the Harvard Law School
catalogues from 1830 until 1869 of a bibliography of recommended
texts apparently reflecting the classification and breadth of
coverage in Hoffman's A Course of Legal Study. 9 would seem to
reflect a judgment that, ideally at least, lawyers should receive a
general exposure to the cultural and transnational dimensions of
law as part of their formation, even if the regular Harvard
curriculum necessarily fell short of that ideal. As we have seen,
Story himself had certainly expressed such an ideal in his
inaugural address. ° Arguably, moreover, the occasional and
temporary efforts after Story's death in 1845 to broaden the
curriculum through the introduction of courses or lectures in other
subjects, including International
Law, Civil Law, and
Parliamentary Law," may reflect the same judgment regarding
the ideal formation of a lawyer.
Fourth, once again, many
students enrolled in the law program at Harvard had already
received a general college education before beginning their legal
studies. 32 As was noted in our discussion of the law program at
Litchfield, a general college education would have included some
exposure to natural law theory and also may have included at
least some exposure to the law of nations. 3 For many students at
Harvard, then, their total cumulative level of exposure to the
cultural and transnational dimensions of law respectively, or at
least their cumulative level of exposure to natural law theory and
the law of nations, during their combined general college
education and formal legal education at Harvard, may have been
considerable.
The fourth cautionary point, regarding exposure to natural
law theory and the law of nations as part of a general college
education, is of more general application because, as we have seen,
many apprentices and many students enrolled in the
college/university law programs (and not just at Harvard) had
already received a general college education before beginning their

528. See REED I, supra note 2, at 453 n.3 app.III, 455 app. III (identifying
Shipping, Bills, Agency, Insurance, Bailments, and Partnership as subjects
under the heading of Commercial and Maritime Law).
529. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
530. See supra note 153 and accompanying text. As we have also noted,
Story had pragmatic reasons for retreating, in his actual reorganization of
Harvard Law School, from the educational ideals he had expressed so
eloquently in his inaugural address. See supra note 154 (citing REED I, supra
note 2, at 144-50).
531. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
532. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
533. See supra notes 516-17 and accompanying text.
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formal legal education.3 ' Moreover, in some college/university law
programs (but perhaps not so commonly at Harvard) students
without a prior college education may have received some
exposure to these subjects in parallel courses they were
encouraged to take outside the law program itself.535 Any such
prior or contemporaneous exposure to natural law theory and the
law of nations presumably must be factored into a calculation of
the total exposure to these subjects that students received by the
time they completed their formal legal education, thereby
enhancing even further what already may be an extensive level of
exposure to the cultural and transnational dimensions of law."s
b.

Influence of Prevailing Jurisprudence and Prevailing
Professional Ideal on Curricular Breadth

In Subsection a immediately above we found that, in all of the
formal legal education settings with which we are concerned apprenticeship training, independent law school programs, and
college/university programs - the curriculum appears to have
placed extensive emphasis upon the substantive dimensions of
law, and at least a considerable emphasis upon the structural
dimensions of law.537 The curriculum also placed at least a
considerable emphasis upon the practical dimensions of law, with
the greatest emphasis, probably an extensive emphasis, upon
those dimensions in the apprenticeship setting.us We also found
that, although it might appear necessary to distinguish among the
curricula in different settings with respect to their emphasis upon
the social, cultural, and transnational dimensions of law, caution
is warranted before reaching any definitive conclusions regarding

534. See supra note 79 and accompanying text (apprenticeship training);
supra note 128 and accompanying text (early college/university law programs);
supra note 168 and accompanying text (later university law school programs).
535. See supra note 129 and accompanying text (early college/university law

programs, specifically the law program at William and Mary, at least under
Wythe); supra note 166 and accompanying text (law schools influenced by the
Virginia curriculum model); see also note 167 and accompanying text
(discussing the more limited opportunities to take parallel courses at
Harvard).

536. As in the case of the social dimensions of law, see supra note 500, there
may have been a category of students enrolled in the college/university law
programs who lacked a prior general college education (or some equivalent),

but who nevertheless received additional exposure to various cultural and
transnational dimensions of law (including especially natural law and the law
of nations) in an apprenticeship experience (or, of course, through their own
independent study). See also supra note 519 (discussing the same point with
respect to the independent law school programs); supra notes 521-22 and
accompanying text (discussing exposure to these dimensions in apprenticeship

training).
537. See supra notes 466-76 and accompanying text.
538. See supra notes 477-89 and accompanying text.
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the extent to which students were exposed to these dimensions by
the time they completed their formal legal education.
With respect to the social dimensions of law, the curriculum
in apprenticeship training placed considerable, and perhaps
extensive, emphasis upon these dimensions of law. 9 In contrast,
the curriculum in the independent law school programs and the
curriculum in the college/university law programs appear to have
placed little or no emphasis upon the social dimensions of law. 4
The apparent contrast between apprenticeship training and
institutionalized legal education tends to diminish, however, when
the exposure received during a prior college education (or some
equivalent) is factored into the calculation."
With respect to the cultural and transnational dimensions of
law, the apparent distinction is drawn differently. Thus, students
in all settings received a basic level of exposure to the cultural
dimensions of law that was at least significant and perhaps even
considerable, and a basic level of exposure to the transnational
dimensions of law that may have been significant and not just
minimal (at least later on during the period)."
Moreover, the
more specifically "legal" component of the curriculum in
apprenticeship training, as well as the curriculum in the early
college/university law programs and the curriculum in the later
university law school programs following the Virginia model,
placed considerable additional emphasis upon the cultural and
transnational dimensions, resulting in a total level of exposure
that may have been extensive.54 In contrast, the curriculum in the
independent law school programs and the curriculum in the later
university law school programs following the Harvard model
appear to have placed little or no additional emphasis upon the
cultural and transnational dimensions.'
Once again, however,
the apparent contrast between the settings tends to diminish
when other considerations, in particular the exposure to certain
subjects received during a prior college education (or some
equivalent), are factored into the calculation. 5
It is interesting to consider what might account for this
remarkable emphasis upon a broad education for lawyers during
this first phase in the history of U.S. legal education. Several
considerations suggest that, to a considerable extent at least, the
emphasis upon the cultural and transnational dimensions of law
that we find during this period may have reflected the influence of

539.
540.
541.
542.
543.
544.
545.

See supra note 491 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 492-95, 502 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 496-500 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 503-09 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 520-26 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 510-12, 527 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 512-19, 527-36 and accompanying text.
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the natural law and legal science elements in the prevailing
jurisprudence," as well as the influence of the prevailing
professional ideal of the lawyer-statesman and the political
philosophy of civic republicanism underpinning that ideal."
Moreover, the influence of the lawyer-statesman ideal may also
help to account for the importance that was so often attached to
lawyers receiving an exposure to subjects relevant to the social
dimensions of law at some point before completing their formal
legal education.
On the assumption that natural law was an important
element in the prevailing jurisprudence and that it helped to mold
the legal thought of the period,' it is possible to discern several
ways in which this natural law element may have contributed
towards the emphasis upon a broad education for lawyers, and in
particular towards an emphasis upon the cultural and
transnational dimensions of law.
First, and obviously, the
prevailing natural law thinking would certainly help to explain
the explicit emphasis on natural law theory in the standard college
curriculum and in much of the formal legal education provided in
the various settings discussed above. 9 Second, it may also help to
explain the emphasis on government and political theory. It
seems that both legal science and politics were widely viewed as
aspects of moral philosophy and as informed by natural law
theory.' ° That the subjects were naturally associated in this way
could have provided at least one reason why it made sense for law
students to study both of them. Third, the prevalence of natural
law thinking during the period may help to explain the emphasis
on legal history and the civil law. Thus, not only was the common
law considered to reflect natural law norms, but the same views
were held also with respect to contemporary civil law, and indeed
with respect to "[t]he municipal law of every age and every
nation.""4 Consequently, study of the civil law, for example, was
useful in illuminating the operation of natural law principles.
Moreover, a comparison of civil law and common law
demonstrating fundamental similarities between them, and hence
a common foundation in natural law, also helped to ensure the
reception of English common law in the new Republic. 2 Finally,
546.
547.
548.
549.

See supra notes 244-51, 258-64, 267-74 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 293-393 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 244-66 and accompanying text.
Regarding this explicit emphasis, see also Bailey, supra note 59, at 323-

25.
550. See id. at 318 (legal science); 326-28 (political theory); see also supra
notes 273, 288 and accompanying text (legal science); supra notes 322, 360,
362-63, 366-67, 386 and accompanying text (political theory).
551. Bailey, supra note 59, at 323-25.
552. See POUND, supra note 176, at 107 (discussing the contributions toward
the achievement of this result made by Kent and Story through their "skillful
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the prevalence of natural law thinking during this period may also
help to explain the emphasis on the law of nations, which was also
importantly informed by natural law thinking.'
The concept of legal science is another element in the
prevailing jurisprudence of the period that may have contributed
towards an emphasis upon the cultural and transnational
dimensions of law, through its stress on the importance of a broad
systematic understanding of law. We noted earlier how the
scientific study of law usually began with the law of nature "as the
foundation of all legal science," followed by the law of nations and
constitutional law, before moving on to a study of municipal law."
Such a broad understanding of law, then, included an understanding of positive law's deeper foundations in natural law.
Thus, we noted earlier as well the following claim:
[Piremodern jurisprudents understood the common law as a science,
a rational system of principles grounded in natural law .... The
whole of jurisprudence could be rationally classified into a system
that included not only the natural law principles but also a
multitude of low-level legal rules that reflected the common law
forms of action.555
On the assumptions that the ideal of the lawyer-statesman,
with its emphasis upon the twin virtues of practical wisdom and
civic-mindedness and underpinned by the political philosophy of
civic republicanism, was the prevailing professional ideal of the
use of comparative law, seeming to show the identity of an ideal form of the
common-law rule with an ideal form of the civil-law rule, and thus
demonstrating the identity of each with a universally acknowledged law of
nature"). See also supra note 244 (discussing the role of natural law in
providing a justification legitimizing the adoption of English common law in
America). Of course, study of the civil law was also useful for at least three
other, perhaps more immediately pragmatic reasons: the civil law heavily
influenced the law of certain states, such as Louisiana; the civil law provided
an essential resource for developing certain specialized branches of American
law, such as the area of commercial law, in which common law materials were
lacking during the early part of the period; and, within American law
generally, the civil law furnished a useful resource for lawyers, judges, and
doctrinal writers as they sought to fashion solutions to legal problems during
the formative era of American law. For a discussion of this pragmatic
influence of the civil law see, for example, POUND, supra note 176, at 145-51.
Canvassing more "critical" viewpoints, Bailey contends that:
American historians have tended to view the emphasis placed on civil
law by law writers such as Nathan Dane, James Kent, and Joseph Story
as an effort to maintain the social exclusivity of the legal profession, to
cement its cultural and political status, and to give a patina of authority
to their legal arguments.
Bailey, supra note 59, at 324.
553. Regarding the "foundations" of the law of nations, see supra note 517
and accompanying text.
554. See supra note 288 and accompanying text.
555. See supra note 273 and accompanying text.
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period" and that it helped to determine the pedagogical goals of
legal educators," 7 it is possible to discern two main ways in which
the lawyer-statesman ideal may have contributed towards the
emphasis on a broad education for lawyers, including an emphasis
upon the social dimensions of law as well as an emphasis upon the
cultural and transnational dimensions of law.
First, legal
educators considered that the cultivation of a liberal frame of mind
was necessary for the formation of lawyers as members of the
virtuous elite. 8 Stress was placed, therefore, on the value of
"broad humanistic learning," and in particular on the value of
studying subjects such as literature, history, and rhetoric in
shaping character and enabling lawyers "to do their jobs in a
properly broad-minded way."5"'
For similar reasons legal
educators also valued the study of natural law and such subjects
as ancient law and contemporary civil law (both of which also
served to illuminate natural law principles), as well as political
economy, political theory, and the law of nations." Second, the
lawyer-statesman ideal represented an ideal of excellence for
lawyers, both when performing their leadership roles in republican
politics as well as when performing their roles as legal
practitioners." 1 This duality of roles doubtless reinforced the
value of a given subject, including those subjects that may have
been less relevant for the achievement of excellence in one type of

556. See supra notes 293-393 and accompanying text.
557. See supra notes 394-435 and accompanying text.
558. See supra notes 409, 415-16,434 and accompanying text.
559. KRONMAN, supra note 218, at 154; id. at 20; see also supra note 425 and
accompanying text (quoting Kronman); supra notes 317, 334 and
accompanying text (further discussing and quoting Kronman's views in this
regard). See generally FERGUSON, supra note 78. Arguably, rhetoric is more
appropriately considered as part of an exploration of the practical dimensions
of law. See supra notes 446, 477-89 and accompanying text. There were
important cultural dimensions to the art of rhetoric, however, that were
reflected in the type of learning, in particular classical learning, possessed and
utilized by the accomplished rhetorician. See FERGUSON, supra, at 66-84;
ROBERT BELLAH ET AL., THE GOOD SOCIETY, 153, 158-59 (1991); see also supra
notes 352, 354-56 and accompanying text (discussing the influence of elite
lawyers throughout society and the main reasons why they held a vision of
themselves as having a "special stewardship"). Regarding the systemically
pervasive nature of the fundamental dimensions of law (in which the
fundamental dimensions are dimensions of each other), see supra note 441
and accompanying text.
560. See supra notes 409-11 and accompanying text (college/university law
programs); supra notes 414-24 and accompanying text (apprenticeship
training); see also supra notes 430-35 and accompanying text (independent law
schools). Regarding the illumination of natural law principles through a study
of ancient law and contemporary civil law, see supra note 551 and
accompanying text.
561. See the earlier discussion in Subsections a-c of Part II.B.2., supra notes
295-361 and accompanying text.
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role than for the achievement of excellence in another type of
role .562
III. THE FIRST PHASE IN PERSPECTIVE:
SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS AND IMPLICATIONS
FOR LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM
We have examined the breadth of coverage provided by the
curricula of studies followed in the various settings apprenticeship training, independent law school programs, and
college/university law programs - in which it was possible to
receive some type of formal legal education during this first phase
in the history of U.S. legal education.5 " We have seen that many
of the curricula in the apprenticeship and college/university law
programs settings displayed a striking breadth of coverage;
moreover, if various other considerations are also taken into
account, in particular the exposure to certain subjects that
students received during a prior college education (or its
equivalent), there was a remarkable emphasis upon a broad
education for lawyers in all settings.' We have also seen that this
remarkable emphasis upon a broad education for lawyers likely
reflected, to a considerable extent at least, the influence of the
natural law and legal science elements in the prevailing
jurisprudence as well as the influence of the prevailing
professional ideal of the lawyer-statesman and the political
philosophy of civic republicanism underpinning that ideal. 5
After this first phase in its history, U.S. legal education
gradually became centered in university law schools.'
The law

562. Examples of subjects with a disparate relevance might include political
theory, political economy, and the law of nations, certain aspects of which at
least may have been more relevant for the role of political leaders than the
role of legal practitioners.
To keep matters in proper perspective, we should also remember that
although the lawyer-statesman is "not just an accomplished technician" with
"specialized professional knowledge," he is certainly such a person, and that
the achievement of excellence, therefore, presumably included a mastery of the

substantive, structural, and practical dimensions of law as well as the social,
cultural, and transnational dimensions of law. See KRONMAN, supra note 218,
at 15-16 (emphasis added); see also supra note 296 and accompanying text
(quoting Kronman). On the other hand, the lawyer-statesman ideal may have
valued "general erudition" more highly than "technical expertise." See
FERGUSON, supra note 78, at 66 (maintaining that "[iun the generations from
Hamilton to Webster general erudition overrode technical expertise as the
primary source of professional identity").
563. See supra notes 465-536 and accompanying text.
564. See supra notes 537-45 and accompanying text.
565. See supra notes 546-62 and accompanying text.
566. For a good discussion of pertinent developments related to this process,
see generally STEVENS, supra note 2. Stevens provides the following succinct
summary of the main stages:
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school curriculum itself was generally narrowed, beginning in the
1870s with Christopher Columbus Langdell's reforms of the
curriculum at Harvard Law School, which then became a model
for other law schools in this as well as in other respects. 67 Thus,
by the mid-1920s, although the mainstream law school curriculum
still placed extensive emphasis upon the substantive dimensions of
law and considerable emphasis upon the structural dimensions of
law, as well as a reduced (but still significant) emphasis upon the
practical dimensions of law, by that time it had come to place no
significant emphasis upon the social dimensions of law, no
significant emphasis upon the cultural dimensions of law (except
for certain limited aspects of legal history and jurisprudence), and
no significant emphasis upon the transnational dimensions of
law.'
Although the situation has clearly improved during the
intervening years, the mainstream law school curriculum still has
not fully recovered from this narrowing. Moreover, any mitigation
of the narrowing of the law school curriculum that may have
resulted from students receiving a broad general college education
before coming to law school has diminished significantly during
the last few decades with a dramatic decline in the percentage of
law students possessing the once traditional background in the
liberal arts."
My particular concern is with the treatment of the cultural
and transnational dimensions of law within the mainstream law
school curriculum. Although relevant subjects addressing these
In the 1870s, legal education essentially meant a requirement for some
period of law study followed by a bar exam. The second stage of growth
had been recognition of law school as an alternative to apprenticeship.
The third stage was the requirement of law school without the
alternative of office study, and the fourth was recognition solely of ABAapproved law schools coupled with the requirement of attendance at
college as well. The third and fourth stages in the movement had begun
in the 1930s and were to come to fruition in the postwar years.
Id. at 205. The American Bar Association (ABA) was established in 1878. Id.
at 27, 92. The Association of American Law Schools (AALS) was established
in 1900. Id. at 96-97.
567. For a discussion of Langdell's reforms at Harvard Law School and their
influence on other law schools, see, for example, REED I, supra note 2, at 34345, 354-68, 369-88, 391-94; STEVENS, supra note 2, at 36-39, 61-64, 96 n.33.
568. See REED II, supra note 2, at 252-56 (discussing the subjects included in
law school curricula in 1925-26). The limited exposure to certain aspects of
legal history and jurisprudence occurred in the second less obvious way of
providing exposure, that is, through the incorporation of some generalized
exposure to a dimension into a a course with a different primary emphasis,
when that dimension is inherent in the materials used for, or otherwise
informs and is reflected in the teaching of, the course. See supra note 453;
infra note 571 (final paragraph).
569. See, e.g., DAVID L. KIRP, HUMAN RESOURCES, MANAGEMENT, AND
PERSONNEL: SHAKESPEARE, EINSTEIN, AND THE BOTTOM LINE: THE
MARKETING OF HIGHER EDUCATION 5, 53-54 (2003).
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dimensions were accorded a central place in much of the legal
education during the first phase, they suffered from the general
narrowing of the law school curriculum that occurred subsequently. Moreover, the cultural and transnational dimensions of
law continue to be relatively neglected and marginalized within
the current mainstream law school curriculum. And this is the
case despite the development, and in recent years remarkable
proliferation, of elective courses and seminars with a primary
emphasis upon the areas of legal history, jurisprudence, and
comparative law, and upon the general subject areas of
international/transnational/global legal studies.57 ° It is the case
also despite even more recent efforts to incorporate relevant
exposure to such areas into courses with a primary emphasis upon
other dimensions of law through the so-called "pervasive
method."57' Thus, although there are important signs that the

570. The development of the elective curriculum after the first phase in the
history of U.S. legal education-an elective curriculum that became
increasingly broader after the end of the second phase (the phase of
Langdellian legal science lasting from the 1870s until the 1920s)-is
documented in the curriculum surveys and studies cited supra note 458. The
"remarkable proliferation" of elective courses and seminars relating to all six
sets of fundamental dimensions of law in recent years, including those with a
primary emphasis upon the areas of legal history, jurisprudence, and
comparative law, and upon the general subject areas of international/
transnationallglobal legal studies, is evident in the results of the two most
recent curricular surveys cited supra note 458, the 1997 AALS Survey by
Merritt and Cihon, and the 2004 ABA Survey.
As discussed earlier, it is important not to be misled into basing an
evaluation of curricular emphasis and student exposure solely upon the
number of courses in the curriculum with an emphasis upon a particular set
(or subset) of fundamental dimensions of law. For example, even if there are
several, or even many, such courses in the curriculum, they may be "mere
electives" that are not within the core curriculum, and they may have
consistently low enrollments. Other determining factors must be considered
as well. See supra note 454 and accompanying text; see also infra note 571
and accompanying text.
Regarding the expression "international/transnational/global legal
studies," the terms "international," 'transnational," and "global" may or may
not be used synonymously, depending on whether they are being used in a
narrow sense or a broad sense. See Jones, supra note 436, at 590 n.60 and 591
n.63. Regarding the relationship of the transnational dimensions of law to the
comparative dimensions of law, and the lines of demarcation between them,
see id. at 589 n.59, and 592-94 & n.65.
571. For discussion of the ways in which an exposure to a set of fundamental
dimensions of law can be incorporated into courses with a different primary
emphasis, see supra note 453. These more recent efforts employing the
"pervasive method" are examples of the first less obvious way in which a
course can expose students to a particular set (or subset) of fundamental
dimensions of law, i.e., through the incorporation of some specific exposure to
a set of fundamental dimensions into a course and/or course materials with a
different primary emphasis. Although law schools were already using this
approach (in particular with respect to the social dimensions of law, see supra
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status of the cultural and transnational dimensions of law within
the curriculum may be improving, there are also several
ambiguities in the current situation and there still appears to be a

note 447 and accompanying text) as a result of the attempts by the American
legal realists to mitigate the "Langdellian" narrowing of legal education, the
more recent efforts employing the "pervasive method" (beginning, it seems, in
the area of legal ethics) attempt to adopt this approach pervasively and
systematically in many different courses throughout the curriculum. Once
again, however, it is important not to be misled by the mere fact of
incorporation of relevant material into a course or by the number of courses in
the curriculum in which this occurs. Other relevant determining factors must
be considered as well. See supra note 454.
For discussion, by way of illustration, of some of the efforts to
incorporate relevant material in the areas of international and/or comparative
law through use of the pervasive method, see, for example, Adelle Blackett,
Globalization and Its Ambiguities: Implications for Law School Curricular
Reform, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNA'L L. 57, 69-70 (1998); Nora Demleiter, A
Response to Mathias Reimann: More, More But Real Comparative Law, 11
TUL. EUR. & Civ. L.F. 73 (1996); M.C. Mirow, Globalizing Property:
Incorporating Comparative and International Law into First Year Property
Classes, 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 183 (2004); Mathias Reimann, The End of
Comparative Law as an Autonomous Subject, 11 TUL.EuR. & Civ. L.F. 49, 6172 (1996). For further discussion of the issues and challenges involved in
using the "pervasive method" to expose students to material in the areas of
international and/or comparative law, see, for example, Mirow, supra,
especially at 183, 186-88, 200; Michael Waxman, The Comparative Legal
Process Throughout the Law School Curriculum: A Modest Proposal for
Culture and Competence in a PluralisticSociety, 74 MARQ. L. REV. 391 (1991);
Michael Waxman, Teaching Comparative Law in the 21" Century: Beyond the
Civil Law/Common Law Dichotomy, 51 J. LEGAL EDUC. 305, 306 n.2 (2001);
Judith Wegner, The Curriculum:Patternsand Possibilities,51 J. LEGAL EDUC.
431, 435, 436 (2001). Some of the challenges identified regarding use of the
pervasive method to expose students to material in the areas of international
and comparative law (such as concerns about the lack of faculty expertise in
these areas or about yet another demand for curriculum space in an already
crowded and pressured curriculum) are applicable, of course, to the use of the
pervasive method in general, including any such use to incorporate relevant
material in the areas of legal history and jurisprudence.
It should perhaps also be noted that, in addition to the attempts to
incorporate some specific exposure to relevant materials in the areas of legal
history and jurisprudence, throughout the history of U.S. legal education
students have always received some limited exposure to the historical and
jurisprudential dimensions of law in the second less obvious way in which a
course can provide exposure to a particular set (or subset) of fundamental
dimensions of law, that is, through the incorporation of some generalized
exposure to a dimension into a course with a different primary emphasis,
when that dimension is inherent in the materials used for, or otherwise
informs and is reflected in the teaching of, the course. See supra note 453.
This is because the study of cases and other texts in doctrinal courses
incidentally and inevitably conveys a sense of historical context and of the
jurisprudential paradigm within which the cases were decided, and does so,
moreover, in a pervasive manner in many different courses throughout the
curriculum.
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considerable way to go before these dimensions are returned to a
central place in mainstream legal education. 72
These descriptive claims about the subsequent historical
development of the mainstream law school curriculum, and about
the current treatment of the cultural and transnational dimensions of law within the mainstream curriculum, will be elaborated
in much greater detail in one or more future articles exploring the
subsequent historical development of U.S. legal education. That
exploration will identify three later phases in this historical
development - the phase of Langdellian legal science (lasting
from the 1870s until the 1920s); the legal realist phase (lasting
from the 1920s until the 1960s); and the postrealist and
postmodernist phase (lasting from the 1960s until the present
time) - and it will follow the model of analysis used in Part II of
this article (i.e., an overview of legal education, prevailing
jurisprudence and prevailing professional ideal(s), and curricular
analysis and evaluation).
These descriptive claims are coupled with a normative
argument. It is my strongly held conviction that all law
students should receive a basic minimum exposure to the general
subject areas of legal history, jurisprudence, and comparative
law, as well as to the general subject areas of international/
transnational/global legal studies; that there is a continued failure
in mainstream legal education to ensure that law students receive
such a minimum exposure; that this continued failure raises
important professionalism concerns because it diminishes the
ability of law school graduates to perform in an optimally
competent, effective, and responsible manner in the various types
of roles they will perform both as practicing members of the legal
profession and as leaders in society;573 and that these
572. With respect to the areas of international and comparative law, for
example, it seems that despite the "remarkable proliferation" of elective
courses and seminars with a primary emphasis in these areas in recent years,
see supra note 570 and accompanying text, the great majority of law students
graduate without having taken any courses in these areas. See, e.g., Carole
Silver, Adventures in ComparativeLegal Studies: Studying Singapore, 51 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 75, 78 (2001) (citing John Barrett Jr., International Legal
Education in the United States: Being Educated for Domestic Practice While
Living in a Global Society, 12 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 975, 993 (1997)).
573. Clearly, I consider that law schools not only bear a responsibility to
prepare their graduates to perform in a competent, effective, and responsible
manner in their roles as practicing members of the legal profession, in
particular in their roles as legal practitioners, as practicing members of the
bar. In addition, in my view, they also bear a responsibility to help prepare
their graduates to perform in a competent, effective, and responsible manner
in their roles as leaders in the many different kinds of leadership positions,
both in the private sector and in the realm of public affairs, to which they will
gain access precisely because they are members of the legal profession even
though they may not be acting as practicing members of the legal profession in
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professionalism concerns must be met by restoring the cultural
and transnational dimensions of law to a central place in the
mainstream law school curriculum, just as they were accorded a
central place in much of the legal education during the first phase.
Again, this normative argument will be elaborated in much
greater detail in a later article or articles. The argument will
draw in part on the 1992 ABA MacCrate Report and on the 1996
ABA Professionalism Committee Report.57 ' For present purposes,
it suffices to make three basic points regarding the support these
two Reports provide for the normative argument outlined above.
First, the MacCrate Report, in its analysis of fundamental
lawyering skills and fundamental values of the profession,
specifically recognizes the importance of historical knowledge,
legal theory and moral considerations, and sensitivity to cultural
differences, for the proper development and exercise of particular
lawyering skills and professional values.575 Moreover, the ABA
Professionalism Committee Report, in seeking to address the
perceived decline in lawyer professionalism since the 1980s, 576 not
those leadership positions. I am obviously not alone in holding such views.
See, e.g., Douglas, supra note 59; Michael Reisman, Designing Curricula:
Making Legal Education Continuously Effective and Relevant for the 21'
Century, 17 CUMB. L. REV. 831, 840-42 (1987); James Rowles, Toward
Balancing the Goals of Legal Education, 31 J. LEGAL EDUC. 375, 391-92
(1981); see also KRONMAN, supra note 218, at 3-4 (implying strongly that law
schools today bear this dual responsibility).
The distinction drawn here between lawyers performing roles as
practicing members of the legal profession and lawyers performing roles as
leaders in society does not preclude, of course, that lawyers may "exercise
leadership" in the former types of roles as well, within the framework of the
lawyer-client relationship. On this point, compare Kronman's description of
the classical nineteenth-century ideal of the lawyer-statesman as a "leader,"
see supra notes 310-11 and accompanying text, and Pearce's discussion of
"America's governing class" of lawyers when representing clients during this
period, see supra note 391 and accompanying text.
574. See ABA SECTION ON LEGAL EDUCATION & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR,
LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT - AN EDUCATIONAL
CONTINUUM, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE
PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP (1992) [hereinafter MACCRATE REPORT];
ABA SECTION ON LEGAL EDUCATION & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, TEACHING
AND LEARNING PROFESSIONALISM, REPORT OF THE PROFESSIONALISM

COMMITTEE (1996) [hereinafter PROFESSIONALISM COMMITTEE REPORT]. The
argument will, of course, draw on other sources as well.
575. For the MacCrate Report's analysis of fundamental lawyering skills and
fundamental values of the profession, see MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 574,
at 135-221. Although clearly recognizing the importance of substantive
knowledge for lawyer competency, the MacCrate Report deliberately refrains
from addressing questions regarding the substantive knowledge that lawyers
should acquire in addition to these skills and values. Id. at 125.
576. The Committee identifies six prevalent themes articulated in the
relevant literature relating to this perceived decline in lawyer professionalism:
the loss of a sense of law practice as a "calling;" the loss of a sense of the
ultimate purpose of lawyers as related to serving the public good by mediating
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only appears to endorse the professional ideal of the lawyerstatesman (including Kronman's specific account of that ideal), 7'
but also includes among its specific recommendations aimed at
"provid[ing] concrete ways to inspire and enhance a greater sense
of professionalism in American lawyers" 78 a recommendation that
law schools "develop[ ...additional perspective courses and
seminars that focus on multiculturalism and diversity, the
internationalization and globalization of law and law practice,
jurisprudence [and] legal history. ...""' Second, in addition to
recognizing specifically the value for lawyers of a familiarity with
the cultural and transnational dimensions of law, the MacCrate
Report and the Professionalism Committee Report also apply, in
any event, generally and mutatis mutandis, within the everexpanding transnational context.
Third, although these two
reports are focused on the roles of lawyers as legal practitioners,
many of the points they make or that may be made in connection
with them (including the two preceding points) also apply
analogously to the performance by lawyers of their roles as
leaders.
My own concrete proposal for helping to "inspire and enhance
a greater sense of professionalism in American lawyers"' ° builds
upon the ABA Professionalism Committee's recommendation for

between conflicting interests in society; various negative consequences
resulting from the growing commercialization of law practice; perceived
excesses of the adversarial process, including loss of civility; an undermining
of the lawyer's independent role as counselor; and, concerns about lawyer
competency and lawyer ethics.

See PROFESSIONALISM COMMITTEE REPORT,

supra note 574, at 3-4.
577. See id. at 5-7 & n.21, 8-9, 31. For a discussion of the lawyer-statesman
ideal, see supra Part II.B.2. For Kronman's specific account of the lawyerstatesman ideal, see supra notes 294-343 and accompanying text.
Building upon Roscoe Pound's understanding of the essence of a
profession as "pursuing a learned art as a common calling in the spirit of
public service," the Committee defines a professional lawyer as "an expert in
law pursuing a learned art in service to clients and in the spirit of public
service; and engaging in these pursuits as part of a common calling to promote

justice and public good." Id. at 6. The Committee identifies six essential
characteristics of the professional lawyer and twelve supportive elements. See

id. at 6-7. The six essential characteristics are: "1. Learned Knowledge[;] 2.
Skill in applying the applicable law to the factual context[;] 3. Thoroughness of
preparation[;] 4. Practical and prudential wisdom[;] 5. Ethical conduct and
integrity[;] 6. Dedication to justice and the public good." Id. The Committee
explains that "professional lawyers practice professionalism," meaning that
"they embrace the characteristics or traits of the professional lawyer" as
defined by the Committee. Id. at 7.
578. Id. at 10. The Committee makes three sets of recommendations:
dealing with pre-law education, law school training, and the practice of law.
Id. For the detailed recommendations, see id. at 11-34.
579. Id. at 21.
580. See supra note 578 and accompanying text.
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law school training described above."' Specifically, I propose that,
with a view to ensuring the necessary minimum exposure to the
cultural and transnational dimensions of law in the most effective,
efficient, and realistic manner, law schools should include two
required general and integrative courses within the core
curriculum addressing the cultural and transnational dimensions
of law respectively. This approach can be complemented by an
appropriate exposure to these dimensions within other courses as
well. 2
It will be clear by now that although the present article is
designed to stand alone, it is also part of a larger project that
consists of a series of several articles intended to address my
central concerns about the law school curriculum and associated
professionalism issues in considerable depth. The purpose of this
larger project is to make the case for the "liberalization" of U.S.
legal education, although perhaps the term "reliberalization"
would be more accurate given the emphasis upon a broad
education for lawyers during the first phase in the history of U.S.
legal education.'
Indeed, the experience of U.S. legal education

581. See supra note 579 and accompanying text.
582. These general and integrative courses would integrate, within one
overarching conceptual framework, the general subject areas of legal history,
jurisprudence, and comparative law (in the general course on the cultural
dimensions of law) and the general subject areas of international
transnationa/global legal studies (in the general course on the transnational
dimensions of law).
One very recent encouraging development in this direction with respect
to the transnational dimensions of law is the bold and pioneering initiative
taken by the University of Michigan Law School in requiring all law students
(beginning with the class of 2004 entering law school in Fall 2001) to take the
new general course in Transnational Law, introducing them to the areas of
public international law and private international law (including European
Union law). For discussion of the reasons for the adoption of such a
requirement, as well as a description of Michigan's new Transnational Law
course, see Mathias Reimann, Taking Globalization Seriously: Michigan
Breaks New Ground by Requiring the Study of TransnationalLaw, 46 LAW
QUADRANGLE NOTES 54 (2003); Mathias Reimann, From the Law of Nations to
TransnationalLaw: Why We Need a New Basic Course for the International
Curriculum, 22 PENN ST. INT'L L. REV. 397 (2004). For a description of the
transnational dimensions of law, see supra note 449 and accompanying text.
583. The present article represents a change in my original plan for the
project, which was to publish a series of three articles, each being designed to
stand alone, while also relating to the other articles in the overall project.
Thus, within the framework of the overall project, the first article puts the
educational issues with which I am concerned into a broader theoretical
perspective, and lays the conceptual foundation for the remainder of the
project, by developing the fundamental dimensions taxonomic schema and the
additional theoretical framework for curricular evaluation and comparison
that are summarized in Part II.C.1 above. That article has already been
published. See Jones, supra note 436.
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during the first phase in its historical development is highly
instructive.5" It highlights the importance of a broad-based legal
education for lawyer professionalism, for the professionalism of
lawyers as practicing members of the profession and for the professionalism of lawyers as leaders, and it points the way toward
the completion of a process that surely has already begun - the
integration, or more accurately, the reintegration, of all six sets of
fundamental dimensions of law within the mainstream law school
curriculum. 8 ' Perhaps, then, we are witnessing the emergence of

Building on the conceptual foundation laid in the first article, the
second article was to put the educational issues with which I am concerned
into a broader historical perspective, and to lay an historical foundation for
the remainder of the project, by tracing the historical development of U.S.
legal education since the founding of the Republic until the present day, and
by considering how the six sets of fundamental dimensions of law have in fact
been treated within U.S. legal education during the several different phases in
this historical development. The second article was also to examine the
current treatment of the fundamental dimensions of law within the
contemporary mainstream law school curriculum that has resulted from this
historical development. For various reasons, however, it makes sense to
publish this historical aspect of the project as more than one article, and the
present article is the first result of that decision. The descriptive claims made
above, supra notes 566-72 and accompanying text, will be elaborated in the
later article(s) dealing with this historical aspect of the project.
Building on the conceptual and historical foundations laid in the first
and second articles, the third article in the series was to develop the
normative argument outlined above, supra notes 573-81 and accompanying
text. The third article was also to describe the nature and content of the two
proposed courses discussed supra note 582 and accompanying text. Once
again, as in the case of the originally planned second article, it may make
sense to publish this originally planned third article, on the normative aspect
of the project, as more than one article.
584. For another, recent work that finds this first phase in the history of
U.S. legal education descriptively and normatively illuminating for both
professionalism and curricular concerns, and one that partly inspired the
decision to publish the present article as a separate article, see Douglas, supra
note 59.
585. Ensuring an appropriate degree of exposure to the substantive and
structural dimensions of law so as to achieve their proper integration within
the mainstream law school curriculum does not generally seem to be a
significant issue. Instead, the more significant issues concern how to ensure
an appropriate exposure to the practical, social, cultural, and transnational
dimensions of law so as to achieve a proper (re)integration of these
fundamental dimensions within the mainstream law school curriculum.
Although the exponential development of the elective curriculum, and the
recent efforts to incorporate relevant exposure to various dimensions into
courses with a primary emphasis upon other dimensions of law, are central
mechanisms in this process, these mechanisms are subject to certain inherent
limitations. See supra notes 570-71 and accompanying text. Ensuring an
appropriate exposure to the practical, social, cultural, and transnational
dimensions of law so as to achieve their proper (re)integration within the
mainstream law school curriculum, therefore, can probably only be fully
achieved by requiring students to take courses with a primary emphasis on
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a fifth phase - the (re)integrative phase - in the history of U.S.
legal education, 86 and it is when this phase fully arrives that U.S.
legal education will have become appropriately reliberalized.

each of these sets of fundamental dimensions as part of their basic legal
education.
Receiving additional impetus from the MacCrateReport, see supra note
574, and the subsequent adoption of more demanding ABA Accreditation
Standards in this respect, there has been a trend in recent years towards
increasing such curricular requirements with respect to the practical
dimensions of law. See Jones, supra note 436, at 552-57; ABA SURVEY, 19922002, supra note 458, at 15-16, 19-21, 25-29, 43-45. What is needed now is to
adopt a similar, but appropriately tailored, approach with respect to the social,
cultural, and transnational dimensions of law. In this regard, some law
schools now require students to take "Perspectives" courses. See ABA SURVEY,
1992-2002, supra note 458, at 17, 44. However, in general, requiring students
to take one or two courses from a block of "Perspectives" courses is almost
tantamount, if not tantamount, to treating any one particular course within
such a required block as a "mere elective" without any particular fundamental
value and importance. For further discussion, see Jones, supra note 436, at
621 n.105; supra note 453 (final paragraph). Regarding the meaning of the
term "mere elective," see supra note 453. My own preferred approach with
respect to the cultural and transnational dimensions of law has already been
stated above. See supra note 582 and accompanying text. I consider that a
similar approach may be appropriate with respect to the social dimensions of
law as well.
586. Another dimension of integration, which is related to this dimension of
curricular (re)integration, concerns the integration, within a broader paradigm
of jurisprudential pluralism, of a number of different jurisprudential
paradigms resulting from the jurisprudential developments occurring during
the various phases in the historical development of U.S. legal education, see
supra note 1 and accompanying text, and focusing on "the good of the legal
order.., and the polity it serves," see GLENDON, supra note 197, at 181,
around which different groups cohere and all of which compete for attention
and sometimes conflict. See Jones, supra note 436, at 613 n.96 (discussing the
concept of a jurisprudential "paradigm"); see also id. at 579 n.43, 583 n.48, 586
n.54, 601-08 (discussing various jurisprudential categories and movements).
Such jurisprudential pluralism, it might be added, potentially facilitates and
enriches the process of practical reasoning in the law. See, e.g., LINDA H.
EDWARDS, LEGAL WRITING AND ANALYSIS 225-41 (2003).

